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Contemporary Social Movements Sessions

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Introduction

As with many academic conference sections, I found the 2006 North Central Sociological Association (NCSA) papers for my “Contemporary Social Movement” sessions fascinating. They were creative, innovative, and diverse in subject. I thought they began pushing social movement theory and research in interesting directions. After organizing the papers together into three separate presentation sessions, I realized that very few people would be able to hear or appreciate these worthwhile research projects. Thus, I decided to compile them into the proceedings you know have in your hand (or on your computer screen).

Even though these are the papers as submitted by the authors, the papers do not constitute finished projects. Many authors plan on revising their work, improving it, expanding them, and maybe even collecting more data. Others plan on trying to publish them as articles in peer-reviewed academic journals or as book chapters. Thus, although six papers appear here, they are not to be considered finished “published” projects. They are not peer-reviewed and often present “preliminary” results and conclusions. Many authors consider their papers, thus, to be “works-in-progress”. I have made no attempt to correct mistakes or oversights—short of standardizing references. Nearly all tables and figures appear the authors original intended.

Please do share these proceedings or individual papers with a wide-audience, and feel free to contact authors with comments, reactions, or assistance. But, remember that the work remains the property of the authors and do not cite any of the papers without the permission of these authors, since some may go on to publish the work in more advanced, peer-reviewed formats. Beyond these cautions and limitations, I encourage everyone to read the work of these scholars—far too often projects and ideas get lost after sparsely-attended conference sessions, and I hope these papers can have longer lives and a greater influence.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge all the scholars who presented in these sessions, particularly those who bravely trusted my idea and immediately shared their full papers with me for this document (despite how long it took me to release them). Also thanks to the research session organizers of NCSA, Jay Weinstein and Rebecca Bordt. Thank you.

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Introduction

**Contemporary Social Movements I: Theoretical Questions**

   *Sibel Karakokcek Cekic*

   Text Sequence and the Prioritization of Information: A Method to Identify Movement Outcomes through Protest Event Frame Analysis  
   *Jared Olesen*

   Not included in proceedings

2. Who Helps Me Fight the Power and Determine the Outcome? Examining Different Expectations among Protestors and the Influence of Social Networks  
   *Michael F. Thompson*

   Contemporary Social Movements II: Pushing the Boundaries of Human Rights

3. Black Churches’ Effects on Rioting in the 1960s  
   *Elizabeth Bullock*

   Girls Rights  
   *hara bastas*

   Social Movements in the Periphery: Women Confronting Economic Globalization  
   *Suzanne Slusser*

   Not included in proceedings

   Contemporary Social Movements III: Anarchism, Power, and Self-Organization

4. Goffman, Foucault, & Chaos Theory: A Power-System Integration  
   *David Piacenti*

5. The New Impatience: The Anarchist Spirit and the Movement for Global Justice  
   *Jamie McCallum and Antonia Levy*

6. An Anarchist CNN: The Organizational Sociology of the Global Independent Media Center Network  
   *Dana Williams*
Introduction

The actors of the great upsurge of collective change efforts in the late 1960s and the 1970s stimulated not only important changes in the socio-political and cultural context of the US and Western Europe but also new ways of thinking and theorizing on collective action. Analyses of these movements led to emergence of resource mobilization theory (RMT) in the US and new social movement theory (NSMT) in the Western Europe. RMT criticized heavily the dominant mode of theorizing, collective behavior paradigm, that reduced the social movements to a mere psychological phenomenon and conceived them as “emotional-expressive outbursts” (Cohen, 1985: 688) by “irrational individuals propelled into movements by crowd contagion or system constrain” (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 283; Eder 1985). Emphasizing their political character, RMT saw social movements as the outcome of a calculation of gains and losses by strategically/rationally oriented and formally organized actors.

Although RMT provided a “sorely needed corrective to the ideological biases” (Cohen 1985: 673) of the collective behavior paradigm, it, nevertheless, overlooked, due to its design, the importance of subjectivity and culture in social movements and, thus, excluded from the scope of analysis those movements where these dimensions seem to be crucial. What have been ignored in the study of social movements by RMT became the central foci of NSMT. New social movement theory saw contemporary social movements as a product of the postindustrial order and purported them to be radically different from the social movements of the industrial era.

There is no doubt that both RMT and NSMT in their own ways contributed greatly to our understanding on social movements. However, as insightful as they might be, they are not immune to their own weaknesses. Thus, the aim of this paper is to examine the main debates of these two diametrically opposed paradigms of social movements and to identify their major shortcomings. To that end, the paper is divided in three parts. In the first part, I will examine both RMT and classical model in an interactive manner and reflect on their problematic aspects. The object of the second part is NSM theory and the criticisms it has been subject to. The third part engages in the literature produced by gender scholars of social movements which problematizes both RMT and NSMT and offers rich insights.

Part I. Classical Model versus Resource Mobilization Theory

In the 1960s, the study of the social movements was dominated by the classical model. In the following decade, Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) emerged as an alternative to classical model and heavily criticized its central tenants. Throughout 1970s and 1980s RMT became the dominant paradigm of the field (Useem 1998; Buechler and Cylke 1997). RMT utilized political sociological and economic theories in explaining collective behavior rather than grounding its analysis in social psychology of collective behavior. The dynamics and tactics of social movements, their growth, decline, and change became the major concerns of RMT (McCarty and Zald 1977: 1213).

While classical model defined social movements as “spontaneous, unorganized and unstructured” (Morris, 2000) forms of social action taking place outside of the realm of institutionalized politics, RM theory saw them as “extensions of institutionalized actions” (Jenkins, 1983: 529) and described them as “structured, patterned, and institutionally organized” collective change efforts (Buechler & Cylke, 1997). Social movements were treated by the former model as a subcategory of collective behavior, a category that included crowds, sects, panics, crazes, gatherings, riots, and mass movements, whereas the latter took them as an analytical category on their own rights (McAdam 1997; Edelman 2001).

Classical model followed a linear causal model and argued that social strains, inevitable results of significant social changes, lead to sudden increases in individual discontents, and, they, in turn, when severe enough or prevalent, give way to emergence of social movements. This model saw society in equilibrium and social changes as disruptive of “the normative order to which people are accustomed to” (McAdam, 1997: 138, Jenkins 1983; Edelman 2001). As a result of this functionalist overtone, the classical model saw system strains as anomalous conditions, discontents as temporary, and, therefore, social movements as rare phenomenon (Jenkins 1993; McAdam 1997).

In this model, participants are conceived to be substantially different than the average person due to their allegedly abnormal psychological profiles (McAdam 1997). For instance, mass society theory argued that when the mediating groups performing the crucial task of integrating individuals into the society deteriorate or cease to function, individuals turn into social isolates and consequently start to develop strong feelings of anxiety and alienation (Kornhauser 1959; McAdam 1997). Likewise, status inconsistency theory stated that individuals become cognitively dissonant as a result of severe and widespread...
status inconsistency. Thus, the classical model contended that individuals with such psychological disturbances involve in collective action and that participation functions as some sort of psychological therapy effective in terms of tension and conflict management (McAdam 1997). In the last analysis, social movements within this model appear to be a function of grievances, and thus, a psychological phenomenon since this model highlights psychological manifestations of system strains as the immediate cause of social movements.

The tendency to see social movements as non-political phenomena might have to do with classical theorists’ adherence to conventionally held definition of politics of their time, which was construed as “a ration group-action in pursuit of substantive political goals” (McAdam 1997: 144) and consequently was limited to such formal activities “as registering to vote, voting, running for office and being involved in the mainstream electoral process” (West and Blumberg, 1990:5).

From a starkly different point of view, RMT emphasized the political character of social movements and saw them as agencies of social change attempting to alter some “elements of social structure and/or the reward distribution of society” (McCarty and Zald 1977:1218). RMT dismissed the classical model’s view of movement participants or its “imagery of emotional crowd” (Morris, 2000: 445; McDonald 2002) and argued that “no matter where we look, we should rarely find uprooted, marginal, disorganized people heavily involved in collective action” (1975: 290). McAdam (1997: 144), one of the proponents of the later version of RMT, states that isolated individuals “do not emerge, band together, and form movement groups” no matter how discontented they are, because social movements depend on a great deal of communication and organizing.

RMT used Olson’s rational-actor model to draw a new profile for movement participants: purposive rational actors pursuing political goals, calculating the costs and benefits of following certain lines of action and then choosing the one with maximum benefit (Oberschall 1978). However, Olson’s rational-actor was at the same time one of RMT’s underlying problems (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1216) because rational actor entails the problem of “free riding”, Olson (1965) argued:

True rational actors will not join a group to pursue common ends when, without participating, they can reap the benefits of other people’s activity in obtaining them. If every member of a relevant group can share in the benefits...then the rational thing is to free ride...rather than to help attain the corporate interests. (quoted in Lofland 1996: 224).

To solve this free-rider problem which renders movement participation as irrational and to maintain the thesis of rational movement participant RMT involved in the analysis of resources. RMT argued that resources are crucial to social movements since they are necessary to involve in the social conflict, maintain the struggles, and to “gain a stake in the political system” as well as to reward the participants (Edelman, 2001: 289; Jenkins, 1993: 528; Tilly 1978; Oberschall 1978; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Zald 1992). RMT maintained that aggregation of resources requires the existence of organized groups. The notions of resources and organizations are the catchwords of RM theory.

RMT saw “conflicts of interest built into institutionalized power relations” (Jenkins, 1983: 528) rather than grievances as the main factor defining the fundamental goals of social movements. This “strategy oriented paradigm” (Cohen 1985) emphasized the idea that “there is always enough discontent in any society to supply grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established group” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1215). RMT’s emphasis on the centrality of resources and organizations was, thus, a critique of and response to collective behavior paradigm’s emphasis on the central role of grievances in social movement formation.

RMT developed into two versions. The first is the entrepreneurial model and the second one is the political process model, for both of which resources and organizations are central. The entrepreneurial version of RMT emphasized the importance of “the interaction between resource availability, the preexisting organization of preference structures, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demands” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1236). This earlier version of RMT saw social movements “as nothing more than preference structures directed toward social change” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218) and analytically distinguished three components of social movements. A social movement organization (SMO) “identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement these goals”. A social movement industry (SMI) consists of all SMOs that aim to realize the broadest preferences of a social movement. And finally, a social movement sector (SMS) includes all SMIs in a society regardless of what specific social movement they are attached to (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218-1220).

The entrepreneurial model attributed the great upsurge of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s to the proliferation of professional social movement organizations and the increase in the availability of resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1978). Briefly, professional SMOs, in contrast with classical SMOS whose resources came from the aggrieved population (McCarthy and Zald 1977), “had outside leaders, full-time paid staff, non-existent or “paper” membership, mobilized their resources form external or “conscience” constituencies, and attempted to “speak for” rather than mobilize direct beneficiaries” (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986: 812). Seeing movement entrepreneurs as a major influence, this model argued that “grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1215). It also contended that even though PSMO is a new phenomenon, it is “the common form of recent social movements” (McCarthy and Zald, 1973: 20) and more effective in garnering resources, “channeling discontent into organizational form” (Edelman, 2001:289) and “mounting sustained challenges” (Jenkins, 1983: 528) than classical SMOS. This contention is made at the expense of ignoring the fact that most of the movements of the mentioned era “were not professional SMOS and did not rely on external resources for their crucial victories” (Jenkins, 1983: 535).

The findings of many studies were in favor of this contention. According to Jenkins (1983: 530-531),

The strongest support... has come from studies of the “public interest” movement that came to prominence in the 1970s. Berry’s (1977: 17-27) survey of public interest organizations found that the majority were formed by energetic entrepreneurs

2
acting without significant increases in grievances. Likewise, Schoefield, Meier & Griffin (1979), and Wood (1982) have traced the emergence of the environmental movement to a handful of natural scientist and policy researchers who redefined traditional conservationist concerns in ecological terms and mobilized institutional resources. These movements pursued goals linked to the interest of broad, diffuse, disorganized collectivities such as the general public or middle-class consumers who were unlikely to mobilize without the initiative of entrepreneurs.

RMT did indeed provide new insights to the field of study and found significant support for its claims. Nonetheless, what seems to be a strength of RM theorizing on some grounds turns out to be problematic on other grounds. RMT’s tendency to explain collective action with strategic-instrumental rationality and interaction is one of them. This view derived from an economic analysis of the issue of support for and involvement in social movements creates “a false dichotomy between reason and emotion” (Hercus 1999: 34), on the one hand, and leaves one with the impression that material self-interests are the main driving force of human conduct. Under such an impression, Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn (2002: 11) argue that RMT imagined people as if they were “nothing more than … unemotional puppets of their material conditions”. To be sure, strategic-instrumental rationality does guide human conduct to a certain extent, and social movements involve strategic interaction. But we can still inquire whether or not it “is the most salient or important feature of collective action at all times” (Cohen, 1985: 688).

If we apply RMT’s this view to the civil rights movements, then we would have time explaining why many activists engaged in high risk activism which resulted in facing police brutality, arrests, ruined careers and sometimes loss of life (Edelman 2001; McAdam 1992 & 1989; Barnett 1993; Robnett 1996; Payne 1990; Irons 1998). McAdam notes that within the first ten days of the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project “three [male] project members…were kidnapped and killed by a group of segregationists led by Mississippi law enforcement officers. That event set the tone for the summer as the remaining volunteers endured beatings, bombings, and arrests” (McAdam, 1992: 1214). “Moreover, most did so while sharing the grinding poverty and unrelieved tension that was the daily lot of the black families that housed them” (McAdam, 1989: 748).

RMT’s excessive focus on resources and on the strategies and actions of well-to-do PSMOs with “clearly defined, fixed goals” (Jenkins 1983: 529) is another major shortcoming of this mode of theorizing with at least four important implications for the field of study. Such a focus downplays the role of grievances in movement formation. Taylor and Whittier (1992) in their study on lesbian feminist mobilization argue that grievances and social psychological factors play a greater role in the creation of collective identity than RM approach is able to offer explanation for. Snow and his colleagues, highlighting the importance of symbolic framing processes in social movements, argue that “grievances or discontents are subject to different interpretation, and the fact that variations in their interpretation across individuals, social movement organizations, and time can affect whether and how they are acted upon”. However, they argue, neither the classical model which put “too much attention…on grievances per se and on their social psychological manifestations (e.g., relative deprivation, alienation)” nor the RMT which viewed grievances as givens was able to comprehend the socially constructed nature of grievances (Snow et al. 1986: 465). Contesting RMT, social constructionist scholars underline the importance of cultural factors defined as “mediating processes through which people attribute meaning to events and interpret situations” (Klandermans 1992: 77) and see social movement actors as subjectivities rooted in gender, class and collective identities (Calhoun 1994; Ferree 1992). In this line of inquiry, social construction of grievances is seen as a “critical step that allows members of socially dispersed groups to mobilize for action” (Buechler and Cylke 1993: 197).

Second, this top-down view of RMT (Buechler and Cylke 1997) does not pay enough attention to social movements of the economically unprivileged population emerged with very little resources and neglects grassroots type of organizing common to such movements as women’s movements (Barnett 1993; Edelman 2001; Robnett 1996; Noonan 1997; Stall & Stoecker 1998; Langman & Morris; White 1995). RMT also neglects the importance of informalism-based or reciprocal type of associations which constitute an essential mechanism in the survival strategies of disadvantaged people (White 1996). White argues that these associations are generally concerned with addressing to the problems pertaining to the living conditions in their communities, and their life span is limited by the problems to which they seek to find a solution. However, “they may form a basis for further, more formally organized, political action” and can mobilize the wider community in political directions (White 1996: 143-152).

Third, due to its emphasis on the movement entrepreneurs and formal movement structures, RMT downplays the role of an essential process called community organizing. Community organizing refers to the process of “building a mobilizable community”, which is often locality-based and includes often pre-political activities (Stall and Stoecker, 1998: 730). Stall and Stoecker (1998) suggest that social movements should be seen as a product of community building process and that viewing social movements as such “can stand social movement analysis on his head, showing how “leaders are often mobilized by the masses they will eventually come to lead” (Robnett 1996: 1664 cited in Stall & Stoecker 1998: 730).

Fourth, by limiting the field of study to institutional change movements with political goals and ends, RMT could not avoid the temptation of treating movement outcomes with a simple dichotomy of success and failure. Success refers to achievement of policy goals specified by movements. Bringing about changes in the political level is not the primary concern in the agenda of some movements such as new social movements. As argued by many, cultural realm is both a site and a target for the struggles of new social movements. Inevitably, the notions of success and failure have very limited utility in accounting for the outcomes of these movements. Social movements might produce policy-related outcomes but also bring about significant social, cultural, and institutional changes (Meyer and Whittier 1994; McAdam 1992 and 1997; Oliver, Cadena-Roa, Strawn 2002; Bernstein 2003). Because of the interaction between these realms, change in one realm or more can spark changes in other realms. Melucci, an advocate of NSMT, argues that RMT tends to “reduce every collective action to the political level”, and, by so doing, it “misses the cultural orientation of the emerging conflicts” (1985: 798).
Additionally, the impacts of social movements are not as direct and intentional as RM framework implies them to be. Movements have unintended and indirect consequences as well (Deng 1997; Giugni 1998; Arrighi 1986; Polletta and Jasper). It is by now almost the common knowledge in the field that social movements have been effective in terms of changing the opinions and values of public on matters that previously had gone unnoticed or given scant attention, by sensitizing people to their importance. We can unfold the theoretical contention about the unintended and indirect effects of social movements by using the resurgence of second wave feminist movement in the US as a tangible case. As already noted by many, marginal position of women and their experiences with sexism in the movements of New Left was one of the sparks that led to resurgence of second wave feminist movement in the U.S. (Meyer and Whittier 1994; McAdam 1992; Echols 1989). This movement, in turn, challenging fiercely and changing to some extent the larger socio-cultural-political arena had an indirect effect on the subsequent collective change efforts. For instance, due to the second wave feminist critiques of sexism it became more difficult for peace groups of 1980s “to continue the exclusion of women from leadership positions” (Meyer and Whittier 1989: 292). Arrighi (1986: 189) argues that earlier movements besides providing direct assistance can also provide “moral encouragement, example, lessons in political tactics” to the latter movements.

Confining itself to the analysis of macro-level political changes movements bring about, RMT overlooked the impacts of movements reflected in the individual level. Numerous studies have shown that social movement participation has profound and enduring impacts on the lives of activist in both political and nonpolitical terms (Stall and Stoecker 1998; McAdam 1992 & 1989; Meyer and Whittier 1994). Speaking from a theoretical point of view, Stall and Stoecker (1998: 739) argue that social movement communities are where participants “attempt to create on a small scale the type of world they are struggling for”. And McAdam (1989: 758), providing empirical evidence, argues that the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer project left activists “attitudinally more disposed and structurally more available for” successive political activism. He also maintains that the long-term effects that the project had on participants was that many activists attuned their lives in accordance with New Left politics that simultaneously emphasized the political significance of personal lives and the importance of making “choices about work, family, and relationships” that reflect this idea (1989: 754). Taken together, it seems that social movements through altering the participants’ lives “affect longer term changes in the society” (Meyer and Whittier 1994: 281).

In sum, we can argue that RMT took a diametrically opposed position to collective behavior paradigm by emphasizing the rational character of social movement actors and the importance of resources and organizations in collective action.

RMT’s focus on “how of mobilization” (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 283) was helpful “understanding how different elements converge in activating specific forms of collective action” (Melucci 1985: 797). However, RMT was not able to explain those movements that organize around a collective identity and that challenge the dominant meaning systems for autonomy and recognition of their identity, the new social movements (Cohen 1985; Melucci 1985; Touraine 1985). The scholars of this phenomena argued that RMT eliminated inquiries about the meaning of collective action (Touraine 1985: 769) and failed to explain “why action arises and where it is going” (Melucci 1985: 797). New social movement scholars contended that making sense of social movements requires taking into account the values, norms, ideologies, moral principles, emotions, projects, culture, and identity as these dimensions guide action and shape the very interpretation of “interests, individual and collective, and affect the very capacity of actors to form groups and mobilize” (Cohen 1985: 688; Melucci 1995; Touraine 1985; Pichardo 1997). According to Cohen we cannot “simply add a consideration of solidarity, collective identity, consciousness, or ideology to the resource mobilization perspective without bursting its framework” (Cohen 1985: 687). Given this, in the next part I will examine the insights NSMT provides and point out its major shortcomings.

Part II. The New Social Movement Theory

New social movement theory is not a unified body of thought. Despite of the divergences, NSM scholars converge on the idea that contemporary social movements are a response to and a product of the crises and contradictions of a new societal type, variously dubbed as postindustrial”, “programmed” (Touraine 1985), “information” (Melucci 1985), or “network” (Castells 2000) society. It is argued that this new social formation began to take shape in the post-World War II decades during which Western capitalist countries reached a certain level of affluence capable of fulfilling basic human needs owing to the swift economic growth and the redistributive policies of the welfare state (D’Anieri, Ernst, Kier 1990: 446). However, the delivery of this economic security brought with itself its own set of problems: the capabilities of “societal actors to organize their own spheres of social production autonomously “(Kitschelt as cited in D’Anieri et al. 1990: 446) began to be appropriated in an increasing fashion by the very same protagonists of this development.

It is argued, the salient features of postindustrial society are that exercise of power is fragmented and that system domination has come to operate more on cultural grounds than industrial/economic realm (Taylor and Whittier 1995; Touraine 1985; Melucci 1985). Put it slightly different, in postindustrial society “life world”, “the setting of a way of life, forms of behavior, and needs” become the new sites of domination (Habermas; Touraine 1988 quoted in Edelman 2001: 288). According to Touraine, postindustrial society must be defined in terms of the technological production of symbolic goods “which shape or transform our representation of human nature and of the external life” (1985: 781). Thus, Touraine argues that the social movements of this new social formation are defined by the “conflicts around the social control of the main cultural patterns” (1985: 760).

To describe the undue interference of the state and the market, Habermas coins the term “colonization of life world”. Habermas sees “life world” as being dependent upon the symbolic process of communication and involving “culturally ingrained background knowledge, social institutions around culture, socialization (personality), and social integration” (quoted in Cohen, 1985: 710). With the notion “colonization”, he refers to the process of monetarization and bureaucratization of life-world (Buechler 1995) or to the deployment of logic of strategic-instrumental action by the state and market as a proxy for the symbolic process of communication (Pichardo 1988: 420). Habermas argues that “colonization of life world” results in a generalized legitimation crisis and this, in turn, generates new...
forms of struggles. These struggles are directed towards “dominant rationalities” as well as “institutional control” (Swain, 7).

According to Melucci, information society, as the term itself suggests, depends on information, and the capacity of this society in terms of gathering, “processing, transferring information” has reached at a level which we cannot even compare to “that of the whole history of mankind”. In this society access to knowledge becomes “a field of a new kind of power and conflicts” and “the deepest bases of human behavior become a field of exploration and intervention” (1985: 804, 805). Exercise of strong pressures over individuals to confirm to normative order is a feature of this new societal type. The conflicts of information society, Melucci argues, affect “personal identity, the time and the space in everyday life, the motivation and the cultural patterns of individual action”. Thus, social movements emerge in those segments of the system which are “connected to the most intensive informational and symbolic investments and exposed to the greatest pressures for conformity” (1985: 796).

What follows the idea that contemporary social movements are the product of and responses to postindustrial society is the claim that they represent a new phenomenon radically different from the movements of the industrial era. These differences are said to appear in the actors, goals/values, and forms of contemporary collective action (Pichardo 1997; Edelman 2001; Polletta and Jasper 2001; D’Anieri et al. 1990). New social movements are said to be distinct in the sense that they are against the domination by the state and the market but their aim is not to seize the state or insert themselves into institutionalized political processes, and also they are neither after a radical alteration of the means/mode of production nor do they strive for maximization of economic gains (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Pichardo 1997; Cohen 1985; Touraine 1985; Melucci 1985; Edelman 2001; Wilson 1995; Offe 1985). Thus, it is neither the state nor the market that NSMs struggle over and for. It is civil society. According to NSM scholars, conflicts take place between the social, “civil actors” (Touraine 1985) within and over the structures of civil society in which culture resides (Pichardo 1997) and norms and identities are created, and that, defined in “action terms”, is a new site of domination and resistance, “public spaces, and political processes” (Cohen 1985: 700).

NSM theory argues that the political and economic cleavages were central to old movements and that the participation in “old” social movements was by a class, generally the working class, and on behalf of that class, and, thus, was reflecting the values, interests, and demands of that class, which happen to be instrumentally oriented (D’Anieri et al. 1990; Offe 1985; Edelman 2001). According to NSM theory, the actors of NSMs are defined neither by a common structural location nor political cleavages but rather marked by common concerns over social problems and by common values (Pichardo 1997; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Melucci 1985; D’Anieri et al. 1990). Although NSM theory acknowledges the “new middle class” base of NSMs, nevertheless, it maintains that the participation in NSMs is by a class but not on behalf of a class (D’Anieri et al. 1990; Offe 1985). According to Offe, it is not only the new middle class that is drawn into activism in NSMs but also the elements of old middle class (such as farmers, shop owners, and artisan-producers), and de commodified or peripheral groups outside the labor market (such as students, middle class housewives, the unemployed, retired people) (1985: 831-834).

NSM scholars present NSMs as the move from materialistic to postmaterialistic values (Pichardo 1997: 414; Polletta and Jasper 2001). The values/demands of NSMs stress the issues of identity, life-style, quality of life, the protection of and expansion of spaces for social autonomy and for construction of new identities and solidarities, democratic participation, plurality, rights for specificity and difference, and emphasize opposition to cultural manipulation, control, bureaucratization, and commodification (Pichardo 1997; Moghadam 2000; Edelman 2001; Cohen 1985; Offe 1985; Polletta and Jasper 2001). Touraine states that the actors of new social movements struggle for “historicity” –“the set of cultural, cognitive, economic, and ethical models through which social practices are constituted” (quoted in Edelman 2001: 288). Eder (1985: 888) sees NSMs as “symbolic crusades” struggling in the name of recognition for their culture and thus challenging the dominant normative system and the way this system defines them. For the new actors control over their lives and culture is more important than appropriating the control over the means of production (Wilson 1995). According to Cohen (1985: 694), the most striking aspect of NSMs is that they involve actors who are conscious about their capability to construct new identities and “power relations involved in their construction”.

Among all the aims/values of NSMs “to define, celebrate, enact, and deconstruct identity” appear to be the most central one (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 287; Oliver, Cadena-Roa and Strawn; Melucci 1985; Langman and Morris; Wilson 1995). NSM theory argues that NSMs organize around a collective identity (Meyer and Whittier 1994) which is seen by Melucci (1985) a prerequisite of mobilization rather than its outcome. Melucci defines collective identity as an “interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constrains in which the action takes place” (1995: 44).

Similarly, Taylor and Whittier point out that such factors as “political opportunity structures, the availability of resources and power” play a decisive role in shaping collective identity, and that collective identity is created, set in motion, and maintained “only through interaction in social movement communities” (1995: 172). According to Taylor and Whittier (1992), collective identity formation consists of three interconnected processes. The first is the boundary drawing process through which differences are established between a challenging group and its counterparts. The second process involves creation of interpretive frameworks which comes out as a result of challenging group’s endeavor to identify and comprehend its interests. And the last one involves politicization of everyday life in both symbolic and action terms to resist as well as to restructure current system of domination.

The organizational forms are said to represent another unique feature of NSMs. It is argued that, in contrast to old movements, the actions of NSMs are expressive rather than strategic (Melucci 1985), and that their organizations are nonhierarchical, highly decentralized, and depend on exercise of participatory democracy (D’Anieri et al. 1990; Offe 1985; Langman and Morris 2002). The organizational form of the NSMs is a goal in itself rather than being merely an instrument for actualization of their goals (Melucci 1985). The structure of the movement represents both the rejection of interventionist character of postindustrial institutions and the changes they seek for: creating a space within which personal autonomy and de-
development as well as solidarity can be realized (D’Anieri et al. 1990; Edelman 2001; Melucci 1985). According to Melucci, the organizational form of the movement “is a message, a symbolic challenge to the dominant patterns… As prophets without enchantment, contemporary movements practice in the present the change they are struggling for: they redefine the meaning of social action for the whole society” (Melucci 1985: 801).

NSM paradigm provided important insights on the dimensions of collective action that have been largely ignored by the earlier traditions: the role of civil society, identity, and culture (Pichardo 1987). “Despite their sympathy with those dimensions of neo-Marxism” that highlights the significance of “consciousness, ideology, social struggle, and solidarity to collective action” (Cohen 1985: 691), NSM theorists developed a substantial critique of orthodox Marxism. These post-Marxist scholars argued that Marxism failed to recognize the profound changes in the nature of Western capitalism after the World War two periods (Swain) and that Marxist theory is inadequate due to its tendency to see collective identity as being determined by “structural contradictions, economic classes and crisis” (Cohen 1985: 691). Inexorably, they found Marxist view of civil society problematic.

In the contemporary civil society literature, it is argued that the notion of civil society virtually disappeared from the intellectual and political discourse for more than a century and then became the subject of an unprecedented upsurge of interest in the late 1980s. Some argue that the decline of civil society as a central subject matter can be connected to a great extent to classic Marxism’s derogatory critiques of civil society (Madison 1998; Baker 2002). Civil society in classic Marxism is thought to evolve out of commerce and production and include the entire material interactions between the individuals. Civil society as such was seen as having a decisive influence on the configuration of the state and the rest of the superstructure (Femia 2001; Kumar 1993a; Ehrenberg 1999; Colas 2002).

Like Marxist scholars, NSM scholars recognize the exploitative nature of capitalism. However they argue against the Marxist tendency that sees oppression only in economic terms, social struggles as class based, transformation of the mode of production as the radical change, and finally civil society being determined by the economic realm (Eschle 2001: 64). Inexorably contradicting to Marxist theory, NSM theory sees civil society as the new locus of social conflict (Pichardo 1997) and assumes, of course, that “the whole of civil society is not “mobilized” or repressed by an absolute state” (Touraine 1985: 776; Pichardo 1997). It can be argued that to some extent NSM theorists resonate Gramsci’s ideas on civil society, who saw it as a domain constituted by practices and institutions not directly relating the system of production. However, radical divergences appear between Gramsci and NSM theorists in that the latter conceived civil society as an indispensable element of contemporary societies whereas the former saw it as a “temporary and historically disposable arrangement” (Keane 1998:16) that would wither away with a complete transition to socialism (Baker, 2002, Keane, 1998). Indeed, NSMT’s emphasis on the importance of civil society have been influential to a good extent on the contemporary tendency to see civil society as a must have in terms of creation and maintenance of a democratic socio-political order and in the ongoing struggles for the enhancement of a democratic space (Eschle 2001).

RMT’s tendency to see social movement participation as something instrumentally-based played a big role in downplaying the role of culture and identity in social movement research. As a response to this theoretical gap in the field of study, NSM scholars emphasized the importance of these neglected aspects and by doing so tried to shed light on how grievances or interests emerge rather than taking them as constant (Polletta and Jasper 2001). In NSM theory, collective identity appears to be an alternative to material incentives of RMT. It also explains better “the pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilize” (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 284) and provides important insights on how structural inequality gets transformed into subjectively experienced discontent (Taylor and Whittier 1995). As informative and insightful as NSM theory is, nevertheless, the central assumptions upon which NSM paradigm is built became the object of heated debates which are the subject of the next part.

Are “New Social Movements” Really New?

The scholars involved in the critique of NSM paradigm contend that the new versus old movement dichotomy established by NSM theory overlooks the fact that movements do not just emerge out of nowhere but rather they “grow from and give birth to” other movements (Meyer and Whittier 1994: 277; Taylor 1989; Tarrow 1988; Scott 1990). Tarrow argues that NSMs are “the latest manifestation of a cyclical pattern that has been evident for over a century” (Tarrow cited in Buechler 1995: 302). In fact, what was seen as “births” by the NSM scholars were “breakthroughs or turning points in movement mobilization” (Taylor 1989: 761). According to Taylor, like the other movements of the 1960s America, the women’s movement of this era can also be viewed as a “resurgent challenge” whose roots goes back to an earlier cycle of feminist collective action “presumably ended when suffrage was won” (1989: 761).

Embedded in the critique of radical break thesis is the idea that some features of NSMs considered to be new may not be new after all. According to Offe (1985: 829), the values of NSMs are not necessarily new in themselves but rather “are given a different emphasis and urgency” within NSMs. D’Anieri et al. (1990) note, the features (values, demands, actors, and organizational structures) used to established the novelty of NSMs were evident in the movements of the past operated in different geographical locations and time period. Similarly, Calhoun’s work reveals that “artisans and agricultural workers, white collar and service employees, and even small proprietors have joined the struggles” of the 19th and early 20th century working class movements. These movements, according to Calhoun, were definitely concerned with economic issues as the struggles over wages suggest but there were also struggles over “women and children working, community life, the status of immigrants, education, access to public services and so forth” (Calhoun 1994: 391).

Additionally, Pichardo (1997: 417-18) informs us that the discussion on the diverse social base of NSMs may not be tenable after all since it is the white middle class that often constitutes the social base of environmental movements whereas participation by minority communities is rare unless there is some locality based grievances. This observation, Pichardo maintains, holds true for most other NSMs. More to the point, Charles (2000) sees NSMs as the struggles by the middle class of the postindustrial order and argues that they represent a new politics of class rather than a new form of politics free from class interest.
Another line of critique relates to outcomes of NSMs and the paradoxical relationship between NSMs and politics. The idea that NSMs challenge the domination of the state but shun established channels of political action (D’Anieri et al. 1990) invites the question of how much and whether or not resisting identities and symbolic struggles pose a real and a sustained challenge to domination of the system (Pichardo 1997; Buechler 1995; Charles 2000). Swain (9) argues that if we think of social movements as “some form of struggle for political or social change, then we just cannot ignore the questions of success or failure”. As already touched on in the previous, RMT style interpretation of movement outcomes is problematic especially when the movements observed deviate from the RMT’s description of social movements. NSM theorists raise the theme that symbolic challenges cannot be measured by notions of success and failure (Melucci 1995: 813) because this couplet fails to capture the fact that creation of a community and construction of an ongoing collective identity is an achievement on its own right (Swain, Cohen 1985; Melucci 1985). Evers (1985: 49) argues that “transformatory potential within new social movements is not political, but socio-cultural”.

In NSM theory, identity is perceived to be not only the object of struggles but also the means of struggle. Cohen (1985: 694) argues that construction of collective identity presents challenges to dominant cultural codes, involves the creation of new meanings to action and a challenge “to the social construction of the very boundaries between public, private, and political domains of action”. Similarly, Taylor and Whittier (1995) say that the notion of collective identity highlights the importance of cultural practices that present a simultaneous challenge to structures of domination and everyday interactions that sustain inequality. According to some, to think of the struggles of NSMs as identity-based and thus void of political dimensions can be misleading because identity politics is in fact is a basic focus of political work in these movements (Edelman 2001; Calhoun 1994). According to Scott (1990: 23), many demands of NSMs, even for personal autonomy, are also political demands...Free abortion on demand, for example, may be couched in the language of autonomy or choice, but it is still a demand on resources, and thus on the state”.

What is also problematic with NSM theory is that it, on the one hand, by seeing the contemporary social movements as the outcome of Western white middle class concerns, marginalizes the class-based struggles and, on the other hand, by limiting the phenomenon to Western world, fails to account for the contemporary social movements in non-Western context. A shift from industrial to postindustrial economy and the rise of postmaterialist consciousness stemming from the satisfaction of basic economic/physical security needs of the population are not taking place in most part of the world. However, in the non-Western context, too, identity-based movements have been flourishing, and the struggles over economic rights are a key feature of these efforts (Pichardo 1997; Basu 2000; Edelman 2001). Given this, the connection assumed by NSM theorists between postindustrial condition and rise of NSMS seems to be untenable (Pichardo 1987; Scott 1990). Following this line of critique, Scott (1990: 9-10) perceives NSMS as political phenomena and argues that these movements emerge in order to express “concerns and issues that are excluded from mainstream political intermediation and interest negotiation”. He goes on to argue that NSMS are rather “manifestations of ‘dysfunctions’ in political decision-making processes”.

Just like classic Marxism eliminated inquiries about movements which did not derive from the working class (Pichardo 1997; Scott 1990), and RMT did not pay attention to movements of underprivileged emerged with few resources and/or based on informal structures, so too NSMT excluded the forms of collective action directed its energies at the state and/or economy (Edelman 2001; Pichardo 1997). Additionally, both RMT and NSMT can only claim to explain contemporary left-wing social movements as these movements were the object of their research (Edelman 2001; Polletta and Jasper; Pichardo 1997; Calhoun 1994; Giugni 1998). Edelman (2001: 301) argues that although “identity-based movements sometimes walk a fine line between celebrating particularities and promoting exclusivity or intolerance, the former dimension has received vastly more attention than the latter” in NSM. Thus, RMT and NSMT have largely ignored the issue of right-wing social movements as they choose overwhelmingly to study left-wing movements with which they sympathize (Edelman 2001; Calhoun 1994; Pichardo 1997).

Before moving on the next section which deals with more identifying blind spots shared by RMT and NSMT, a final remark is in order which sums up the discussion of the previous two parts briefly. RMT and NSMT substantially transformed the study of social movements from a “marginalized and almost-dying sub-specialty of social psychology in the 1960s” (Oliver et al. 2002: 1) to an ever burgeoning specialty of the field of sociology in its own right. RMT provided an important corrective to the “political biases” (Cohen 1985) of the earlier social movement research tradition by emphasizing the political character of social movements and centrality of resources, organizations, and rationality of movement actors. However, RMT narrowed down the theoretical boundaries of field of study to include only institutional change movements with political goals and ends and ended up treating every social movement as if they were all primarily and merely concerned with policy changes. Due to its one-sided focus RMT left essential issues unexamined: social and norm oriented dimensions of social movements. In turn, NSMT emphasized the importance of those neglected dimensions of social movements – the role identity and culture– and, thus, provided a much necessary and needed corrective to RMT. However, by excluding from its scope of analysis what was being included in RMT, NSMT tended to describe movements as if they were not at all concerned with politics. Consequently, NSMT neglected the fact that both social movements and civil society involve strategic interaction (Cohen 1985: 705). Scott reminds us that contemporary social movements are “as expressly concerned with institutional politics and power as they are with collective identity and culture, that organization and resources are as critical as ideology and lifestyle” (in Steinberg 1992: 551). From the discussions carried out so far, we can reach two conclusions. First, neither RMT nor NSMT provides a complete picture of the contemporary social movements, which will be further discussed in the next part. And second, although it is plausible to argue that these approaches represent two theoretically irreconcilable standpoints, it is more plausible to see them as addressing different but equally important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon under consideration.

Part III: Further Problematizing RMT and NSMT from a Gender Perspective

As Oliver et al. (2002: 3) rightly argue, all theories, “no
matter how abstractly stated, are grounded in empirical cases”. The prevalent tendency in social movement research has been to take movements of the relatively stable democratic and advanced nation-states of Western world as an empirical base to formulate theories. For RMT the American social movements of the late 1960s and 1970s and for NSMT the Western European social movements in the 1970s and 1980s constituted the empirical base, which, in turn, brought the charge of ethnocentricism (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Edelman 2001; Pichardo 1997; Calhoun 1994; Giugni 1998; Oliver et al. 2002). Regimes differ significantly in terms of their “legitimacy, stability, readiness to repress, and responsiveness to popular mobilization as well as in their capacity to contain and channel intergroup conflicts within the nation state. These matter even in comparing European nations, but the range of variation is severely truncated when only the dominant industrial nations of US and Western Europe are considered” (Oliver et al. 2002: 3).

Although the social movement scholars were not unaware of this bias, the democratization wave of the 1990s played a big role in heightening their sensitivity about the form and role of social movements as well as their relationships to regimes in authoritarian and postauthoritarian societies (Oliver et al. 2002: 3).

Territorially bounded nature of RMT and NSMT left them vulnerable to another critique that both of these frameworks fall short of explaining the new actors of the global political arena, transnational social movements. Transnational social movements (TSMs) are said to be qualitatively different than the previous collective social change efforts in the sense that they transcend the boundaries of single states, have constituent groups from non-Western nations, and seek not only to influence national states but also subnational and transnational authorities. A growing number of scholars argue that as TSMs are a product of, a response to, and a criticism of globalization processes, a theoretical shift from statecentric approaches to another one which takes globalization as a frame of reference is not only desirable but at the same time necessary (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Smith 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald 2000; Moghadam 2001; Kriesberg 1997; McCarthy 1997).

Contemporary social movement theories came under the heavy and sustained critique of gender scholars of social movements especially since 1990s. Gender scholars of social movements have argued that what is perhaps the most serious, yet least acknowledged, weakness of existing paradigms of social movements is that they suffer dramatically from a lack of attention to gender as well as its intersections with the other axes of domination matrix. They observe that contemporary theories have been developed and applied with a supposition of gender-neutrality contradicting starkly to the fact that that gender is a constitutive element of all social relations and interactions, and penetrate every crevice and corner of economic, social, political, and cultural institutions and processes (West & Blumberg 1990; Ferree 1992; Ferree and Martin 1995; Ferree & Roth 1998; Taylor 1998, 2000; Taylor & Whittier 1998, 2000; Robnett 1996; Ferree & Merrill 2000; Moghadam 2001; Abdulhadi 1998; McAdam 1992; Kuumba 2001; Charles 2000).

Gender scholars of social movements suggest that social movements should be treated as gendered terrains and constructs rather than other way around as their work made amply evident that what is assumed to be gender-neutral, namely, the state, discontents and claims, resources, opportunities and constrains, organizational structures, recruitment patterns, leadership patterns, strategies, tactics, collective action frames, ideologies, outcomes and so long, are indeed gendered (Barnett ; Robnett 1996; West and Blumberg 1990; McAdam 1992; Pope 1990; Lawson and Barton 1990; Stall and Stoecker 1998; Abdulhadi 1998; Payne 1990; Iron 1998; Maggard 1990; Ferree and Roth 1998; Taylor 1998; Hart 1996). The following few works exemplify what is gendered about social movements.

In his work on the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer project, McAdam looks at the influence of gender in shaping the experiences of young, white college students with mostly middle class background. He finds substantial differences between males and females with respect to recruitment to the project. Females were less likely to be accepted to the project and more likely not to show up in Mississippi even though they were more qualified than their male counterparts in terms of previous civil rights activism and organizational affiliations. McAdam calls for two factors to explain this quite paradoxical situation. First, he notes that the time period in which the civil rights movement emerged was one of the most conservative eras in the U.S. history. Omnipresence of traditional conception of men and women, rigid sexual double standards, and taboo concerning interracial contact were defining characteristics of the U.S. cultural context. Naturally, the cultural aura of the time inserted extra elements into the biographical constraints for females for sure. Second, he argues that these hegemonic cultural codes were reflected to some extent in the organizational practices of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the unit responsible for the organization of the project. The combined effect of these two factors was to turn the recruitment step into a big barrier to be overcome by the females. McAdam firmly puts that recruitment to the project was a highly gendered process and that females had to be overqualified to become a member of the project.

It is worth mentioning here that in theory such values as decentralized leadership, equality, and participatory democracy were purported to be essential elements of organizational philosophy of SNCC (McAdam 1992; Barnett 1993). Even though SNCC’s rhetoric was in favor of creating an ambiance that would encourage egalitarianism and females were indeed overqualified, gender influenced every aspect of the fabric of life within the project. The clash between the ideals and the lived experiences was virtually a constant feature of the project as the females “were subjected to considerable [sexual] harassment and a clear double standard regarding sexual behavior...A number of women were asked to leave the project” for violating “social and public etiquette”, while no evidence exist to suggest that “any male –white or black, staff or volunteer –being removed from any of the projects for sexual (or any other) reasons” (McAdam, 1992: 1225).

McAdam also finds a significant discrepancy between what female volunteers had preferred to do and what they ended up doing in the project: teaching and clerical work positions were dominated by females while voter registration and other political activities by males. McAdam argues that this was a clear reflection of “less political conception of women’s role on the project” (1992: 1226) and that the works performed by women were valued less. Furthermore, In the following two quotes from McAdam’s work, two female activists tells us that movement “housewifery” was part of what was expected from them.
“The men would leave every morning and go off to work while the women stayed around the (freedom) house and cared for the children (read, “students”). Then, “when they [the mostly male voter registration workers] came home you were to be out of the kitchen…they were tired and they had driven long distances and worked under greater pressure” (McAdam, 1992: 1226).

“There was very much a sense [that]… voter registration activity was where it was at...And since we had chosen teaching, we were sort of shoved to the side...You know here [were the]...guys running out...being macho men…you know, ‘We’re going to go out and get our heads busted and we’ll come back to here where you nurse us… and otherwise service us and send us back out again” (McAdam, 1992:1227-28).

In other two accounts on civil rights, Barnett (1993) and Robnett (1996) direct our attention to how gender as an exclusionary construct structured Black women’s leadership and participation. These scholars reveal that Black women who might have filled the formal leadership positions if criteria for leadership were to be what one can do rather than what your sex is were not entitled to such positions. They had to remain active in the grassroots level and work behind the scenes as “bridge leaders” (Robnett 1996) or “invisible leaders” (Barnett 1993) because of the exclusionary practices of male dominated black church and the gendered order external to the movement.

Bridge leadership was informal in nature, and it was the only position of leadership open to women. Bridge leaders most of whom were African-American women functioned as a connective tissue between the formal leaders and the masses or adherents of the movement (Barnett 1996: 1676-77, 2002). Robnett (1996: 1663) notes that experiences with racial oppression on a daily basis did not drive all African-Americans automatically to the movement. It was not the case that they all had prior knowledge about the movement and about their constitutional rights and that they were all enthusiastic about taking part in the movement as involvement meant risking a lot. They were needed to be enlightened and persuaded in order to be recruited to the movement. Bridge leaders played a paramount role in this process: establishing a sense of group identity, collective consciousness, and solidarity between rural and small town communities—where mobilization proved to be especially hard—and the movement. Barnett (1993: 169) reminds us:

“Had it not been for Septima Clark and her mastery at teaching illiterate adult Blacks how to read and write, the 1965 Voting Rights Act would have been meaningless because Southern states had successfully disenfranchised the majority of the Black population by establishing gerrymandered districts, the grandfather’s clause, all-white primaries, and high poll taxes and by requiring Blacks to pass literacy and citizenship tests before they were allowed to register to vote” (Barnett, 169).

Robnett’s work challenges the general proclivity in social movement research which dichotomizes movement participants as leaders and followers and views masses as being mobilized by formal leaders. She argues that bridge leaders who were the “recruitment and mobilizing force” in the civil rights movement not only bridged potential members and supporters to the movement but also mobilized the potential formal leaders (1996: 1688, 1678). Barnett provides a more complicated picture vis-à-vis McAdam and Robnett. She analyzes the leadership roles carried out by Black men and women in the civil right movement encompassing the time period of 1955 to 1968 and explores the way how race, class, and gender simultaneously affected the leadership experiences/opportunities of Southern Black women. Barnett (1993: 174) argues that

“Not only were Black women in the South constrained by their jobs as public school teachers, but they were constrained as well by their jobs as domestics in white and public buildings. The Southern Black male minister, perhaps the traditional counterpart to the Black female schoolteacher, generally did not have the same constraints on him. He was not as economically vulnerable as his female counterpart or a domestic worker... He generally had to answer only to his Black congregation, not to the white school superintendent or the white mistress or master of the house.

Despite of all the constraints they to face and the hardship they had to endure, Black women whom Barnett calls as invisible leaders, unsung heroes, performed important leadership roles indispensable to the maintenance of the movement such as “the initiation and organization of action, the formulation of tactics, and the provision of crucial resources (e.g., money, communication channels, personnel)” (Barnett 1993: 177).

In her relatively recent account, Iron (1998) emphasizes the diversity in women’s experience in the civil rights movement and the important role played by race in this diversity. Iron shows that both black and white women were mobilized into action through personal and religious networks although these took different forms. Black women’s participation was channeled by informal, grassroots networks whereas white women’s participation by larger, more institutionalized, and often national religious organizations (Iron, 1998: 705, 706). What drove Black women into the struggles in the first place was experiencing racism in a direct way and at a personal level as Black people and mothers while it was empathy for black people, shaped often by religious beliefs, in the case of white women. This explains, according to Iron (1998: 705), why black women were more stoutly attached to the movement and tended to involve in high risk activism and as activist mothering while white women developed a more indirect relationship to the movement and “involved at low-risk institutional levels or with organizational work that offered little threat to their social, political and economic security”.

The gendered nature of resources is yet another insight offered by Iron. Confirming the argument Payne made earlier, Iron (1998: 699) finds that “women brought different skills than men” to the civil rights movement many of which were obviously “rooted in the way in which these women operated in their families” (Payne 1990: 163) such as maternalism, nurturing, and domesticity. Iron (1998: 705), differing from Payne, argues that although the work by both black and white women in the civil rights movement can be categorized as “women’s work”, in the case of black women this work took a different
form that can be called as “activist mothering”. Taking an African American woman, Aurelia Young, as a case in point, she argues that Young expanded her “mothering” skills to the community struggling for civil rights and carried out responsibilities in reproducing the daily life of the movement. Young, like many other, opened her house to those students released from jail, channeled the goods donated by the community to students in jail, and also she “fed civil rights workers and attorneys in her home, although she worked as a music teacher,…her kitchen was known as one that never shut down” (1998: 699).

Maggard describes the struggles of women in the coal miners strike in Brookside, Kentucky, which began in the mid 1973 and lasted over a year. These women were in a position of almost entire dependence in the local economy and in their families and involved in the strike to support their male family members. These working class women faced with serious criticism especially from their husbands since participating in the strike meant running against the traditional values prescribing home as their proper place and men as the head of the household. It was not the case that a new division of labor came about with their involvement in the strike. To reduce the tensions and conflicts that involving in the strike brought with itself, they had to defend the traditional division of labor at home. They organized themselves in a way that would allow them simultaneously to perform the roles of a fulltime housewife and to attend the strike duties, which, of course, required enormous amount of time and energy (Maggard 1990: 89). Despite all of the odds, women achieved what men could not: switching the scabs and shutting down the mines (Maggard 1990: 88). Pointing out the gendered nature of tactics, Maggard (1990: 86) maintains that these women “used their gender as a license to behave in extreme ways that might have gotten men beaten or arrested”, which included beating up scabs and taking the kids with them when they were put in the jail.

Maggard says that these women were switching scabs, taunting the company president, testifying in court about their living conditions, risking their lives in violent confrontations, appearing on national television, getting arrested, and going to jail (1990: 75,89). However, they were also the ones “getting meals on tables, cleaning clothes, and seeing to domestic chores” (Maggard 1990: 89). Their involvement shaped the strike in crucial ways and was a key element “in the successful negotiation of a union contract at Brookside” (Maggard 1990: 96).

Pope describes the struggles of poor women, mostly black, involved in Brooklyn Welfare Action Council, an organization with the largest body of membership in the national welfare rights movement during the late 1960s. These women came into the movement with grievances and demands that were gendered in nature: they were low-income mothers dependent on the state for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) who participated in the movement to demand from the welfare agencies “their right to basic human needs for themselves and their children” (West and Blumberg 1990: 39-40). Pope shows that white nuns played important roles in terms of supporting the efforts and organizing the movement at the initial stages. Although white nuns chose to act independently from the parish priests initially, they were not unaware of the “pragmatic demands of convent life and of the limitations of women in the church hierarchy” (Pope 1990: 62). That awareness led them to enlist the participation of priests who later did the high level negotiating with the authorities and increased their control over the movement as it spread.

This is actually the same kind of observation Lawson and Barton (1990) make in the case the New York Tenants Movement. They indicate that although women dominated men in numbers in almost all organizations of this movement at every structural level, and figured greatly in organizing the challenge the movement come to represent and mobilizing others by spreading the message of the movement, men emerged at the forefront when the higher levels of the structure took place. “They have also usually been the leaders of organizations initiating new strategies at these higher levels” (Lawson and Barton 1990: 41-42).

When we combine the insights from the literature by gender scholars of social movements with the ideas emerging out of the works presented in this part, we can say the followings. Both the external context and the internal dynamics and structures of social movements are gendered. Social movements do not emerge and develop in a vacuum but rather have organic ties with the society in which they operate in that they reflect and reproduce unequal power relations and hierarchies existing in the larger society. Although social movements open up a space for women to assume new roles to act politically, gender ideologies and gendered role expectations limit these opportunities. The space for activism is often marked by gender within social movements.

As the works on civil rights movement make it clear, even in the case of gender-inclusive movements challenging orthodoxies vibrantly and demanding justice and freedom for all from subjugation, divisions and inequalities along the lines of gender as well as others find their way into their oppositional communities and shape the experiences of movement participants in fundamental ways. Gender ideologies work in a way to channel women away from movement positions entailing greater power and visibility to positions translating into less power and invisibility and men to fill the formal leadership positions. As West and Blumberg (1990: 99) put it, it appears to be rule rather than exception that “women seldom consistently share” formal leadership positions and make decisions at higher levels of organizations with men. West and Blumberg (1990: 100) argue that “Women often predominate as leaders and organizers as long as protest fairly confined to the grass-roots, neighborhood level. Once the movement “takes off” and shifts to confrontations at the regional, or national levels, men tend to take over the leadership, especially the formal leadership positions”, an argument developed also by Lawson and Barton (1990), Stall and Stoecker (1998), and Barnett (1993).

What is also increasingly evident in the works produced by gender scholars of social movements is that gender ideologies does not only shape the fabric of life within social movements but also informs the logic of scholarly work on social movements. If gender ideologies function to restrict women to work largely behind the scenes, contemporary social movement theories by tending to treat social movements as gender-neutral constructs have rendered women and their contribution invisible in social movements. West and Blumberg (1990: 7, 8) argue that in the research on social movements “men assumed to be leaders and organizers in the public sphere, while women who enter it are viewed as their supporters…women’s contributions are ignored, misrepresented, or erased from history”. Stall and Stoecker add that it is not only the women and their contributions but also an entire substructure of action has gone unnoticed in the scholarly work (1998: 751).
The idea echoing in many works from a gender perspective on civil rights movement is that that the movement “would not have been so successful” without the contribution of women (Iron 1998: 700). “The crucial role of African-American women in starting the Montgomery bus boycott, which triggered the civil rights movement, has emerged more than thirty years after it occurred” (West Blumberg 1990: 9). Barnett argues that Black women’s experiences and leadership roles “virtually have been neglected, forgotten, or considered inconsequential or of secondary importance relative to those of men” which can be explained for the most part by gender, class, and race biases prevalent in the scholarly work (1993: 163). A great bulk of the current research on movement leadership has primarily focused on “great men and elites as movement leaders”, neglected the role of black women as leaders and organizers, and, thus, created an erroneous image that “all of the women are white, and all of the Black are male” (Hull, Scott, and Smith 1982 quoted in Barnet 1993: 165).

It has become clear by now that the arguments presented in this part represent a serious challenge specifically to RMT and its later version, political process model which emerged in the period after the mid-1980s, provided a “bottom-up” level of analysis (Buechler and Cylke 1997: 60) and attempted to reconcile the insights put forward by NSMT and social constructionism with the purely organizational view of earlier version of RMT (McDonald 2002). Political process theorists, Goodwin and Jasper (1999: 29) argue, tend to wash the meaning and fluidity out of strategy, agency, and culture so that they will look like more structure”. Resource mobilization theory, as Ferree and Merrill (2000: 458) put it, is “embedded in an androcentric” worldview as it exclusively focuses what is visible, formal movement organizations, activities, and actors. This focus of RMT is informed by a logic that relies heavily on the dualistic framework of public versus private realm, which is something feminist scholars have been very critical from the onset.

Fraser argues that public/private distinction over looks the importance of “private, particular interests in constructing public, political selves” (cited in Meeks, 2001: 337) and Rabo (1996: 155) argues that these notions have been deployed as if they lacked any “historical moorings” (Rabo 1996: 155) and as if they were not both to mirror and strengthenened unequal power relations in society (Sullivan 1995). RMT by focusing the attention on what is visible neglects social movement activities that take place behind the scenes at the grassroots level and their actors who are often women. Women’s social, economic, and political participation and contribution find little resonance in accounts like RMT which focuses on the “public realm” since women most of the times participate in the “public realm” based on their gendered identities and familial roles (White, 1996; Rabo, 1996; Sullivan, 1995). Blumberg (1990: 170) argues that “motherhood and household roles link women to their communities”. Lawson and Barton suggest that an “awareness of the division between home and community...is vital to an understanding of participation patterns” in social movements (1990: 48).

Ferree argues that RMT does not deal well with women’s movement for which “reason and emotion, both in theory and in the practices of organizing, plays such a central role” (1992: 43). Feminist scholars found RMT responsible from creating a false dichotomy between reason and emotion (Hercus 1999; Ferree 1992) which elevates ‘abstract masculinity’ over women’s standpoint (Oliver et al. 2002). Due to this “constructed cultural prejudice” (Ferree 1992: 42), forms of collective action conceived to be driven by emotions such as women’s movement are often marginalized in the mainstream social movement research. In a similar vein, Jaggar argues that “oppressed people particularly need and value emotions as a means of affirming the values and people that the rational standards of the culture demean” (quoted in Ferree 1992: 42). Oliver et al. (2002: 17) add to the discussion by arguing that

The rationalist bias pervades the culture and affects movements’ collective identities. Movements perceived as emotional are often not considered respectable. To gain respectability movement activists may develop a ‘vocabulary of emotions’ to rationalize their participation to others and to themselves. The animal rights activists, Groves (1995) studied in the southern United States, reproduced organizationally the dominant gender division of emotion: recruiting men was considered a strategic devise to bring credibility to the movement because men were believed less emotional and more rational than women. As a consequence, male activists were often chosen for spokesperson and leadership positions while women tended to be overlooked for those positions.

It is true that RMT gets the lion’s share from the critiques, but NSMT is also criticized on similar grounds since it saw the notion of collective identity as only important to the study of new social movements owing to the assumption that NSM actors are not defined by their structural locations (Robnett 1996). NSMT suggests a uniform experience for movement participants as it overlooks the ways in which how gender, class, and race differentiates the experiences of participants in movements.

Although gender scholars of social movements have found the insights of NSMT on the centrality of culture and identity especially useful, they, nevertheless, argued against the description of women’s movement as symbolic and cultural rather than political challenges by NSMT (Pichardo 1997; Buechler 1997; Charles 2000). Charles (2000) pointing out the simultaneous importance of politics, the state, and cultural innovation for feminist movements argues that feminist movements do not fit into the movement model drawn by either RMT or NSMT. Taking a slightly different turn, Calhoun (1994: 4) sees women’s movement as a new social movement political in nature which seeks the affirmation of excluded identities as publicly good and politically salient. More to the point, Moghadam (2001), analyzing four transnational feminist networks (TFNs), argues that these TFNs “organize around issues pertaining to the economy, the political system and foreign policy, as well as reproductive rights, family laws and violence against women”. Given this, Moghadam says women’s movements are not necessarily non-economic and identity focused.

This part ends with a final critique on NSMT revolving around two interconnected ideas related to the notion of civil society. The first is that NSMT developed a framework in which civil society relates to the state and the market in a dualistic manner. In this framework, the state represents the locus of coercion and control and is seen as an intrusive institution potentially harmful to individual rights and freedoms. By contrast,
civil society represents a realm that is autonomous from the state and the market resisting both the state control and the market exploitation and that is a new site of democratization. In relation to first argument, we can say that this binary model of civil society versus state not only informed the NSMT but also has remained in use for a long time in the contemporary literature on civil society. Today, an increasing number of scholars pinpoint the inadequacies of this model and underline the need for a theoretical move towards a dialectical model, without developing any discussion about the role that NSMT possibly played in the development of this binary model. These critics argue that the real nature of the relationship between civil society and the state is more complex than this model could possibly capture since especially under the liberal democracies a multiple level of interaction and engagement and even an interdependency relation underline the nature of civil society state relation (Swift, 1992; Cohen and Arato, 1992; Persell, 1994; Cohen, 1995; Walzer, 1995 & 2002; Norton, 1995; Rabo, 1996; Hann, 1996; Dunn, 1996; Loizos, 1996; Knight, 1996; Diamond, 1996; Mbogori and Chigudu, 1999; Then and Walkenhorst, 1999; Encarnation, 2002; Buchowski, 1996; Khilnani, 2001).

The second idea is that NSMT saw contemporary social movements as the “emancipatory projects, expression of societal democratization and indicators of, and contributors to civil society” (Moghadam 2000: 58). Going beyond the rather romanticized version of civil society developed by NSMT as well as by liberal accounts of civil society, feminist scholars along with others argue that the civil society in which social movements reside is in fact a realm of fragmentation, inequality, and exercise of power. Himmelfarb (2000: 98) argues that civil society is not an immaculate moral space free form the relations of domination and subordination. Civil society does not only reflect but also, more importantly, reinforces the impacts of societal hierarchies and inequalities since the “relationships within civil society are inextricably intertwined with the way people organize and relate to each other in the wider society” (Philips 2002: 75; Swift 1999). Even the most pro-democratically oriented groups in civil society do not constitute an exception to this.

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Who Helps Me Fight the Power and Determine the Outcome? Examining Different Expectations among Protestors and the Influence of Social Networks

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ABSTRACT
This presentation considers varying expectations that protestors have of the impact of their protest activity and explores the influence of social networks through original survey data collected outside the 2004 Republican National Convention. Previous studies have shown the important effect of social ties for social movement success, particularly for recruitment and movement longevity, but have not directly compared participants themselves and their expectations at such a large inclusive event.

Preliminary analysis finds that while most protestors (labeled Externalists) believed that their activity could lead to immediate political change on outside reference groups, a surprising amount (Solidarians) believed instead that only protestors themselves would be primarily affected by their activity. Considering what may cause protestors to have such different outcome perceptions can give social movement leaders and scholars better insight as to how to align or understand protest participation. Early results revealed that, members of multiple organizations and social movement organizations in particular seem more likely to be Solidarians, along with protestors from neighborhoods that were unsupportive of the protest. However, protestors recruited or accompanied by family members or friends seem more likely to be Externalists.

Keywords: Protest, Social Movements, Expectations of Protestors, Social Networks, Republican National Convention 2004

Introduction
The massive demonstrations outside the 2004 Republican National Convention show that contemporary protestors are a diverse group varying not only demographically but by their expectations of who is most affected by their protest action. As part of a larger project on protestor expectations (Thompson forthcoming), this presentation pays attention to the influence of social networks such as organizations and family members that may account for these different expectations. To do this, protestors were surveyed at the United for Peace and Justice (UPFJ) protest held in New York City on the eve of the Republican National Convention (August 31, 2004). Their answers to questions about their expectations and the process of their involvement were then used to investigate hypotheses based on social movement theory.

Social Networks have been used in a variety of Social Movement studies that typically focus on recruitment and participation but have rarely applied these techniques on the expectations that protestors might have. Research on formal organizations has consistently revealed the important effects that they have on their members’ roles and participation in a social movement (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977). Close family and friends have also proven crucial in their effect on an individual’s understanding of a social movement and the importance it may have on her life (McAdam and Paulsen 1993 (1997); Snow, Zurcher Jr., and Ekeland-Olson 1980 (1997)). Finally, neighborhood factors can influence an activist who may feel an urgent sense of pessimism that nothing will get done without their participation (Oliver 1984). All of these factors are likely to be important considerations in determining a protestor’s expectations.

The Network Perspective Applied to Social Movements
A quick review of seminal social network theory easily demonstrates its relevance to social movement research. Social networks are described by Marden as “structures of relationships linking social actors [that are] omnipresent in contemporary society” (2000, 2727). As tempting as it may be to think that individuals operate independently as rational thinkers, the network perspective encourages a more comprehensive understanding of human action by revealing the salience of our interdependence. Although there is some disagreement among social scientists as to the extent to which humans, within their social networks, have agency or are “passive recipients of environmental pressure,” belief in the significant power of these networks has widespread popularity in contemporary research (Marsden 2000). Simmel’s seminal essay “The Web of Group Affiliations” explained that human interaction moved from a pattern of being heavy constrained in ‘concentric’ social circles in medieval times to often unique patterns of intersecting group memberships by the 20th century (1922 (1955)). Finally, Pescosolido and Rubin argue that contemporary Western society has evolved to a third social form – a spoke structure in which people are connected to each other through multiple kinds of associations that often temporary, not single and lifelong as previously (2000).

Social movements are a challenge to analyze because of their diversity of forms and objectives as well as strategies of “non-conventional political means to reach their goals”. McAdam and Snow define a social movement as “a collectivity acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional channels for the purpose of promoting or resist-
The goal of the legally-permitted march was to demonstrate non-violent dissent to the actions and plans of the President, his administration, and even the local Republican mayor. The fact that global media outlets would be present due to the convention was cited as crucial by the anti-RNC protestors to show the world the tremendous unpopularity of the President’s foreign and domestic policies, and hopefully influence undecided American onlookers to vote against him in the upcoming November elections.

**Expected Externalists**

As a result of the largely external goals of the UFPJ protest, we would expect that the protestors descended upon mid-town Manhattan with the hope of affecting others, through persuasion or even disruption. This idea fits comfortably with the dominant social movement theory of resource mobilization and its synthesis with the theories of political process and framing. The synthesis of theories proposed by McAdam, McCarthy and Zald melds the importance of protest action within the broader political context (political process), the importance of formal organizations and informal social networks for activism (resource mobilization) and appropriately promoting the goals of action to resonate well with activists and outside actors alike (framing). Considered jointly, these theories transcend simple rational choice to make a seemingly comprehensive account of protest activity and how it fails or succeeds (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). According to this dominant theory, virtually all protestors are expected to be who this project terms Externalists – protestors who express the hope that their actions will influence outside actors (such as the President and his administration). Indeed most protestors (almost 80%) fell within this Externalist category, fully or partly naming outside actors as who they thought would be “most affected by the outcome of the protest”:

Those who haven’t registered to vote, those who don't vote - they will see how [important] a single vote is to get rid of BUSH.

(Female, 61, New York)

Republican party. They will learn 100's of thousands that represent millions are aware and disapprove of their actions.

(Male, 39, New York)

Citizens of foreign nations who will see that not all Americans think alike. (Male, 26, New York)

I would like to think that Kerry and the Democrats will wake up to the true strength of the anti-war (anti-Bush) movement, the grassroots’ demand for justice. (Male, 57, California)

**Surprising Solidarians**

However, not all protestors expected outside actors to be most affected by the outcome of the protest, instead citing protestors (including themselves) without any mention of external reference groups. The protestors labeled Solidarians...
(roughly 20%) believed that protestors will have life-changing and renewing experiences that could confirm their identity as non-conformists to a maligned societal system. Protestors themselves, particularly first-timers, would feel the support of like-minded individuals and perhaps become more ideologically committed. Solidarians typically made statements like the following, in explaining who they thought would be “most affected by the outcome of the protest”:

The Protestors - individuals become more emboldened & therefore are more apt to become activists when they know (by first hand experience) that others feel as they do. (Male, 44, Indiana)

People who participate because of the positive experience, especially first-time demonstrators. (Male, 59, New York)

The people who took part in the protest. It takes a lot of commitment to become involved. (Male, 47, unknown)

protestors - the Republicans will not change their viewpoints, but at least the protesters will exercise their Freedom of Speech. (Female, 33, New York)

The protestors, since this is largely symbolic, we're not going to effect any level of change, except to galvanize ourselves further. (Female, 31, New York)

### Understanding the Solidarians

What would explain the existence of Solidarians, despite the political goals of this event and the external orientation of dominant social movement theory? Despite having similar socioeconomic backgrounds to the Externalists, perhaps Solidarians feel the way they do because their social networks at this protest are substantially different in ways predictable by dominant social theory. Their perception of the outcome might be traced to their different organization memberships, or they may not have been recruited or accompanied by family members and peers, factors more likely to be associated with Externalists. Perhaps they are products of neighborhoods that are already interested in the goals of the protest so they do not feel the same pressure to commit to external change.

However, taking a broader view of protestors and considering alternative theories may better account for the Solidarians as activists with important strategic differences from Externalists. New Social Movement Theory counters dominant social movement theory by focusing less on instrumentality – direct and immediate outcomes related to outside actors – and more on the identity and ideology of the protestors themselves (Klandermans 2004). Therefore, as instrumental as the goals of the UFPJ protest were, a substantial number of protestors may have been skeptical of immediate instrumental outcomes and instead found value in showing solidarity with like-minded individuals. By developing and testing the hypotheses informed by a variety of social movement theories, this presentation offers some evidence of the influence of social networks on the differing expectations of Solidarians and Externalists.

### HYPOTHESES: ACCOUNTING FOR SOLIDARIANS AND EXTERNALISTS

The following are selected hypotheses dealing with formal and informal social networks of protestors that have been chosen for this presentation from the author’s larger project (Thompson forthcoming) on protestor expectations:

1) Formal Organizations and Protestor Expectations: Linking Membership to Externalists

- **Hypothesis 1A:** Members of formal organizations are more likely to be Externalists
- **Hypothesis 1B:** Among members of formal organizations, members of social movement organization in particular are more likely to be Externalists

2) Formal Organizations and Protestor Expectations: Linking Membership to Solidarians

Contrary to Resource Mobilization theorists, New Social Movement scholars go beyond the instrumental goals, to suggest that protestors may also want to express their identity with like-minded individuals and “give meaning” to their social worlds (Buechler 2000; Klandermans 2004). Members of organizations can develop an affinity for each other and this collective identity may be the primary goal of their protest activity so that they are more likely to be Solidarians. Therefore, Solidarians are more likely to come from organizations than Externalists.

- **Hypothesis 2A:** Members of formal organizations are more likely to be Solidarians
- **Hypothesis 2B:** Among members of formal organizations, members of social movement organization in particular are more likely to be Solidarians

3) Personal Networks of Trust Lead Protestors to External Goals

While most protestors were accompanied to the demonstration or mentioned that they were recruited by family or friends, a substantial amount showed up alone and did not mention close ties in the process that lead them to the protest. Recruitment and active support from close ties should play a major role in whether a protestor believes her activity would encourage change on outside actors since these close ties are likely to have helped her conceptualize this external effect. Passy finds that an activist’s “socialization, … structural-connection… , and decision-shaping” continue to be influenced by her close ties (Passy 2003). Without this active social network, it seems far less likely that protestors would make this link between protest activity and effecting political change.
These ideas motivate the following:

Hypothesis 3A: Protestors who cite members of informal social networks for recruitment are more likely to be Externalists.

Hypothesis 3B: Protestors who are accompanied by members of informal networks, such as family members, are more likely to be Externalists. Protestors who come to the protest alone are more likely to be Solidarians.

4) A Desire to Influence Outside Actors Stems from Perceiving their Lack of Interest

Optimism about the role of members of a protestor’s extended social network may not be the essential motivator driving her involvement in collective action. Oliver’s study of participants in neighborhood organizations led her to conclude that “pessimism [of the actions of others], not optimism, makes a person more willing to contribute” (1984, 602). Protestors who expect their activity to effect immediate social change beyond the protest are likely to have this expectation out of a need for such change due to the hostility or apathy of their social environments.

Hypothesis 4: Protestors who cite lower interest in the protest by neighbors are more likely to be Externalists.

METHODOLOGY: ANALYZING PROTESTOR EXPECTATIONS AND NETWORKS

Survey and Sampling

It was determined that this project would be best achieved through use of surveys completed by active protest participants instead of media sources, such as newspaper coverage, and non-media sources, such as archived social movement organization files. The concern with using these more popular methods were that they were unlikely to reveal the substantive motivations of the protestors and may contain excessive bias – concerned noted by several researchers (Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Smith, McCarthy, McPhail, and Augustyn 2001).

Through active collaboration with a research team of Indiana University colleagues conducting simultaneous projects, and a test run at an earlier protest, the final research strategy involved meeting with protestors and distributing a survey that they would return by mail. A concise survey instrument was developed that asked key questions about protest involvement and social networks, along with socioeconomic characteristics, all on one side of a regular-sized page that could be easily folded and mailed. Along with two colleagues who assisted me (each of us situated about five street blocks apart), I approached every tenth participant (alternating between men and women) who passed by my position within the crowd. Walking briefly with her (or him), I asked whether she would be willing to complete the anonymous survey (pre-stamped and addressed) and mail it within a couple days.

In total, 400 surveys were distributed and 153 were returned by the time of data analysis for this study (December 2004) for a reasonable response rate of over 38%, considering that mailed surveys “seldom generate response rates higher than 30 percent” (Klandermans and Smith 2002, 17). Overall, the demographics of respondents were quite similar to those collected by other researchers who conducted 206 ‘on-the-spot’ surveys at the same protest (Heaney and Rojas 2005; Rojas 2004).

Coding and Measurement

Once surveys were returned, decisions were made as to how best to code responses in order to examine the hypotheses of the study with quantitative measures. While the closed-ended questions were typically straightforward to quantify, content analysis was needed to categorize answers to several open-ended questions. What follows is a description of some key coding decisions made for this analysis and Table 1 summarizes all variables used for analysis.

Dependent Variable. A bivariate variable for ‘Being a Solidarian’ (1=Solidarian; 0=Externalist) was created by analyzing responses to the question: “Who do you think will be most affected by the outcome of this protest? Please explain who and why.” As described earlier in the paper, if in answering the protestor mentioned exclusively fellow protestors (including themselves) with no mention of any outside actors, the protestor was coded as a Solidarian, otherwise as an Externalist.

Independent Variables. Many variables here were obtained directly from survey respondents except for the following variables which required coding decisions from open-ended questions. To construct the variable for Membership in a Social Movement Organization, every organization listed by respondents was investigated to determine if social change was a primary part of its mission statement. To determine the variable measuring whether a respondent’s neighbors were not interested in the protest, the value of ‘1’ (instead of ‘0’) was assigned if the protestor perceived mostly apathy or even hostility towards the protest by their neighbors.

Control Variables. While most variables in this category were created directly from survey responses, additional analysis was needed for the ‘Live within the New York Metropolitan area’ variable (for whether a respondent lives 50 miles or closer to the protest site). Using the home residence zip codes provided by each respondent, the approximate driving distance from the site of the protest (Madison Square Garden, zip code 10001) was determined.

Analysis

Due to the bivariate nature of the dependent variable (Being a ‘Solidarian’ versus Being an ‘Externalist’), logistic regression was the primary method of data analysis. For added clarity, bar charts of cross-tabulations between the dependent variable and key independent variables that had significant Pearson $\chi^2$ statistics were also included (Figures 1 through 4).

V. EARLY RESULTS: THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL NETWORKS ON EXPECTATIONS

The following preliminary results reveal that social networks clearly have an important effect on the expectations a protestor has of her protest action.

While simply being a member of any formal organization does not make a protestor any more likely to be a Solidarian or an Externalist, the number of memberships that a pro-
testor has does seem to have an effect. There is no statistically
significant association between being a member of an organiza-
tion and being a Solidarian versus an Externalist ($\chi^2=0.59;  
p=0.44)$. However, when we take into account the number of
organizational membership a protestor has, we find evidence
that supports Hypothesis 2A while contradicting Hypothesis 1A.
Controlling for demographic characteristics, regression results
revealed that each additional organization membership that a
protestor has increases the likelihood that she is a Solidarian by
38\% ($|z|=2.21; p<0.05$).

Considering the type of organization, we see that be-
ing a member of a social movement organization (SMO) also
has a significant effect (Figure 1). For protestors who have
joined at least one formal organization, none of them who were
members of exclusively non-SMOs were Solidarians, while
protestors who were members of at least one SMO included 19
Solidarians – a statistically significant difference ($\chi^2=3.32;  
p<0.10$). While having no Solidarians come from the former

| Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Analysis, N=147* |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| Variable                    | Description                                                | Mean  | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| Dependent Variable          | sol4 1=Solidarian; 0=Externalist                            | 0.204 | 0.404      | 0   | 1   |
| Organization Independent Variables (Hypotheses 1A through 2B) |
| memaorg                    | 1=Member of Any Organization; 0=Not Member of Any Organization | 0.571 | 0.497      | 0   | 1   |
| totalorg                   | Total Number of Organization Memberships                    | 1.442 | 1.844      | 0   | 9   |
| socmove                    | 1=Belong to a Social Movement Organization; 0=Does not belong to a Social Movement Organization | 0.503 | 0.502      | 0   | 1   |
| Close Tie Independent Variables (Hypotheses 3A & 3B) |
| pafafreeb                  | 1=Recruited by Partner, Family Member or Friend; 0=Not Recruited by Partner, Family Member or Friend or Did not mention Recruiter | 0.158 | 0.366      | 0   | 1   |
| pafafacc                   | 1=Accompanied by Partner, Family Member or Friend; 0=Not Accompanied by Partner, Family Member or Friend | 0.760 | 0.428      | 0   | 1   |
| aloneb                     | 1=Came Alone to Protest; 0=Came with others to Protest      | 0.158 | 0.366      | 0   | 1   |
| Pessimism Independent Variable (Hypothesis 4) |
| pessn                       | 1=Neighbors Lack Interest in Protest; 0=Neighbors are Interested or Respondent does not know interests of neighbors | 0.381 | 0.487      | 0   | 1   |
| Demographic Control Variables |
| age                        | Age (years)                                                | 41.442 | 15.927  | 16  | 80  |
| female                     | 1=Female; 0=Male                                            | 0.551 | 0.499      | 0   | 1   |
| white                      | 1=White (Not Hispanic or Mixed); 0=Other Race/Mixed Race/Hispanic | 0.752 | 0.434      | 0   | 1   |
| bagrad                     | 1=Has Bachelor's Degree or higher; 0=Did not complete Bachelor's Degree | 0.823 | 0.383      | 0   | 1   |
| hincome                    | Annual Household Income (1=less than $20,000 (10.2% of sample); 2=$20,000 to $44,999 (28.6%); 3=$50,000 to $74,999 (24.5%); 4=$75,000 or more (36.1%)) | 2.870 | 1.026      | 1   | 4   |
| fullwork                   | 1=Works Full-time; 0=Part-time or Other Work Status (including students or retired persons) | 0.456 | 0.5      | 0   | 1   |
| nymetro                    | 1=Lives 50 miles or closer to Site of Protest; 0=Lives further than 50 miles from Protest | 0.710 | 0.455      | 0   | 1   |

*These are categorical variables for Frequency of Protest (0=one of the other 3 responses)

*Examining the data and extensive tests (including joint significance tests) revealed that these two variables are in fact independent of each other and had similar sample distributions, entirely by coincidence

*NB: While 153 surveys were received, 6 were excluded completely because few or no survey questions were answered for a total of 147 valid cases in most variables. The following variables had substantially fewer valid cases: Bush Vote variables (141 cases); Frequency of Protest Variables (135 cases)
group prevented regression analysis of this difference, it is still clear that there is support for Hypothesis 2B over 1B.

While these findings are surprising considering the external aims of organization membership espoused by resource mobilization theory, they make sense considering ‘New Social Movement theory. While just being a member of any organization was not significant, perhaps protestors who were ‘joiners’ – joining multiple organizations – are more likely to associate membership as an important part of their identity and thus more likely to consider fellow protestors as being most affected by the protest. The type of organization also seemed important since being merely a member of organizations with no focus on social change meant that they were not likely to feel a sense of collective identity with other people at a change-oriented event such as a protest.

Considering personal networks of protestors, there is strong support for Hypothesis 3A. Figure 2 shows that Protestors who mentioned being recruited by a partner, family member or friend were more likely to be Externalists than Solidarians ($\chi^2=4.39; p<0.05$). In fact, only one respondent recruited by a close tie was a Solidarian. Even controlling for demographic characteristics, the regression model estimates that being recruited by a close tie makes a protestor 85% more likely to be an Externalist than a Solidarian ($|z|=1.83; p<0.10$).

This finding demonstrates that family and friends are likely to socialize a protestor to expect external outcomes as a result of her protest action. Beyond McAdam and Paulsen’s finding that the strength of strong ties is crucial for predicting an individual’s participation in collective action (McAdam and Paulsen 1993 (1997)), these strong ties also seem crucial for the expectations of the participant. In encouraging the protestor to take part in the event, close ties may mention possible external benefactors or targets who will be affected by the protest or these ties may also serve as ‘bridges,’ actually linking the protestor to these external actors. As a result the protestor is more inclined to mention targets such as undecided voters, moderate Republicans or international observers, instead of primarily fellow activists as people most affected by their protest action.

There was only partial support for Hypothesis 3B since, although being accompanied by close ties to the protest had an effect on a protestor’s expectations, this effect was only significant when controlling for demographic characteristics. While Figure 4 does show that a greater proportion of protestors who attended with close ties were Externalists, this difference was not significant at the 90% confidence level ($\chi^2=2.19; p=0.14$). Only when demographic controls are added in the regression model does this effect become significant with an estimate that being accompanied by close tie makes a protestor 48% more likely to be an Externalist than a Solidarian ($|z|=1.70; p<0.10$). There is also insufficient for support the second part of Hypothesis 3B.
which predicts that protestors who attend the alone would most likely be Solidarians. Though protestors attending alone were slightly more likely to be Solidarians (30%) than those who had came with others (18%), this difference was not statistically significant in cross-tabulation ($\chi^2=1.92$; $p=0.17$) nor in the regression model with demographic.

These results indicate that partners, family members and friends not only have an effect on a protestor’s expectations at the recruitment stage but actively during the protest as well. As the protest unfolds, protestors accompanied by close ties interpret the event through people with whom they spend much of their everyday lives – external to the protest. Since the role of these close ties may differ depending on factors such as the age of the protestor and how far the protestor traveled to the event, it is not surprising that the effect of close ties is only significant when we control for these demographic factors. While conversely we would expect protestors who came alone to the event to identify and congregate with other protestors, perhaps they were not significantly more likely to be Solidarians due to factors beyond the scope of the survey – they may not have planned to attend the protest alone.

Protestors who perceive a lack of interest (or even hostility) in their neighbors’ attitudes about the protest are more likely to be Solidarians than Externalists, a finding that strongly contradicts Hypothesis 4. Figure 4 shows that the proportion of protestors with non-interested neighbors that were Solidarians (29%) was almost double the proportion of Solidarians (15%) among protestors who did not perceive a lack of interest in their neighbors ($\chi^2=3.71$; $p=0.10$). The regression model estimates that, controlling for demographic characteristics, protestors with non-interested neighbors were over two-and-a-half times more likely to be Solidarians than Externalists ($|z|=2.13$; $p<0.05$).

While Oliver’s thesis that pessimism, rather than optimism, is more likely to drive an individual to participate in collective action (Oliver 1984), pessimism does not seem to similarly translate into protestors having externally-oriented expectations. Rather, protestors seem to be reluctantly pragmatic in believing that since their neighbors are not interested in the protest, then perhaps only fellow protestors are and this is the group who is most likely to be affected by their protest actions. Finally, it should be noted that demographic characteristics did not have a significant effect on a protestor’s expectations (at the $p<.10$ level) when considered on their own or in any of the other models discussed. This point is important since it strongly suggests that the significant effects of the explanatory factors important to this study are generally independent of demographic characteristics.

VI. SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

This presentation makes the point that, while past studies have focused on differences between participants and non-participants, or collective dynamics of protestors as a whole, there are also important differences between protestors. Considering this diversity through surveys of actual participants, this presentation reveals that protestors at the same event can have substantially different expectations of their protest activity. Most protestors, the Externalists, expected their protest activity to primarily affect outside actors (such as undecided voters), unsurprising given the external goals of the United for Peace and Justice demonstration on the eve of the Republican National Convention 2004. However, less easily understood were the expectations of the Solidarians who believed that the protestors themselves would be primarily affected by the protest.

Social Network theory was found useful in helping to account for differences in protestor expectations though in a manner that was not always consistent with the dominant synthesis of social movement theory that combines the resource mobilization, political process and framing literatures. Consistent with this dominant synthetic theory is that protestors who were recruited or accompanied by close ties (partners, family members and friends) were more likely to be Externalists, as were protestors who came from unsupportive neighborhoods. However, New Social Movement theory proved better able to predict that protestors who were members of multiple organizations, particularly social movement organizations, were more likely to be Solidarians.

Activists and social movement scholars can benefit from further understanding protestor expectations since these are crucial to the success and longevity of a broader social movement. Externalists may be more likely to act vigorously for immediate change than Solidarians who are more interested in expressing ideology or showing solidarity with fellow activists. Solidarians are also less likely to be disillusioned if external goals are not readily achieved, perhaps forming a constituency that could be crucial for the longevity of a particular social movement. Understanding the roots of protestors’ differing expectations is also important since the task of recruiting participants with expectations appropriate to an event’s goals defies mere use of socioeconomic characteristics which do not have a significant effect on protestor’s expectations.

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Notes


1. “Jays” Janney video-recorded and analyzed protestor-police interaction, and Rachel Ernst photographed and interviewed protestors who held signs.
2. Crucial advice on survey and question design was received through meetings with my thesis advisor, Tim Bartely.
3. The script, survey and accompanying study information sheet were all approved by the Indiana University Human Subjects Committee as Study # 04-8988 (Michael F. Thompson, principal investigator).

(Author’s Note: This presentation reveals early results of a larger project by the author and readers are encouraged to contact him for further information)
Black Churches and Their Effect on Race Rioting in the 1960s

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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the relationship between religion and the rioting that occurred in the 1960s in the United States. In an attempt to understand the role that black churches played in urban rioting, I study the relationship between the size of Baptist adherents in a community and that city’s propensity to riot. My analysis finds that the percent of Baptist adherents in a city was negatively associated with rioting. This relationship changed, however, in cities with large non-White populations. By testing an interaction between non-White population size and percent of Baptist adherents, I find that in cities with large non-White populations, as the percent of Baptist adherents increased, the number of riots also increased. This result suggests that Black Baptist churches had a politicizing effect on their communities, contributing to a greater propensity to riot. While Spilerman (1970, 1976) found that the size of non-White population and a dummy variable for Southern states are the best predictors of rioting, I suggest that this is an incomplete view of the differences between northern states and southern states as they relate to rioting. While southern states did experience fewer riots, the reasons for this effect has cultural and religious explanations that are more complicated than simply a city’s Southern location.

Introduction
The civil rights movement in the United States brought dramatic changes to the legal, political, and social landscapes of America. As the 1960s drew to a close, however, nonviolent sit-ins and marches waned and hundreds of riots broke out across the United States. The late 1960s and early 1970s were scarred with urban rioting. Since then, this period of collective violence has been the subject of repeated social scientific research into the causes of rioting. Spilerman (1970, 1976), for example, conducted a series of tests on the patterns of rioting during the 1960s in the United States. He concluded that the size of the non-White population of a city and a dummy variable for Southern location were the best predictors of rioting (1970, 1976). The South dummy variable was employed “in recognition of the very different traditions of race relations in the South and non-South” (Spilerman 1970: 643).

Despite the clear results of Spilerman’s research, sociologists have continued to search for explanations of the variance in rioting behavior of the 1960s and 1970s (Granovetter 1978; Macy 1991; Myers 1997; Oberschall 1978). Many sociologists, believing that non-White population and region were incomplete explanations of the violence, continued to search for additional structural conditions of rioting, including individual thresholds for riot participation (Granovetter 1978; Macy 1991), patterns of diffusion of riots among cities (Myers 1997), and interethnic competition (Bergesen and Herman 1998; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996).

While structural conditions clearly are critical to our understanding our rioting, there has been less of a focus on cultural conditions that may also affect rioting and collective violence. Even the broader field of research into social movements has tended to neglect cultural dimensions, instead focusing on group resources and political opportunities for collective action (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). This research has assisted in interpreting the structural components of social movements, but also has offered an incomplete picture of the components that contribute to collective action. Religion, especially, is frequently overlooked as a variable in social movements (Smith 1996).

This void in sociological research is particularly troublesome because of the leading role that religion played in launching the civil rights movement, which preceded the outbreak of race riots during 1960s and 1970s. Black churches were the organizational center of the early civil rights movement. They provided an existing framework for mobilization and a community of people who were willing and able to participate in boycotts and demonstrations (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Smith 1996). The mobilizing ability of the black churches was the result of their role as the dominant institution within African American society (Morris 1984). Given their central role in African American communities, any discussion of the race riots that followed the civil rights movement must also consider the influence of the churches on the minority culture. Thus, my paper examines how religion may have influenced the propensity of a city to riot, and whether religion generally, or black churches specifically, have different effects on a city’s propensity to riot.

A great deal of sociological research treats rioting as an extension of protest activity. Although it occurs in a different form than a boycott or sit-in, a riot is a similar expression of a grievance (McAdam 1982; Turner 1969). While Christianity generally may have discouraged disruptive behavior by its adherents, black churches acted as a mobilizing and politicizing institution during the civil rights movement. They produced communities that were more prone to participation in collective protests, whether non-violent or violent. The radicalizing effect of black churches could therefore be expected to be positively associated with rioting.

Background on Churches During the Civil Rights Move-
Black churches in the South played a vital role in initiating and sustaining the many struggles of the civil rights movement. Beginning with bus boycotts in Baton Rouge in 1953 and Montgomery in 1955, black churches helped to rally the African American community. They were the source of fundraising, volunteers, and leaders for the movement (Morris 1984). The dominance of black churches in African American society allowed organizers of these social movements to use the churches and ministers to reach the majority of the city’s African American population quickly. Many of these ministers rose to become prominent organizers and leaders of the movement.

The significant mobilizing abilities of the urban black churches were the result of their dominance within African American society. Morris (1984) explains:

It [the black church] has provided the organizational framework for most activities of the community—economic, political, and educational endeavors as well as religious ones. The black church was unique in that it was organized and developed by an oppressed group shut off from the institutional life of larger society. (P. 4-5)

The black churches remained central to the civil rights movement for several years. Between 1960 and 1965, however, “formal movement organizations gradually replaced the indigenous institutions of the African American community as the driving force behind black protest activity” (McAdam 1982:182). Black churches, during these years, ceased to act as the primary resource for social movements. Instead, organizations like NAACP, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) began to rely upon their own resources to instigate social change. Despite the decrease of formal organizing in the churches, the black church institutions remained central to the black community (Wilmore 1998; Pinn 2002).

The civil rights movement proved that religion has the potential to contribute significantly to the occurrence of social movements. Smith (1996) explains that:

Religion itself is a socially constituted reality that always exists in a social context that shapes and is shaped by religion. For this reason, in explaining social movements, it is simply impossible to separate the religious factors of belief and practice from more mundane matters of wealth, power, and prestige. All of these elements of social existence interact dynamically and mutually, and can have combined and reinforcing effects in generating disruptive social conflict. (P. 7)

In this way, the religious beliefs of a community will shape the direction that a social movement takes. The urban black churches that helped to organize the early civil rights movement significantly affected the dynamics of the movement. The tactics used to instigate change during the civil rights movement primarily were based on ideals of peaceful resistance, and were greatly influenced by the Christian roots of the movement.

In order to be effective, the civil rights leaders had to present the movement in ways that resonated with the men and women they were recruiting (Snow et al. 1986). Understanding the prominent role that the churches played in African American culture, many used the Christian roots of the community to frame the movement’s actions. Traditional church hymns were transformed into anthems for the civil rights movement; church events became centered on civil rights. McAdam (1982) explains, “it was not so much that movement participants were recruited from among the ranks of active churchgoers as it was a case of church membership itself being redefined to include movement participation as a primary requisite of the role” (p. 129). Thus, not only was the movement framed to include much of the language of the black churches, but the framing of the role of an African American churchgoer was also expanded to include participation in the movement. The message of the church was clear: support for civil rights had become a central element of African American Christian identity (Morris 1984).

As the civil rights movement drew to a close, the non-violent tactics of the bus boycotts and sit-ins that had begun the movement greatly decreased. Attempts by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and others to address urban poverty and violence through the traditional desegregation tactics were ineffective and often met by violent repression (McAdam 1982). National church organizations distanced themselves from Dr. King and other civil rights leaders and organizations, hesitating to invest their resources fully in the movement (Wilmore 1998).

Concurrently, the idea of “Black Power” was spreading quickly. As the non-violent tactics of the civil rights movement faded, other groups and leaders advocated more direct action. Leaders like Stokely Carmichael of SNCC advocated an insurgence of Black Nationalism and separatism. Black Power became increasingly popular among those in urban areas who were frustrated with the seemingly utopian dream of integration (Wilmore 1998). Carmichael and others began to encourage separatism, claiming, “no matter how ‘liberal’ a white person may be, he cannot ultimately escape the overpowering influence—on himself and on black people—of his whiteness in a racist society” (Carmichael 1967:61). The Black Power movement was spreading.

During the 1960s, the Nation of Islam also began to gain support. It vocally criticized Christianity as a religion of whites and slavery, declaring that the Christian faith was a tool for continued oppression of blacks across the United States and the world. Black Muslims became more numerous, following the message of black separatism encouraged by leaders like Malcolm X. (Wilmore 1998). The influence of the Nation of Islam on black Christian churches is unclear. Wilmore (1998) explains that:

There is no evidence that there was wide-
Some Christian pastors, concerned about the influence that Malcolm X had over urban youths in the community, banned Muslims from their pulpits. Other church leaders, however, integrated some of the Black Power message into their vocabulary, radicalizing their own churches rather than risking losing followers. Wilmore (1998) suggests that the growing popularity of Black Power led some major denominations “to shift to more militant tactics and [they] now gave open support to the movement” (p. 210).

The 1960s ended with the explosion of urban race riots across the United States: “This [period] was, after all, the peak period of urban rioting. No less than 290 ‘hostile outbursts’ were recorded for the years 1966-68 alone” (McAdam 1982:182). While it is clear that black churches played a monumental role in the civil rights movement, their cultural significance after this time is less obvious. Certainly, they continued to be important institutions in black communities (Baer and Singer 2002; Pinn 2002; Wilmore 1998), but their ability to continue to politicize the community is less obvious.

Religion and Social Change

Just as religious organizations can shape the path of a social movement, they also have the ability to either encourage or discourage social change in a community (Hunt and Hunt 1977; McVeigh and Sikkink 2001; Smith 1996). McVeigh and Sikkink (2001) explain, “a religion’s system of collective beliefs can be drawn upon to construct a worldview that legitimates the use of contentious tactics” (p. 1429). Some denominations of black churches condemned the more militant approach of addressing inequality, while others became more radical, embracing the Black Power movement (Pinn 2002; Wilmore 1998). Various radical preachers and ministers from Methodist, Baptist, African Methodist Episcopal Zion, and various other denominational backgrounds worked together to from the National Committee of Negro (later Black) Churchmen. The NCNC published a statement that gave theological backing to the black power movement (Pinn 2002; Wilmore 1998). The NCNC issued an interpretation of Black Power through the gospels, stressing stressed that the greatest threat to the United States was its failure to follow God’s rules of justice and righteousness (Pinn 2002).

Research has found that black religion has the potential to fuel or stifle this form of “militancy” within the black population. In this context, militancy is defined to include:

The feeling that there are definite barriers to personal achievement for blacks, that integration of American life is proceeding too slowly, that blacks deserve equal public accommodations, and that more demonstrations against racial inequality are desirable. (Hunt and Hunt 1977:6)

While some black churches suppressed militancy among its adherents, the “activist” black churches were associated with high levels of militancy (Hunt and Hunt 1977). Within black churches, African Americans found “a stimulus for militancy and protest” (Nelsen, Madron, and Yokley 1975: 176). Thus, the churches that were more active in the movement, produced adherents that were more politicized and militant in their views. Further research has continued to indicate that Black churches, with gospel music and liberation themes, encouraged—and continue to encourage—community action among their adherents (Barnes 2005). Black churches after the civil rights movement continued to have the power to politicize the community, creating a social network of individuals who believed that the status quo of racial inequality was inadequate, and that continued efforts should be made to fix the problem.

**From Protests to Riots**

While rioting may have been antithetical to the non-violent campaign that defined the civil rights movement, by the end of the 1960s it became apparent that the tactics used during the civil rights movement would not easily improve conditions for African Americans across the country; poverty in urban ghettos could not be solved by a march or sit-in. Despite their conflicting methods, the protests of the civil rights movement and riots that followed were not completely different from each other. McAdam (1982) explains:

> The urban riots of the mid to late 1960s can be seen as a final extension of the “politics of protest.” That there were differences between the riots and the earlier southern campaigns should be obvious. Underlying these differences, however are two basic similarities. Both forms of action occasioned a dramatic breakdown in public order. And both served to stimulate or hasten federal action favorable to blacks (P. 221).

So while the riots took a more radical approach to addressing grievances than the protests had taken, the goals of the two tactics were consistent with each other.

Indeed, many sociologists view riots as a form of political protest. Turner (1969) finds that riots were a distinct form of protest and a means to expose injustices:

> The riots are protests because they are attempts to call the attention of white society to the Negroes’ widespread dissatisfaction with racial subordination and segregation in urban America. The riots are also articulate because they are restrained, selective, and perhaps even more important, directed at the sources of the Negroes’ most immediate and profound grievances. (P. 817)

Public opinion also supports this interpretation of rioting. Many Whites in Los Angeles, especially those who believed that discrimination existed, saw the 1965 Watts Riot as social protest (Jeffries, Turner, and Morris 1971). This view of rioting as a distinct form of civil protest is supported in other research as...
well. Many scholars have attempted to explain rioting as the result of rational actions (Bergesen and Herman 1998; Myers 1997; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996).

Paige (1971) expands this idea by concluding that many riot participants are those who have high political efficacy, but low trust for the government. Thus, those who are participating in riots believe that they have the ability to influence the government, but do not trust that the government will naturally act in their best interests. This combination of characteristics leads to riot participants who are highly integrated into their community, but may feel that traditional outlets are not effective. Their beliefs that the government is untrustworthy would cause them to resort to more radical or violent actions, like rioting. Greater political access for minorities, on the other hand, would reduce this risk for violence (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). In the late 1960s, however, as the Voting Rights Act was just beginning to reduce voter exclusion and discrimination, few cities offered true political access for its minority populations.

By categorizing riots as an extreme form of protests, with participants who are well integrated into their societies, the potential influence for black churches becomes more obvious. Black churches during the civil rights movement produced adherents with highly politicized views, who had begun to view political participation as an extension of their role as church-goers (McAdam 1982). As the effectiveness of sit-ins and protests began to wane, trust in the government’s willingness to improve conditions began to decline as well. At the end of the 1960s, there was growing pessimism among African Americans, especially regarding their status in the future (McAdam 1982). Black church adherents, with a general skepticism of the government, became a demographic with characteristics that Paige (1971) links to rioting: high political efficacy and little faith in the government. The growing militancy of some black churches intensifies this quality, by deepening their adherents’ beliefs that changes continued to be necessary. These communities, accustomed to protests, may have contributed to rioting, a more extreme type of protest. Black churches, therefore, have the potential to increase the likelihood of a community to riot.

Structural Explanations of Rioting

In addition to studying the types of people most likely to participate in riots, sociologists have also examined the structural conditions of cities that contribute to rioting (Myers 1997; Spilerman 1970, 1976). To understand the role that black churches played in preventing race riots after the civil rights movement, other causes of riots must be taken into account. Spilerman (1970, 1976) conducted a great deal of research into the variables that influenced the occurrence and severity of race riots in the 1960s. After testing various explanations of rioting, he determined that the only significant predictors of rioting were the size of the non-white population in the city and a dummy variable for southern states. Spilerman’s (1970, 1976) research found that non-white population was positively associated with rioting; the larger the non-white population, the more likely a city was to have riots. He justified this finding by concluding that the size of the non-white population “relates directly to the ability of the Negro community to mobilize a disorder, and also to the number of incidences occurring in a ghetto which might precipitate a disturbance” (Spilerman 1970:643). These riots, in addition to being more likely to occur, became more severe as the non-white population increased (Spilerman 1976).

Spilerman’s use of a dummy variable for Southern states showed that riots occurred less frequently and were less severe in the South than in the North (1970, 1976). Several explanations have been offered for the significance of the “South” variable in Spilerman’s research and subsequent analyses. Spilerman (1976) explained this effect as a result of the repressive nature of race relations in that region, “A southern city tended to have fewer and less violent outbursts, possibly because Negroes in that region held lower expectations regarding improvements in their circumstances and were more fearful of retribution from participating in racial protest” (p 790).

The view that riots were fewer in the South because of a fear of retribution, however, seems inconsistent with the path of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Threats of violence did not prevent protests in the South, even as fire hoses were sprayed at peaceful protestors and bombs were thrown into the homes of controversial leaders. Oberschall (1978) argues that institutional repression failed to end the Movement. Instead, it was internal weaknesses in organizations that caused the decline in organized activism during the 1960s.

In my analysis, I hoped to find that black churches politicized communities in a similar way as they had during the civil rights movement. The politicized communities, with few legal outlets for grievances, would turn to violent protests instead. To ensure that an effect that black churches may have had on rioting was not simply mirroring the effect of religiosity in general, I also examined that religiosity, generally, and test this relationship, I looked at the relationships between other types of religiosity and rioting. If black churches actually did have a positive correlation with rioting, then the effect would likely be different than the effects observed from other types of religious participation. Black churches should have a positive correlation with rioting, while other forms of religiosity should not.

Data and Methods

To test the relationship between black churches and rioting, several concessions had to be made. The American Religion Data Archive (ARDA) gathered the religion data used in the study. ARDA collects religious information every ten years, to supplement the lack of religion data in the US Census. I used the ARDA “Churches and Church Membership in the United

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-White Population</td>
<td>Natural log of total non-white population of the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent black denomination</td>
<td>Percentage of total adherents in county belonging to American Methodist Episcopal Zion or Christian Methodist Episcopal denominations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Baptist</td>
<td>Percent of total adherents in county belonging to any of the eight Baptist denominations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Religious</td>
<td>Percent of total county population who are adherents to a religious denomination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
States, 1980 (Counties)” data set which provides the number of adherents, by county, to over 100 religions and religious denominations.

A 1970 data set from ARDA is available. However, this set failed to differentiate any of the seven major black denominations from their larger denominations. The 1980 data set includes the measures for the African Methodist Episcopal Zion and the Christian Methodist Episcopal churches, two of the major historically black denominations. Although the 1980 ARDA includes these two denominations, it neglects the five other significant ones: the National Baptist Convention USA; the National Baptist Convention of America; the Progressive National Baptist Convention; The African Methodist Episcopal Church; and the Church of God in Christ (Steenland et al. 2000). Instead, the churches that belonged to these denominations are included within the larger denominations. The absence of these five denominations is troublesome for the accuracy of the study because it makes it impossible to distinguish the black churches from the others.

The limitations on the black church denominations caused us to look into other possible, less direct, measures of the effects of black religion. Many black churches are Baptist churches, and these churches were frequently associated with the civil rights movement. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. preached at a Baptist church, as did Rev. Abernathy. “In 1977, the American Baptist Churches, U.S.A. had more blacks than any other denomination. The denomination’s 1.6 million members included 200,000 blacks” (Fitts 1985:302; see also Progressive National Baptist Convention 1977). However, Baptist African Americans are not confined to the American Baptist Churches, U.S.A. They span across the various Baptist denominations (Fitts 1985). As such, I created a Baptist category that included all Baptist denominations for each of the cities. This category was the sum of the adherents in each of the eight Baptist denominations in ARDA. Although not all adherents in the Baptist variable are African American, in cities with larger nonwhite populations, a significant amount of the Baptist population is likely to be African American. This allows the Baptist variable to reflect black religious composition in a county, even if this measure also includes other races as well.

Carter (1983, 1986) previously assembled the riot data, as well as the population data for the cities. The data set includes the race riots in the United States from 1964 to 1971. The city sizes and non-white populations are from 1970 U.S. Census tabulations. The data are sorted by city, with the 125 largest cities included for my analysis. I limited the sample to 125 cities to reduce error in using county religion data to approximate a city’s religious profile.

| Correlation Coefficients and Univariate Statistics for Independent Variables |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
|                                            | 1         | 2         | 3         | 4         | 5         | 6         |
| Total City Population                      | 1.00      |           |           |           |           |           |
| Southern State                             | -.139     | 1.00      |           |           |           |           |
| Log of Non-White Population                | .586**    | .093      | 1.00      |           |           |           |
| Percent Black Denomination                 | .272**    | .331**    | .355**    | 1.00      |           |           |
| Percent Baptist                            | -.147     | .834**    | .037      | .344**    | 1.00      |           |
| Percent Religious                          | -.126     | .136      | -.085     | .098      | .104      | 1.00      |
| Mean                                        | 421881.2  | .38       | 10.646    | 2.176     | 16.7922   | 49.9431   |
| Standard Deviation                         | 808489.6  | .486      | 1.241     | 3.643     | 16.28871  | 11.77942  |
| Minimum                                     | 110938    | 0         | 7.91      | 0.00      | .61       | 27.34     |
| Maximum                                     | 7894851   | 1         | 14.41     | 20.43     | 59.38     | 88.73     |

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
1971. The majority of the cities—all but 22—experienced at least one riot, but the number of events varied significantly. The greatest number of riots occurred in New York City; the city had 18 in the time period. The mean number of riots for the 125 cities was 3.29 with a standard deviation of 3.235.

As shown in Figure 2, a strong correlation exists between the South and the size of the Baptist adherence. The Pearson Correlation coefficient of .834 indicates a strong positive relationship between the southern region and the percentage of Baptist adherents. The Baptist adherence percentage varied greatly among the cities; Baltimore, MD (Baltimore County) had less than 1 percent (.61 percent) of its religious adherents in a Baptist denomination, while Knoxville, TN (Knox County) had the highest percentage of Baptists, 59.38 percent. The percent black church variable had a strong, positive correlation with the size of the non-white population in the city. This correlation seems somewhat intuitive, however, since cities with few African Americans are unlikely to have black churches. The percent black church was also strongly correlated with the log of the total city population. This relationship is likely a result of the strong correlation between city size and size of the non-white population. As the city population increases, there is a corresponding increase in the non-white population. Alternatively, this correlation could indicate a greater amount of religious differentiation in larger cities.

As Figure 3 indicates, the non-white population size is directly related to an increase in rioting. Cities with larger non-white populations tended to experience more race riots in the 1960s and 1970s than cities with smaller non-white populations experienced. This result is consistent with Spilerman’s (1970) findings that non-white population was positively associated with increased number of riots in cities.

When performing the negative binomial regression analysis, I began by replicating Spilerman’s (1970) analysis of riots. As model 1 in Figure 4 indicates, the natural log of the non-white population was positively associated with rioting, and the dummy variable for South was negatively associated with race rioting. These results are consistent with Spilerman’s findings.

Following the replication of the Spilerman analysis, I added a variable of “Percent Black Church” to the regression. The addition of black church adherents to the data set proved to be insignificant, and had little impact upon the strength of the South and non-white population variables as predictors of rioting. The statistical insignificance of the variable likely results from its incomplete nature. Although this variable is comprised of the adherents of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-white Population</td>
<td>.422*** (.049)</td>
<td>.430*** (.050)</td>
<td>.426*** (.049)</td>
<td>.425*** (.050)</td>
<td>.436*** (.049)</td>
<td>.435*** (.049)</td>
<td>.308*** (.060)</td>
<td>.384*** (.051)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern city</td>
<td>-.509*** (.139)</td>
<td>-.455** (.147)</td>
<td>-.265 (.276)</td>
<td>-.472*** (.141)</td>
<td>-.313 (.277)</td>
<td>-.336 (.275)</td>
<td>-.4050* (.740)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Baptist</td>
<td>-.007 (.008)</td>
<td>-.013** (.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.005 (.008)</td>
<td>-.145** (.050)</td>
<td>-.007 (.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Black Church</td>
<td>-.001 (.019)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Religious</td>
<td>.009 (.006)</td>
<td>.008 (.006)</td>
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<td>Percent Baptist X Non-white Popu-</td>
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<td>.342* (.155)</td>
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<tr>
<td>South X Non-white Population</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>.013** (.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.283*** (.550)</td>
<td>-3.369*** (.594)</td>
<td>-3.291*** (.555)</td>
<td>-3.259*** (.558)</td>
<td>-3.880*** (.645)</td>
<td>-3.807*** (.655)</td>
<td>-1.984*** (.677)</td>
<td>-2.821*** (.577)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-255.28</td>
<td>-242.47</td>
<td>-242.14</td>
<td>-242.60</td>
<td>-241.27</td>
<td>-241.05</td>
<td>-238.01</td>
<td>-239.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Christian Methodist Episcopal denominations, it is not a comprehensive measure of black religion; the majority of black church adherents are included in the “Percent Baptist” variable. It remains possible, therefore, that a more inclusive measurement of black churches would be significant or would affect other variables.

The addition of “Percent Baptist,” which includes the majority of black churches, to the Spilerman model had a surprising effect (see model 3 in Figure 4). When the percent Baptist was included in the regression, the South variable ceased to be statistically significant. As discussed earlier, and shown in Figure 2, there is a strong correlation between South and percent Baptist. Since the South variable is no longer significant when controlling for percent Baptist, it is possible that the negative effect that “South” has on rioting is, at least partially, a reflection of the religious distributions in southern cities. It is also possible, however, that the strong correlation between the two variables simply causes the two to cancel each other’s effect.

Model 4 replaces South with percent Baptist. The effect shown is as expected; the percent Baptist measure has similar effects on rioting as South has. Cities with more Baptists tend to have fewer riots. Figure 5 illustrates this relationship.

To explore the effect that percent Baptist has on rioting, compared to South, I used the coefficients from models 1 and 4 to predict the probabilities of rioting in cities. Using model 1, a southern city with an average non-white population would have a predicted riot value of 2.014—approximately two riots would be expected for that city. A non-southern city with the same non-white population would have a predicted riot value of 3.352. Using model 4, a city with an average non-white population and the minimum percent Baptist (.61%) would be expected to have 3.517 riots, while a city with the maximum percent Baptist (59.38%) would have a predicted riot value of 1.638. Since the range of predicted riots is greater for model 4 than for model 1, the percent Baptist variable appears to have a stronger impact on rioting than the South variable. A city with the maximum amount of Baptists would be expected to have fewer riots than a southern city, while a city with the minimum percent Baptists would be expected to have more riots than a northern city.

To ensure that the effect of percent Baptist was not merely a reflection of the religiosity of the South, I added percent religious to the Spilerman model. Percent religious was insignificant in the analysis. The South and non-white population continued to have high statistical significance. Percent religious, while positively correlated with percent Baptist, fails to replicate the effect of percent Baptist on rioting. Model 5 illustrates these results.

**Interaction Variables**

I created an interaction variable for percent Baptist and non-white population to clarify the influence that the Baptist variable had on rioting. The interaction is a calculation of the product of percent Baptist and the log of the non-white population of each city. By calculating the product of percent Baptist and non-white population, the value is roughly equal to the number of black Baptists in the city, assuming that the number of non-white Baptists in total Baptists is proportional to the number of non-White persons in the city. Model 7 of Figure 3 shows the results of this analysis. The interaction between Baptist and non-white population helps to reveal if the two variables have different effects on rioting under different conditions.

The interaction reveals that, in addition to non-white population, percent Baptist and the interaction between percent Baptist and non-white population are highly significant. The dummy variable for South, however, loses its significance. The positive coefficient for non-white population indicates that in areas with few Baptists, non-white population continues to have a positive and strongly significant effect on rioting. The coefficient for percent Baptist indicates that the effects of percent Baptist on rioting shifts from negative to positive as the size of

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“Low” and “High” values of Percent Baptist and Non-White Population are one standard deviation above and below the mean values.
the non-white population increases; the effect of non-white population on rioting becomes stronger with increases in percent Baptist.

Figure 6 illustrates the results of the interaction by showing the predicted number of riots in cities with the specified characteristics. In a southern city with average non-white population and percent Baptists, for example, 2.18 riots would be expected to occur. If the percent Baptist for this city is increased, however, the expected number of riots decreases to 1.83. In a city with a large non-white population and a low percent Baptist, 3.84 riots would be expected. As the percent Baptist increases in this city, however, the number of predicted riots also increases.

The interaction shows that the effect of the Baptist population on rioting is affected by the non-white population of the city. As shown in Figure 7a, the percent Baptist is negatively associated with rioting in cities with average or below average non-white populations; the number of riots predicted for these cities decrease as the percent Baptist increases. At higher levels of non-white population, however, the likelihood of rioting increases as the percent Baptist increases. This pattern holds true in both the North and the South, although the interaction coefficients are higher in the North, due to the inhibiting quality that South has on rioting (Spilerman 1970).

This interaction provides significant insight into the influence of religion on rioting. Although the presence of Baptists did generally reduce the level of rioting, which was also true for cities with non-white populations at or below the mean, the opposite occurred in cities with larger non-white populations. It is not surprising that cities with low non-white populations would experience fewer riots. In these cities, especially those in the South, likely were more conservative, discouraging more militant actions in their communities. They would have been better insulated from the radicalization that was propelled by the Black Power and Nationalist movements. Their adherents would have been less likely to turn to violent protest. The coupling of Baptists with large non-white populations, however, had the opposite effect. In these cities, a large number of the Baptists would have been African Americans. This would create a situation in which the black Baptist churches would have a greater influence on the actions of the population. The belief systems that led to such strong support of the civil rights movement, of these churches may also carry over into rioting. As Paige (1971) discussed, the participants in riots frequently are those who are politically minded. The black church adherents in these cities closely fit this description of common riot participants. The civil rights activity of the black churches, therefore, may have contributed to characteristics that made individuals more likely to riot, by increasing militancy in their congregations.

These results also illustrate the power of churches to influence militancy in their populations. As Hunt and Hunt (1977) discussed, different denominations of black religions had different amounts of militancy in their populations. These correlations are unlikely to change within a few years. The militancy that encouraged African Americans to participate in
protests may be the same force that increased the likelihood of rioting.

I also tested an interaction between South and non-white population. The results of this interaction are found in column 8 of Figure 4. The interaction indicates that in the North, as previously known, the size of the non-white population has a significant, positive effect on rioting (Spilerman 1970). The negative effect that South has on rioting becomes less negative as the size of the non-white population increases. The non-white population, therefore, has a stronger effect on riots in southern cities than in northern cities. This interaction also indicates that percent Baptist is not mirroring the impact that South has on rioting. While it is true that percent Baptist is strongly correlated with South, the differences in the interactions indicates that percent Baptist affects rioting in a different manner than South does.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Weaknesses in the Data

The available data for this project created several problems for analysis. The religion data were gathered a decade after the riots occurred. It is not possible, therefore, to claim that the religion values assigned to each city actually could have “contributed to” a riot. It is reasonable to assume, however, that religious affiliation is somewhat static and changes slowly over time. So, although the religion data are not from the decade in which the riots occurred, they may be used to provide a general idea of the religious makeup of the cities in the analysis. The difference in the measures of the riot and religion data also decreases the validity of the study. Most cities, however, fill the majority of the county they reside in. Therefore, the influence of "suburban" religious adherence on the county profile will be minimal. These data limitations require that the results of this research be qualified more than what is desirable. The significance of the Baptist variable, despite the measurement error, however, suggests that this relationship could be even stronger than what is indicated in this project. A more precise measurement of the variables would help to clarify the relationship between the variables.

Riots and Protests

The civil rights movement brought the strength and significance of black churches to the foreground of American understanding. Churches organized sit-ins, protests, and boycotts; the government responded through the repeal of Jim Crow laws. The significance that the black churches played during the 1950s and 1960s in the United States can be difficult to overstate. They provided leaders, funding, participants, and organizational support for the civil rights movement; they acted as cultural hubs for African American society (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). After the civil rights movement ended, the black churches no longer organized protests and marches, but continued to be—and still are—significant elements of African American culture (Baer and Singer 2002).

Although the percent black church variable was incomplete and proved to be insignificant, a great deal can be learned about the impact of religion from the Baptist variable. The interaction between non-white population and percent Baptist indicates that, as Smith (1996) explained, religion has the ability to pacify its followers, but it also has the ability to inspire or encourage social change. My analysis suggests a similar idea. In populations with average or below average non-white populations, high concentrations of Baptist adherents can discourage rioting. This likely reflects the larger number of white Baptists in the population, but could also be an indication that black Baptists in these communities are less radical due to the cultural domination of whites. In cities with large non-white populations, however, a large percentage of Baptist adherents can increase the likelihood of rioting. This interaction suggests that the size of non-White Baptists in a city generally has a positive effect on rioting behavior, although the interaction can only roughly measure the black Baptists in the city.

This relationship can seem logical if rioting is viewed as an extension of protesting (McAdam 1982; Turner 1969). During the civil rights movement, the strength of black churches helped to fuel the protests that were occurring. The black churches—and black church adherents—at this time became inseparably tied to politics and civil rights activity (McAdam 1982). Black church adherents became highly involved in protest events. These church members were highly integrated “into the most organized segments of the black community,” and the roles of the church members were extended to include participation in the movement (McAdam 1982:128). This politicizing of religion created a mobilized African American community that was sensitive to civil rights issues. As the civil rights movement ended and the nonviolent tactics became less effective, however, these individuals may have become disheartened by the government’s inaction. Individuals, like these, who are highly integrated into the community, politically minded, but frustrated with the government are often the ones who participate in rioting (Paige 1971). The potential for “militancy” among churchgoers also suggests that these riots are an extension of the protests that occupied the previous decade.

Impact on Spilerman and Other Riot Research

The finding that the variable of percent Baptist causes the South dummy variable to become statistically insignificant is an important one. Spilerman (1970), in his analysis, determined that, “if nothing else, nonwhite population and South are certainly efficient predictors of rioting. One can do better in predicting disorders with these two variables than with all other clusters and South” (p. 644). My research suggests that this provides an incomplete picture of rioting patterns. It is important to consider that there are cultural factors about the South that differentiate it from the non-South. If these individual social qualities can be separated from a general category of “South,” then it may be possible to determine the specific qualities in the South that inhibited rioting.

It is also vital to acknowledge that, although the South and Baptist variables are strongly correlated, the Baptist variable did not completely mirror the effect of South on rioting. As was previously discussed, the role that the percent Baptist played in the community changed as the non-white population changed. This indicates that the percent Baptist is not merely replicating the results that Spilerman (1970) found to be true for South.

The research suggests that black churches were an empowering force in the community. The energy created through the mobilization of communities in the South was funneled into non-violent tactics that ended Jim Crow in the South. In the North, however, where Black Nationalism pressured churches
towards more militant and radical messages, the communities’
protests frequently were more violent—riots, rather than sit-ins.
This could explain why Spilerman found the South to have a
negative relationship to rioting; the black churches in the South
were not radicalized to the extent that the northern churches
were. Ultimately, additional research will be necessary to deter-
mine all of the conditions that created regional differences be-
tween North and South, but religious differences will clearly
play an important part in this analysis.

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Notes
1. These eight denominations are: American Baptist Associa-
tion; American Baptist Churches U.S.A.; Baptist General
Conference; Baptist Missionary Association; Conservative
Baptist Association; Separate Baptists in Christ; Seventh
Day Baptist General Conference; Southern Baptist Con-
vention.

2. For a description of variables, see Figure 1.
Abstract

This paper creatively outlines the cognate characteristics of Goffman’s normative expectations and Foucault’s regimes of truth as a discussion piece. I believe integration is useful for all disciplines that utilize Goffman and Foucault. I feel that academic compartmentalization has maintained a division between both theorists and that little has been written to integrate their work. I also argue that they are cognate concepts, one at the micro-level and one at the macro level, and that both are cognate to the “self-organizing systems” of Chaos Theory. Using the new cognate of self-organizing power systems, social change, and radical social movements can be expected through boundless creative actions that permeate self-organizing power systems. Major theorists such as Mead, Goffman, Garfinkel, Foucault, and Gladwell are outlined along with anecdotal evidence of the implications and application of the integration of Goffman and Foucault with the concept of the self-organizing system. Anecdotal information includes the Berkeley riots, September 11, Pakistani shame raping, and the recent debate concerning the remarks of the president of Harvard University.

Keywords: Chaos Theory, Foucault, Goffman, Power

Introduction

General Overview of the Problem

In sociology and other disciplines, there is a tendency to maintain strong divisions between theoretical concepts that are cognate. Because of this tendency towards academic compartmentalization, conceptual overlap often result in discipline-specific duplications of esoteric language. Thus, when two discipline-specific concepts are cognate, and can be synthesized into one overarching concept, the result may speak with more clarity and with broader academic implications. Removing one extra layer of conceptual language is appropriate when nothing is lost in translation. I believe that is the case with conceptions of power.

First, this essay seeks only to be creative—no, to be boundlessly creative, and advance the sociological imagination through academic curiosity and a love for new theoretical questions. In this writing, I discuss the similarities of Goffman’s “normative expectations” with Foucault’s “regimes of truth” by claiming that they both reflect the inherent conceptual components of the “self-organizing power system.” I treat Foucault’s regime of truth and Goffman’s normative expectations as theoretical cognates and sociologically useful in the description of a self-organizing power system. I also claim that self-organizing power systems are highly permeable through boundlessly creative actions. I begin by outlining the underlying assumptions, propositions, and consequences of those propositions. Next, I outline the work of Gladwell, Goffman, Garfinkel, Greene, Foucault, Chaos Theory, and Self-Organizing Power Systems. Finally, I demonstrate, through anecdotes of creative action, how self-organizing power systems can be permeated. Ultimately, I hope that this creative discussion demonstrates the power that the individual actor is able to utilize. A movement towards individual utility of power is the impetus of social change and is imperative for social sustained social progress. I also hope this theoretical joyride opens up further discussion into serious attempts at integration.

Assumptions

I support the assumption that the human actor enjoys a type of freewill. The limits of this freewill are hedged only by the limits of the creative action of that actor. Rather than seeing the actor as only being able to rely on preexisting structural resources such as language and culture, the actor is capable of creative action that is completely beyond any pre-existing cultural knowledge. Thus, there is infinite creative potential in each actor that may never be realized beyond the actor’s own consciousness. Therefore, there is always the ability to act in a way that does not sustain or reflect current cultural knowledge. To accept this argument, one must accept the premise that we are not bound by creative action—creative action is boundless.

Truly boundless, creative actions are beyond the routinized experiences of day-to-day life. Once boundlessly creative actions are interpreted by others through language, they become categorized as human and cultural, sub-cultural, or deviant. However, until that gestural and symbolic interpretation occurs through language and culture, the behavior exists internally as boundlessly creative—and is a social unknown. In reference to social interpretations of novel, creative action, Berger and Luckmann (1966: 26) state, “Typically, therefore I ‘distort’ the reality of the latter [new behaviors] as soon as I begin to use the common language in interpreting them, that is, I ‘translate’ the non-everyday experiences back into the paramount reality of everyday life.” Though this boundlessness may not appear practical in everyday life, the impact of boundless creativity has indeed been the impetus for the social change of power systems throughout history.

For this writing, power is defined as “agency, driven by conscious and unconscious motivation, in which the actor or actors seek to maintain, redress, utilize, or manipulate certain social facts or arrangements through the use of those same arrangements and the other actors within the boundaries of those
arrangements.” This means that power is defined as coming from the system itself, and, more importantly, the actors within that system.

**Propositions**

In reference to power, both normative expectations and regimes of truth are framed with the following three propositions. [1] Power, as expressed through both normative expectations and regimes of truth, is crystallized in a tenuous, systemic formation. [2] Power systems are highly permeable [3] Power systems are permeated by boundless creative action, no matter how seemingly insignificant. [4] Power systems are self-organizing in nature.

Framing the above propositions epidemiologically, Gladwell (2000) outlines the tipping point of social change whereas the individual is intimately connected to others in society. Along with this, the ability to execute the beginnings of social change comes down to only three social facts: [1] A few people can make a big difference. [2] The message conveyed must be packaged to “stick” in the minds of the audience. [3] Context is very important. In other words, social change is assisted by occurring at the right time in the right place with the right environmental support. Like a virus, one alternative action can unleash a chain of events which alter the normative expectations of the specific context in which they occurred and possibly that of the broader regime of truth for that political landscape.

**Consequences**

No matter how seemingly insignificant the action, there are three power-related consequences to action. [1] The action is positively or negatively sanctioned, and the existing power system maintains its formation. [2] The action can disturb the power system, causing the system to be structurally modified by the disturbance. [3] The action can destroy the existing system, with a new system rising and forming in its place.

I believe that most actions, no matter how radical, generally result in consequence one or two—with two being the most likely result. History bears this point repeatedly. It is important to recall the three propositions of power systems, as they are [1] tenuous, [2] highly permeable, and [3] self-organizing in nature.

**Theoretical Framework**

**Foundations**

Regardless of the particular cultural theatre, there exist systems of power that pervade every social context within that theatre. Power systems range from broad, macro-level global-state actors to micro-level interactions by individual actors in dining rooms and taverns. Power systems exist as the current bedrock definition that determines both symbolic, conscious and gestural, unconscious action. When an action occurs in a manner that is reflective of the current context, it is an active response to the prevailing normative expectations and/or regimes of truth—in other words, the prevailing power system. The perceived norms of a situation, which reflect underlying assumptions about power, allow the actor to have a social template from which to judge the appropriateness of self-action and the action of others. Even when action is not consciously reflective of contextual expectations, the actor still tends to be-have according to this underlying bedrock of power, regardless of whether or not the action constitutes the complete act as outlined by Mead (1934). In other words, the social act can occur apart from conscious realization.

Many times an individual action that runs counter to prevailing power systems has little recognizable social consequence. Thus, the individual actor errantly interprets, substantiates, and transmits the idea that social change is out of reach. This is a mistake. The most nominal of gestures, when coupled with other supportive factors such as a perception of subordination, assistance from other actors and/or smoldering social conflict can create large-scale power-system upheaval. To be adequate, many times the consequences of an action are only recognized after-the-fact such as latent functions or dysfunctions that exist as unintended consequences of action.

Turning to the work of Goffman and Foucault, we find that both offer insight into the question of power from different levels of analysis. However, their perspectives are decidedly cognate. Hacking (2004: 300) states, “Foucault gave us ways in which to understand what is said, can be said, what is possible, what is meaningful—as well as how it lies apart from the unthinkable and indecipherable. He gave us no idea of how in everyday life, one comes to incorporate those possibilities as part of oneself. We have to go to Goffman for that.” I offer the idea that Goffman and Foucault are more than complimentarily situated at opposing ends of the analytic spectrum. Rather, they can be integrated as equivalents.

**Goffman**

To begin, I accept the thesis of the “presentation of self in everyday life” by Goffman (1959). The actor moves in and out of differing contexts and differing situations within those contexts, which results in modifications in the presentation of self. This is always related to informal identities and formal roles that are both ascribed and achieved within that context. As an actor moves from one context to another, their demeanor, language, attitude, and posturing can change to reflect the prevailing normative expectation, and for our purposes, regime of truth. In other words, normative expectations and regimes of truth are based in the social realm of relationships and assumptions about appropriate action within the context.

Goffman does not explicitly state his stance on the notion of power systems though it is pervasive implicitly in his theoretical architecture. Goffman (1959: 242-3) states, “When an individual appears before others, he knowingly and unwittingly projects a definition of the situation, of which a conception of himself is an important part. When an event occurs which is expressly incompatible with this fostered impression, significant consequences are simultaneously felt in three levels of social reality—personality, interaction, and social structure.” In this case, the three-part action-alignment with the prevailing power system is crucial to creating and maintaining coordinated social action in a way that is reflective of that power system.

Action-alignment can be consciously or unconsciously used by the actor to extract power from the available power system formation. Goffman (1959: 3-4) says, “Control is achieved largely by influencing the definition of the situation which the others come to formulate, and he can influence this definition by expressing himself in such a way as to give them the kind of impression that will lead them to act voluntarily in
accordance with his own plan.” Regardless of intentional, Goffman’s observations stand-alone with respect to normative expectations and power. The concepts offer and reflexively demand adherence to a prevailing attitude of appropriateness for the situation.

Social situations, contexts, and interaction exert a form of power on the individual. Rogers (1977) nicely extrapolates the elements of power from Goffman’s work piece-meal. Rogers (1977: 90) states, “Interaction, whether strategic or not, necessarily affects behavior insofar as copresence typically demands modes of behavior (e.g., speech) which are generally not exhibited by solitary individuals.” It should be noted that this ability to demand a certain brand of behavior from others is not always apparent to the individuals involved. This is not to say that the actor is not savvy to status and power differentials in the various relationships encountered in everyday life, but that social interaction typically does not allow consciousness of power to be a resource at all times. Rogers (1977: 90) states, “It can be inferred that power is a capacity which exists but may or may not be used.”

One potentially subversive action within the micro-sociological context of normative expectations is role distancing. According to Goffman (1959), while people certainly carry formal roles in everyday life, they also carry informal identities that require varying amounts of subordination while acting upon the formal attributes and behavioral characteristics of the role. The actor assumes a stance that is a reflection of what the actor assumes is expected within the minds of the audience. However, an actor can distance themselves from their respective role by allowing aspects of their identity or other roles to seep out from underneath the formation of the current power system. Role distancing allows the prevailing power system to be permeated, which demonstrates the fragility of the power system itself.

Through all social activity, the individual remains a viable agent of boundless creativity. Regardless of the oppressiveness of a particular context, the individual always has a choice to make—either conforming to the prevailing regime of truth and/or normative expectation, or defying the power system by acting differently and role distancing (Goffman, 1959). The individual can exact a type of freewill from every situation. With this agency comes the gift of choice, option, and possibly a completely novel idea as the catalyst of radical social change. This does not mean people do not resist in subtle, passive aggressive ways, as this is a day-to-day reality much the same.

Foucault’s conception of power systems describes how the actor feels comfortable, pleased, and enticed to act in a way that reflects the normative expectations or contextual regime of truth. From this standpoint, Foucault substantiates Garfinkel’s demonstration that power system disturbances result in discomfort, confusion, displeasure, and even anger for the other actors in the context of that power system. This also links Foucault and Goffman through the behavioral expectations of power systems that are experienced by the actor.

For Foucault, power systems can be breached in even the direst of circumstances. Even in concentration camps in which power is seemingly absolute, the individual has the power to resist. From Rabinow (1984: 245), Foucault states, “...[N]o matter how terrifying a given system may be, there always remain the possibilities of resistance, disobedience, and oppositional groupings.” Some historical research has shown that under moments of inter-group conflict, in-group solidarity increases while in-group-out-group definitional lines are streamlined and crystallized as a form of resistance or defiance. This process, though social, is also exacted by each individual within that group as a reflection of that group solidarity (Piacenti, 2000).

According to Foucault (1984), power and dominance of the individual by society is all encompassing in breadth, however, this formation of power is susceptible to disturbances by individuals or groups seizing control of the prevailing power system. When this occurs, control of the legitimized through a change in formal, legal discourse. The dominant discourse of a particular historical context is the regime of truth, and exists as a type of power system in society.

Chaos Theory: Self-Organizing Systems

Chaos theory has much to offer the social sciences. Behind the numbers and elegant computer models is a recipe for social change. This comes from the proposition that a small action can have enormous consequences. As is frequently cited in pop-science parlance, the butterfly flapping its wings in the Marshall Islands can cause a thunderstorm in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Though this is a theoretical possibility, it certainly

volved were “let in” on the project. Empirically, this demonstrates power-system proposition number two and consequence number one. The power system is highly permeable and the consequences may be nil. In this case, the disturbance was fleeting and the system self-organized to its previous state.

Foucault

Foucault’s conception of power systems is also based on the notion of high permeability. Foucault’s power system is deep and broad but demonstrates a highly permeable characteristic. From Rabinow (1984: 61) Foucault states, “If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say ‘no’, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says ‘no’, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance whose function is repression.” This means it is subtle and people largely go-along with the current system in day-to-day activity. This does not mean people do not resist in subtle, passive aggressive ways, as this is a day-to-day reality much the same.

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Chaos theory has much to offer the social sciences. Behind the numbers and elegant computer models is a recipe for social change. This comes from the proposition that a small action can have enormous consequences. As is frequently cited in pop-science parlance, the butterfly flapping its wings in the Marshall Islands can cause a thunderstorm in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Though this is a theoretical possibility, it certainly
does not happen often. The same goes for contextual disturbances in which individual actions result in little or nothing of consequence.

Related to chaos theory is the concept of self-organizing systems. The theory of the self-organizing system implies that formations or patterns found in nature are self-organizing and that the minutiae of micro-scaled events, regardless of each event outcome, continue to propagate this trend towards a type of tenuous formation. Eve, Horsfall and Lee (1997: xxxi) state, “Let sand drip from a tube upon a table for a few hours and what do you see? At first glance, you will see a sand pile. Look closer and longer however, and you will see avalanches of sand grains from time to time. [P]redicting the path of a single grain of sand in such an avalanche would defy our most powerful computer because the avalanche is a chaotic system (it involves so many interaction effects as grains of sand bump each other, the path of a single grain becomes infinitely complex to compute... however, the sand pile itself stays the same shape. It does so because it is a self-organizing system.”

Self-organizing systems also exist in computer weather models. Though storms come and go on Earth, relative calm is the reality of most geographical contexts most of the time. Therefore, it also is with social relations at both micro and macro-sociological levels. At times, the action of the individual in a context causes a disturbance or breeze. At other times, the action or actions of individuals in a context are very disruptive and a social storm occurs but can soon blow over. Lastly, an action can cause a social storm or conflict that is so severe that social relations and the power system indicative of those relations is permanently destroyed. However, when action causes an upheaval in a power system, that conflict is not infinitely sustained at an overt level. Rather, the social climate changes and eventually becomes part of a new power system formation—or “relative calm” marked by a new normative expectation and/or regime of truth. In other words, a new self-organizing power system is created.

The self-organizing system is valuable to the understanding of power systems. For my purposes, the idea of the self-organizing system is framed as historically and contextually contingent, highly permeable, and most importantly, wholly destructible. Again, there is no denial of overt or covert conflict as being integral to this discussion. As Gladwell (2000) points out, context matters, but conflict does not appear to result in significant social consequences on a daily basis.

Rather than viewing the self-organizing power system as a barrier to social change, what is implied here is that the ease by which the pebbles tumbled can be viewed similarly as the ease by which social change can occur within a system through individual action. The implications of Goffman, the work of Garfinkel, the macro-level analysis of Foucault, the actions of individuals acting alone or in unison with like-minded others, all demonstrate that a tipping point, can be reached and that power systems can be breached (Gladwell, 2000). After large-scale social change, the self-organizing system of power returns as either a modified, or an entirely new formation. By breaking norms, acting differently, boundless creative action, or social movements, the individual is quite capable of causing social change. Though not every action of resistance results in large-scale change, chaos theory allows us to realize that it might. Though not every flap of a butterfly wing causes a storm, occasionally it happens.

Empirical Anecdotes

September 11th

The above propositions and consequences to action can be empirically noted throughout history. As example, never before in history have 19 individuals’ piloted four commercial planes into two large non-military commercial buildings housing a variety of people in an urban public space. This was an act of boundless creative action, and had to be categorized into Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) “paramount reality” in hindsight. Even the meaning attributed to the kamikaze pilots in World War II is fundamentally different on a historical, contextual, and cultural level. In the case of the 19, the tipping point of the prevailing United States political power system had been reached. The consequences are obvious—as the creation of the Patriot Act and the Department of Homeland Security, as are reflections of consequence number two. That is, a modification in the existing United States political power system is occurring with the above bureaucratic structures and the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Pakistan Gender Rights

A few people can also change power systems that are cultural, rather than political. Recently a woman in rural Pakistan was shame-raped as part of centuries old tradition. Instead of allowing this to happen without retribution, as it has for a long time, she fought it and demanded the men involved be arrested. She brought the case to the Pakistani Supreme Court. She won. This case changed Federal, State, and, most importantly, tribal law concerning this centuries-old custom. Not only did she win, but similar cases in other cultural contexts are now finding a social climate of acceptance in which to be heard. Social change has been enacted. Both the 19 and the Pakistani woman demonstrate boundless creative action and the validity of the propositions of Gladwell (2000). A few people can make a big difference, and the context in which the few people operate makes a difference. The “stickiness factor” is also evident in the case of September 11, as the “war on terror” continues to be a symbol of the current political regime of truth while other shame-rape cases are emerging as new, normative expectations. Regardless, each is a new self-organizing power system.

The Berkeley Riots

In the 1960’s, social turmoil in the United States caused the higher educational power system to be modified in accordance to consequence two. The Free Speech Movement on the campus of the University of California-Berkeley and many other campuses of higher education is a prime example. Heirich, (1971: 10) states, “The explosion that rocked the Berkeley campus and reverberated across the country was triggered by actions so innocuous, in themselves, as to leave the uninitiated totally perplexed. How could such trivial events shake a university to its core?” This example is also congruent with power system proposition two and Gladwell’s first proposition—the power system was modified, and the modification was due to the actions of only a few people in the right context.

President Summers

Recent statements by President Summers of Harvard University concerning the innate inability of women to become proficient in the “dry sciences” is a good example of the ramifi-
ocations of discourse that is contrary to the prevailing institutional regime of truth and the normative expectations of the audience within that context. After Summers made this statement, some female scientists got up and walked out. In addition, the President’s job is being “called for” publicly. This is an example of consequence two and quite possibly consequence three depending on whether or not President Summers is released and whether or not the new power system will be similar to the old. Chances are it will be modified but similar.

Flash Mobs

Another recent phenomenon that has made headway into the insights of the individual upon power structures is flash mobs. Loosely defined, flash mobs are groups of individuals who belong to an electronic, web-based list-server, which sends out periodic announcements to its members in order to coordinate and choreograph random acts of non-violent civil disobedience and generally mild forms of norm violation and deviance. Examples include over 1000 people converging on an intersection and engaging in a pillow fight at a pre-determined time. Though harmless, traffic was disrupted, not to mention the order of the context in which the individuals converged. In another similar example, a student moviemaker provided footage of twelve cars, four-wide driving the speed limit on a major city freeway. Though not actually breaking the law, this stunt caused the disruption of thousands of commutes and backed traffic up for miles. Flash mobs demonstrate the capabilities of the individual, when coordinated with others, in altering the powers structure and potentially bringing the social structure to its knees.

Immigration Protests

“A day without a Mexican,” though only the title of a movie, was a reality for many U.S. cities in recent protests concerning the change in immigration laws. When the word got out that a proposed law would make felons of illegal immigrants, their children (regardless of age), and social service agencies who aided and abetted, people individuals used cell phones and blogspots to amass a group of protestors that reached 500,000 in only a few days of coordination. It should be noted that local Hispanic-market radio stations also played a key role in the mobilization, but the power of the individual and their networks was also integral to the success of the protests. In all, this effectively halted the progression of ill-fated Sensenbrenner House Bill-4437, and created a new context of negotiation concerning immigration reform and the economic realities of migrant labor in the U.S.

In Sum

Certainly, when the 19 pilots, the Pakistani woman, the students of Berkeley, and President Summers performed their disruptive action, conflict at various levels of intensity and with various amounts of social salience were at work prior to the observable actions. In other words, the environment has to be receptive of the action in a way that fosters a viral spread that has the potential to disrupt the current self-organizing power system. Though each scenario is different culturally, historically, and contextually, each shares a common element. That common element is the unyielding impression that self-organizing power systems are tenuous and highly permeable, and that the breach of such systems, regardless of micro or macro level, are possible through boundless creative action and an environment with the proper nutrients to foster large-scale social change.

Conclusion

Self-Organizing Power Systems

The metaphor of the pile of sand as an infinitely complex, self-organizing system is practical for sociology. As new pebbles are introduced, there is a natural breaking point where the sand tumbles. However, the form is not altered beyond what appears to be the shape of a sand pile. Therefore, the power system moves beyond a threshold of tenuous formation to a place where it self-organizes by reestablishing a state of relative balance (Eve, Horsfall et al., 1997). This same process exists at the micro-level as evidenced by the work of Goffman and Garfinkel, and at the macro-level as outlined by Foucault. Once the sand pile (power system) topples, it becomes a new type of sand pile (power system), and the process begins anew. Maybe one grain (actor/action) will not affect it (consequence one). Maybe one grain (actor/action) will affect it but it will not completely avalanche (consequence two). However, maybe one grain (actor/action) will cause an avalanche of the entire system—causing a new power system to self-organize and begin its movement towards a new, tenuous formation (consequence three).

To reiterate, in a self-organizing power system, relative calm does not imply the absence of conflict. Heirich (1971: 35) states, “Despite occasional flare-ups, and ruffled feelings most of social life remains orderly, even harmonious. Even when hostility is open and recognized, the occasions for direct confrontation are relatively rare.” This is a good example of how Chaos Theory’s weather model applies to the climate of social relations on an everyday basis. Though there is some validity to the idea of relative social calm, the potential social climate for direct confrontation is continual. The illusion that the opportunities are rare is just that, an illusion. Behind the social veneer of the self-organizing power system, behind the power that is perceived, acted upon, and not acted upon, exists a nothingness—and when this self-organizing power system is permeated through boundless, creative action, it becomes evident that this “power” can be very thin.

Power systems do not try to change for they are self-organized, but that does not mean they are inapproachable by the individual. However, they will exist in one form or another, beyond the life of any one individual. They are, in a word, institutional to humans. They are quite permeable, but it must be reiterated that there is always a new power system on the Eastern horizon emerging and self-organizing as the toppled power system sets in the West. Similarly, Simmel (1921: 11) in Etzkorn (1968) describes society as being simultaneously created and destroyed by stating, “Left to itself, however, life streams on without interruption; its restless rhythm opposes the fixed duration of any particular form. Each cultural form, once it is created, is gnawed at varying rates by the forces of life. As soon as one is developed, the next begins to form; after a struggle that may be long or short, it will inevitably succeed its predecessor.”

In conclusion, there are three propositions of power which frame this discussion; [1] Power, through normative expectations and regimes of truth is crystallized in a tenuous, systemic formation. [2] Power systems are highly permeable [3] Power systems are self-organizing in nature. Next, there are three power-related consequences to boundless creative action;
[1] The action is positively or negatively sanctioned and the existing power system maintains its current formation. [2] The action disturbs the power system and causes the system to be modified by the disturbance. [3] The action destroys the existing power system, and a new power system emerges in its place.

Freewill and boundless creative action is at the heart of this argument. Permeating the self-organizing power system is possible at every imaginable sociological level. It is up to the individual actor to cause disturbances in the power system. Inaction by the actor will get the actor just that—inaction. Using this framework, we can understand the implications of Goffman and Foucault and the cognates of normative expectations and regimes of truth in a way that simultaneously describe self-organizing power-systems and a type of individual freewill, which continually threaten their very existence.

Notes
1. On pages 17-8 of Mind, Self & Society, Mead states, “Contrary to Darwin, however, we find no evidence for the prior existence of consciousness as something which brings about behavior on the part of one organism that is of such a sort as to call an additive response on the part of another organism, without itself being dependent on such behavior. We are rather forced to conclude that consciousness is an emergent from such behavior; that so far from being a precondition of the social act, the social act is the precondition of it.”

2. This information comes from a master’s thesis on the topic of slavery and group solidarity. Using the theories of mead, Goffman, and Shibutani, the context of inter-group conflict and in-group solidarity within slavery in the Southern United States is explained.

3. For more on this bill, see www.icirr.org for a complete description of the bill parameters.

Bibliography

Since the fall of state socialism, the ideals and aspirations of past Left goals seem increasingly hopeless and unrealizable, often deferring to some recapitulation of Keynesianism. The political arena is, by many popular perceptions, a fixed no-fly zone for intervention; the very notion of a pluralist system exists more as an historical dream than a present reality. More than fifty years since Herbert Marcuse published his manifesto on one-dimensional society, increasing isolation of the academy and hopelessness in the streets leaves few inroads for new social possibilities or radical critique. The pressures of neoliberal globalization and neoconservative domestic politics—to say nothing of internal strife and confusion—have sunk the social and labor movements into a crisis that can get deeper only in death.

The paradox of expanding potentialities in the economic sphere and the ever-more rigid paralysis of social and cultural forms is central to understanding the structure and content of the opposition. Against the backdrop of this schizophrenia and the lurid torpor of Liberalism, there is, however, still reason for hope. For the first time, the technological capability to network social movements on a global scale is at hand, which makes the reliance on a party or a national vanguard less likely and perhaps even less feasible. The global justice movement—so called for its organizational structure and disparate but-related claims and goals—has made a habit of disruptive and inspiring protests of the leading proponents of empire, at times in coalition with the large sections of the labor movements. In this paper we seek to highlight an emergent political perspective—the anarchist spirit within the global justice movement, a thread of radicalism which has at times claimed great victories in the streets, confused more than a few media pundits and intellectuals, gained both the ire and admiration of the Left and Right, and despite this controversy remains a concomitant part of the new social movements.

Brief Genealogy of Anarchism

The European conception of anarchism of the mid and late nineteenth century—largely promulgated by Bakunin, Stirner, and Marx and Engels’ primary anarchist interlocutor, Proudhon—arose amid wildly contested intellectual and political activity (Thomas 1980). That revolution seemed possible, indeed even inevitable, gave the discussion a sense of urgency. Could society be changed through the state? Did communism or state socialism provide the necessary conditions for human freedom, or would the state have to be abolished with the mechanisms of capitalist production as well? Though Marx and Engels were at the heart of this controversy, little of what they wrote was in fundamental disagreement with the majority of anarchist conceptions of a free society. The notion of a dictatorship of the proletariat was an unfortunate phrasing, having given rise to a multitude of misreadings, not the least of which stir from reactionary currents of anarchism.

Politically, Marx and Engels understood the state as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie; philosophically (stemming from a critique of Hegel) they viewed it as a mediating force among human relations. The primary disagreement among the various radical camps hinged predictably not on the end desires for freedom and equality, but the mode of revolution. Where Marxists tend to view the state as a vehicle for social transformation, anarchists maintain that the state paradigm, as a mode of the centralization and accumulation of power, stands to uphold modes of domination no matter who sits at the head of the table. Against a positivistic sense of communist logic, the state will not “wither away,” they say. Anarchists contend the world in which state powers are merely rearranged, or change hands to fulfill a revolutionary objective, reinforces the deck of cards metaphor—a set of suits and symbols and hierarchies no matter how you shuffle.

The rich public debate around anarchism that evolved in Europe was relatively absent in the US. The deep philosophical tendencies suspicious of the state that were present in the European tradition do not inform early US anarchism as strongly. Historically, the US anarchist current emerges amid the libertarian tendencies within the socialist movement, in particular organized labor. At the turn of the century, the anarcho-syndicalism of organizations like the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) occupied the militant, radical space within the mainstream labor movement that communism—boosted by the victories of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—would come to hold in the forties and fifties. The Knights of Labor, the first large scale national workers’ organization in the US, took a lukewarm stance on class struggle and union militancy, yet as the late nineteenth century economy dipped in and out of frequent depressions, working class sentiment often openly opposed capitalism (Murolo, Chitty: 2001). The American Federation of Labor initially associated itself with this radicalism, but as it grew later denounced it in favor of a more liberal populism.

Still, some of its member organizations—most notably, the Western Miners’ Association—helped build radical alternatives. The IWW arose from this impulse, and while it originally attracted socialists as well as anarchists (the Socialist Party often divided along lines of affinity for the IWW), its rejection of the political party system and emphasis on direct action and mass strikes lost it supporters in mainstream socialist ranks. The chronic history of infighting and government repression helped weaken the organization, and in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution (support for which was strong in the US
left and immigrant communities), further eroded their numbers and strength. By 1927, when anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti, two Italian immigrants accused of robbery, were executed, anarchism had lost nearly all its sway in the US left.

The anarchist impulse, so often associated today with the cultural aesthetics of contemporary youth movements, actually emerged with a critique that looked much more old left than new left, engaged as it was with the political economy of work and labor.

A resurgence of the anarchist spirit in the US appeared again in the late forties and fifties as an outcropping of pacifist activism and in alliance with organizations which opposed the Cold War. Though small in comparison to those activists who advocated electoral politics as a means to oppose instances of war, anarchists and pacifists opposed political violence in general, and often led the charge to employ tactics like civil disobedience and strategic property damage.

Anarchism probably earned its reputation for violence in Europe, where terrorism, assassinations, and “propaganda by the deed” were more common anarchist practice. But even in the US, many anarchists joined the friends of Abraham Lincoln Brigades that fought against Franco in the Spanish Civil War, supported Alexander Berkman (Emma Goldman’s lover who tried twice unsuccessfully to assassinate steel baron Henry Clay Frick), and advocated armed struggle in labor battles. In the sixties, Weatherman and the Black Panther Party were more influenced by third world Marxist-Leninist and Maoist resistance movements though the fixation on violence was confusing for some who wanted to equate such action with anarchism. Despite this historical link to violence, anarchism has, according to Barbara Epstein and Chris Dixon, “often provided a too-often ignored moral compass for the left.”

In the late seventies and early eighties, the nonviolent direct action movement against the nuclear power industry and nuclear armaments was influenced by anarchist principles. The emphasis placed on large-scale direct action and civil disobedience that was developed in the sixties, and the consensus decision making processes inherited from the Quakers, framed a logic of protest whose aims were often electoral reform, but with tactics which epitomize anarchist practice—suspicious of hierarchies and forms of domination, hoping to sway public opinion with moral arguments and actions that involve personal risks. While it would be foolish to claim this movement—which ended as the arms race declined at the end of the Cold War—was an anarchist movement per se, it would also be unwise to overlook the remnants of anarchist practice that informed it.

This example illuminates an interesting development in social movement history. While the theoretical, humanist, and explicit anti-statist positions of anarchism are often overlooked (or dismissed as utopian) many popular and successful US social movements employ tactics developed and pioneered by anti-authoritarian socialists and anarchists and base their moral claims on similar foundations. Practical anarchist tactics and strategies, in other words, have tended to outlast theory and egalitarian aspirations. In this context, students of social movements often detect an anarchist sensibility present in many radical movements of the past few decades. This is most true today of the global justice movement.

**Global justice activism**

As capitalism has extended its reach into all corners of everyday life—exemplified most notably by the privatization of almost everything, especially natural resources, healthcare, and education—there has developed a global “anti-neoliberalist” movement that confronts the expansion of the limits of capital and its social, economic and environmental consequences in varied and interconnected ways. Alternately, this movement has been called the anti-globalization movement, the globalization movement, anti-corporate globalization movement, the anti-capitalist movement, and the movement of movements, more or less interchangeably, none of which satisfy a great degree of accuracy. For us, the term Global Justice Movement represents the most suitable label for the diverse formations, goals and objectives within the movement.

The movement exists not as a unified front, but rather as a series of interrelated movements. Where previous left movements have at times consolidated their power in political parties or front organizations, the global justice movement’s characteristic organizational style is its decentralized power base. Moreover, the structure and sometimes the critique of this movement bare the obvious mark of an anarchic sensibility in its core values, operating procedures, tactics, and desired outcomes.

Naomi Klein, in her manifesto-esque essay, writes:

This kind of impression is reinforced by the decentralized and nonhierarchical structure of the movement. Rather than forming a pyramid, as most movements do, with leaders up on top and followers down below, it looks like an elaborate web. In part this web-like structure is the result of internet-based organizing. But it is also a response to the political realities which sparked the protests in the first place: the utter failure of traditional party politics.

But what is this movement, and where did it come from? Or: “Who sent out the memos?” The answers very widely. Some say Seattle was a coming out party, while others claim it began over 500 years ago, at the dawn of resistance to imperialism. Both these positions have merit. Most, however, situate the movement’s origins at a particular confluence of both political-economic factors and levels of organized resistance.

Kiely (2005) points to Polanyi’s theory of a “double movement” as a method of explaining the rise of the global justice movement at the end of the twentieth century. Similar to Polanyi’s diagnosis of the socio-economic situation a hundred years earlier, when “instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system” (Polanyi, 57), the rise of neoliberal capitalism in the eighties and nineties constitutes the ‘first phase’ of such a new double movement. In both instances the formation of a ‘separate’ economic sphere, with its tendency to dominate all facets of social life, leads to a “second phase”: a counter-movement of organized resistance and efforts to regain some control over the market. At the end of the 19th century, this phase constituted struggles for universal suffrage, the rise of mass politics and trade unions. Today the protests against the politics of IMF, World Bank, G8 and WTO suggest growing opposition to the disengagement of capital from social relations and its detrimental byproducts: uneven global development,
increased inequality and poverty, environmental destruction.

Officially, push came to shove on January 1st, 1994 in Mexico, when Zapatista rebels took up arms against NAFTA. Undeniably the inspiration of the Zapatista struggle to the burgeoning global justice movement was found less in their actions than in their rhetoric. Predictably, the mainstream press grabbed on tightly to the apparent Marxism-Leninism of the uprising, situated as it was in the Third World; articulated, as far as anyone could tell, against the Mexican state. For clarity’s sake, one of the first communiqués of the Zapatista army sought to set the record right. “We wish not to seize power,” they said, “but to exercise it.”

Chiapas has been a revolutionary tourists’ Mecca since the uprising began, and a light in the dark for anti-authoritarians who questioned the statist position but had no alternative to offer. Two years after the uprising began, activists from across the globe met in the muddy jungles of Chiapas with Zapatistas to discuss plans at The International Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism, which essentially led to the birth of the network mentality for the modern global justice movement, most notably Peoples’ Global Action (PGA). PGA is the international network that first drafted the call to protest at the WTO in 1999; from its inception the federation included constituencies as diverse as Maori indigenous groups in New Zealand, anarchists from Spain, Indian farmers’ organizations, and the Canadian Postal Workers’ Union.

According to their web page, PGA

“is not an organisation and has no members. However PGA aims to be an organised network. There are contact points for each region, who are responsible for disseminating information and convening the international and regional conferences; an informal support group that helps with fundraising; a website, numerous email lists; and a secretariat.”

PGA’s style is symbolic of the movement’s structure as a whole, and its characterization as a network, as decentralized, as autonomous, as international, all tend to color it with sympathies for anarchism.

The majority of the objectives, goals, and campaigns of various components of the global justice movement have an international focus. Graeber (2002) points to Ya Basta!, an Italian anarchist organization whose handle derives from a slogan of Zapatista resistance meaning, “Enough already!” They support a guaranteed basic income, global citizenship, and equal access to new technologies. Further, one need only to look at the main sites and targets of protest in the last ten years of global justice activism to ascertain an emphasis on internationalism: the WTO meetings in Seattle (1999) and Cancun (2003), the IMF/World Bank meetings in Washington D.C. (2000) and Prague (2000), the meeting of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in Quebec in 2001, as well as the G8 summits in Genoa (2001) and Scotland (2005).

If there is any overriding public face of the movement it is summit-hopping. Activists regularly establish convergence spaces that act as a base of operations for trainings, medics, and street protest information weeks in advance of meetings of large international financial institutions. Generally, it is local activists who call protests and who are responsible for much of the internal infrastructure of the convergences. From there the scene generally involves a collage of union organizers marching lock-step in the streets, mixed with roving bands of punks on bicycles, organized street medic teams, well-rehearsed theatrics and elaborate costumes, black-masked rebels, fire-breathing performers, Zapatista supporters, and a small army of frantic organizers screaming into Nextels. So-called “Carnivals Against Capital” have hopped up at almost every decision-making meeting of the WTO and IMF since November 1999. We remember walking through tear gas on April 16th, 2000 in Washington DC with a friend as a motley group of students on stilts and workers dressed as butterflies repeatedly shouted at a line of riot cops the familiar refrain: “This is what democracy looks like!”

“Maybe my reading of the Federalist Papers is the deficient one,” our friend told us, looking at the spectacle in front of us. “But somehow I don’t believe this is what Madison or Hamilton had in mind.”

Amid the carnivalesque spectacles of these demonstrations, it is admittedly sometimes difficult for the casual observer (e.g. most Americans) to discern a unified plea or a common grievance. Despite its diverse and seemingly fragmented constituencies, opposition to the neo-liberal globalization project unites the global justice movement. The diverse criticisms from within the movement might be summarized in the following five points: (1) opposition to increased exploitation, e.g. through free-trade zones and the abuse of cheap Third World labor for First World consumption; (2) criticism of intensified social inequality between countries by the marginalization of certain regions and peoples and the apparent lack of effective redistributive mechanisms; (3) opposition to global political inequality, in particular to US hegemony; (4) resistance to a perceived cultural homogenization or the “inequality of cultural flows”; and (5) opposition to continued environmental destruction by disregarding the “social costs” of production and consumption; criticism of the limited success of global environment conferences, like the Kyoto Accords in 1998.

But if the anarchist sensibility is the modus operandi of the global justice movement, shouldn’t the uncompromising abolition of the state be at the top of the list of complaints? Also, as an organizational style, anarchism is typically considered apropos only in small, insular environments, and seems all the more incongruous with rising globalization and a global social movement. As the world gets bigger, shouldn’t it automatically undermine a social project that, at its best, is applicable only on a small scale?

Anarchism and the Global Justice Movement

The "New New Left" differs fundamentally from the revolutionary movements born at the end of the nineteenth century in a number of ways, one being the most general and useful here: while the Leninist format was widely accepted and followed as the only course for struggle, no single ideological construction drives the new social movements. Rather, the new politics embraces a multiplicity of tactics, forms, and ideologies, which constitutes a qualitative shift both in rhetoric and action—suspicion of hierarchies and bureaucracies in organizational structure, de-emphasis on the state as the fulcrum of radical change, and a dedication to elaborate and disruptive street protests against institutions of meta-governance and corporate globalization. It’s not the case that self-identified anarchists comprise the majority of global justice activists, but that the movement as a whole tends to embody many of the principles often associated with anarchism.
Graeber contends, somewhat anhemically, that “Anarchism is at the heart of the movement, its soul; the source of most of what’s new and hopeful about it”. While the anarchist sensibility is certainly vital, as we have tried to make clear, it’s not always central to what the movement actually does. Rather, the power of the movement, and the possibility for it to grow, lie not in its philosophical and/or structural foundations but in its continued insistence on emphasizing the role of resistance in transforming everyday life, and in giving material existence to some rather immaterial targets—the secretive WTO, the Washington Consensus, global warming, etc. The World Social Forum (WSF) is the crowning achievement of the global justice movement not because of its potential for political power, though that is of high importance. More to the point, it represents the union of demands for changing daily life and raises issues pertinent to that end—the burden of debt, the quality of food, the commodification of health care and education, the solvency of corporate-political elite governments, the ownership of bio-technology.

Anarchism may not be the soul of the movement, but it is the force, which has tended to most dramatically re-shape the left and help promote the idea of global justice and global resistance. As a political philosophy, the ethical standpoint of anarchism, which emphasizes equality, participation, and access, has enlarged the ability of radicals to make socially relevant moral claims on a global scale, leading many to theorize the development of a “global civil society,” that exercises “global solidarity” with an understanding of “global norms and rights”. Though many have welcomed what they view as a more open and democratic field of political engagement, others are more skeptical.

Tariq Ali claims, for example, that there is a “virtual thesis” within the global justice movement--we can change the world without taking state power—that is hindering our ability to consider fully the objectives and necessities for real radical change. He credits the Zapatista movement, in its ability to capture the imagination of the world, for fomenting a brand of revolutionary doctrine that, while possibly useful in Southern Mexico, is mere fantasy anywhere else. Ali is hardly alone in this criticism; the social democratic parties generally acknowledge the gains won by the movement, gains which they feel are greatly limited by the burden the anarchist sensibility places on the movement.

Responding to Ali’s remarks, Andrej Grubacic, an anarchist student leader of the Serbian resistance to Milosevic, says that changing the world without taking power, “is about the refusal to accept the disastrous idea, which, somehow, still refuses to die, of the separation of ends and means, which always leads to a divorce between the ‘vanguard’ and ‘another world’.” Grubacic highlights the essence of prefigurative politics and the consistent demands by anarchism that the movement actually reflects—with regard to diversity, solidarity, equality, etc—to the greatest degree possible, the future society.

Critiques like Ali’s have considerable merit and weight, however, and not only because of his notoriety as a veteran street fighter. The anarchism within the movement, in its push for radical equality, diversity, solidarity, and often-complete distrust of organization, sometimes has the effect of derailing the movement and collapsing it inward on itself. Too often the fear of hierarchy leads to the abandonment of the entire notion of structure and organization, and by default anarchist organizations defer to a politics of openness that tends to maximize painstaking and tedious analysis of internal issues of democracy at the expense of the issue at hand—neoliberalism, war, etc.

In the first place, it is in the name of efficiency and efficacy that Ali’s complaints make sense. His criticism is practical, but it underscores obvious theoretical tensions the anarchist spirit tends to engender within the movement—the mode of organization and question of the state.

On movement organization

All revolutionary action is collective, and all collective action requires some form of organization. All organization requires some degree of bureaucracy, which implies hierarchy and a division of labor. All hierarchy involves exclusion and domination, and the exercise of power of one group over another, especially when many constituencies with various goals and priorities are involved. This is the take-it-or-leave-it logic of social movement-building, which anarchism struggles to undermine and modify.

Just weeks after the May revolts in Paris, 1968, student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit wrote, “What we challenge is not the need for this [organization] but the need for revolutionary leadership, the need for a party.” The revolutionary year of 1968 – in politics, social norms, culture, and styles of resistance – represents the most direct ligature between the old left and the anarchist sensibility that inspires today’s movement for global justice. Many young radicals today are repeating/continuing Cohn-Bendit’s call, the shortcomings of totally decentralized activism becoming increasingly evident.

For example, anarchist organizer and scholar Ezequiel Adamovsky, active early in the Argentinean assembly movement and the massive street demonstrations that helped oust three different presidents in just one week, explains what he calls a “double recapturing” of the revolutionary momentum. He laments the degree of disorganization that prohibited the radicals and antiauthoritarian activists in Argentina from being able to build a movement with wider parts of society, when the fervor of revolt finally died down and everyday Argentines returned to their loyal parties and bureaucratic organizations.

“In the months following the 2001 uprising, the people of Argentina turned off their TVs and opened their ears to hear us. Sadly, in this moment we didn’t have any real alternatives to offer them. And, not surprisingly, there was then a double recapturing. The people were recaptured by the state; and the activist movements were recaptured by the Leninists and the nationalist left.”

The Argentine situation exemplifies what many anti-authoritarians consider to be a step towards horizontalism, a system of networked social movements (the unemployed workers’ movements, the asambleas, the piqueteros, the occupied factories) that are organized non-hierarchically. Nevertheless, the road to social transformation is paved with more than good intentions, and Adamovsky’s point highlights a common fate of radical alternatives—they often end up in the hands of those with the most clout, power, and historical significance, who are not the stewards of their true possibilities. In light of the growing ineffectiveness of summit-hopping protests—of which the recent anti-G8 demonstrations in Scotland were especially illustrative—many anarchists are calling for some degree of formalism within the movement. The idea of anarchist organization to most people is comically ironic, the punchline of a bad
movement joke. The real irony of course is worse—the insistence on maintaining non-hierarchy and avoiding any kind of alienating leadership often comes to dominate every practical decision and step taken by an organization/movement, evoking notions of what feminist writer Joreen Freeman called the tyranny of structurelessness. (Freeman, 1970)

Can this be overcome; can anarchists and the global justice movement develop new modes of organization without the alienation and oppressive character of the old left and still be effective? PGA’s impetus to coordinate lasting relationships and alliances with myriad international organizations is a case in point. The recent changes in the Zapatista organization constitute a stronger example. For ten years, the “Autonomous Municipalities” in Chiapas inspired social movements around the world interested in horizontal forms of social organization and control. Then, late in 2003, the Zapatistas announced a system of reorganization with the creation of “Good Government Junta’s” situated in buildings called “Caracoles.” Where some saw this formalization as a consolidation of power (indignant Mexican political leaders denounced the idea of a “state within a state”), it became soon clear that the new structure hoped to alleviate issues of inequality within the Zapatista territories and, interestingly, to “confront problems of autonomy.”

Marx says “to be radical is to go to the root, to make a ruthless critique of everything.” Anarchism does this quite well, but recently many have been for want of something more substantive. To that end radicals of various stripes have embraced thinking that makes attempts toward such formalizations. The reverence for a politics of openness has often tended to sidestep the possibility of vision for a future society, or even a mechanism for a transformative process. As Adamovsky (2005) points out, a lack of internal structure seems linked to the inability of new social movements to even consider formal alternatives to capitalist organization. Undoubtedly one of the primary objectives of socialist organizers in the 1930s and 1940s in the US was to inspire in people—through labor unions and civil organizations—a possibility for a new way of life, a better way of life. Anarchism makes claims about a world free of domination and hierarchy, and is eager to agree that “another world is possible.” But how? And what might it look like? Some new thinking is trying to meet this need. Many say the World Social Forum, the defacto annual meeting of the movement, which, as it has grown in recent years, attracts tens of thousands from around the world, including heads of state in Latin America as well as thousands of disaffected youth who establish a camp outside in protest of the “coup” the political parties have engineered over “their” movement.

The WSF is not an anarchist project. Nevertheless, the experiment in doing politics without a party, as a network of organizations, is as worthwhile to anarchists as anyone else. In that sense many new anarchists join the chorus of voices who would like to see a return to more open, democratic, and egalitarian politics within the social forum scene. They also tend to view the local social forums more hopefully, for their potential to help build, empower, and radicalize local institutions.

Generally speaking, a primary goal of the social democratic parties, the NGOs, and liberal street protesters—many of whom make the trek to the WSF year after year—is to enlarge the role of the state relative the economy in the hopes that the political sphere can better serve the citizens and act less at the beck and call of capital. Even a quick perusal of the literature produced and distributed by global justice activists will show an impressive emphasis on the desecration of the national state qua sovereign power over territory and economics. The WTO makes decisions for the EU, the IMF places demands on Central America, the World Bank controls the African continent, and so on. The strategy of expanding the scope of the nation-state largely follows the theoretical perspective that the state, as a locus of sovereign power for local governance, has eroded during the age of globalization, and that the job of the movement is to re-invigorate its role in politics and social life over the domination of the market. In other words, to enlarge the welfare state. Anarchists generally view the welfare state, which is often lauded as the pinnacle achievement of the organized Left, as a massive lumping of apologies for the exigencies of capitalism. In exchange for the falling rate of profit, there is the minimum wage; for the division of labor and alienation in the workplace, the right to form a union; for the greater fulfillment of leisure time, the culture industry. The state, as an enormous mediation, serves the fundamental legitimation and reproduction of a system based on exploitation. Philosophies that disavow the state as an impediment to true freedom and those which seek to enlarge its capacity and charge are often irresolvable conflicts that play themselves out in the movement as disagreements over the nature of power and prospects for change. Therefore, the model of social change that instrumentalizes the state by enlarging its powers is obviously antithetical to the goals and politics of anarchism.

On the state

Never is this tension more tenuous than at the World Social Forum, the defacto annual meeting of the movement, which, as it has grown in recent years, attracts tens of thousands from around the world, including heads of state in Latin America as well as thousands of disaffected youth who establish a camp outside in protest of the “coup” the political parties have engineered over “their” movement.

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The question of how to engage the state and what demands to place upon it has always been at issue. But because corporate-led globalization and institutions of meta-governance (WTO, IMF, World Bank, etc.) have altered the fundamental nature of the state’s relationship to its territory and constituency, the problem is even muddier today. In light of the declining power of states to recognize claims made by their constituents, because of pressure from international capital, radicals are often quick to highlight a disturbing paradox of today’s mainstream national social movements: the capacity and incentive for social change are inversely related.

While anarchists certainly see political power as useful
to movements and important for democratic organization, they do not envision that power as rooted in a large state apparatus. Ideally, anarchism grants the space for multiple forms of the consolidation and organization of power, and at various points the global justice movement has inspired some interesting examples.

The historical struggles of the anarcho-syndicalists in the times leading up to and during the Spanish Civil War often typify what many anarchists think of when they consider a working anarchist movement. And though today the Zapatista struggle has captured more hearts and minds of many young radicals—authors included—the experiences of the Argentinian uprising in the wake of the 2001 economic collapse may be more instructive to the global North when considering prospects for a social movement that values direct democracy, mass organization, and direct action.

Naomi Klein’s and Avi Lewis’s recent documentary, The Take, explores the movement of unemployed factory workers to occupy their factories after bosses shut the doors and locked them out when they ceased to be profitable. Today over 15,000 people work in occupied factories in Argentina, as well as schools, hospitals, and other businesses. And the movement is growing. The film documents what Klein has dubbed “the new impatience”—a sentiment she says is insinuating itself around the globe (from Seattle to Soul) that takes issue with the reform-oriented politics of social democratic parties and also the alienation associated with hierarchical forms of organization. The movement of recovered factories operates as a network, working as allies when necessary, and autonomously when appropriate, and many of its supporters shun the political system altogether, refusing to vote in national elections. Around the same time workers began recovering jobs in closed factories, Argentinean neighborhood assemblies were popping up like weeds, relatively autonomous councils of neighbors and community leaders, to discuss plans for action to respond to the economic crisis. The assembly movement grew to typify the new politics—small-scale autonomous groups of working class people committed to local struggles within a global context that developed alternative institutions and workplaces. Activists saw the building blocks of a possible dual power movement emerging and quickly joined the assemblies, eager to help shape a kind of political consciousness that might grow and strengthen its capacity for political action.

Movements must not seize power in order to exercise it. Having followed developments for more democratic forms of governance in Chiapas and taken pointers from the new social movements in Argentina, new anarchists are investing in institutional reforms of governance and government institutions that have been won by workers and are worth expanding upon, for example, and what parts purely serve the interests of capitalists and heads of state? If nothing else, all of these questions are helping to further discussions on real radical alternatives for social organization—what society might look like without a state, and how the movement itself can best reflect those wider aspirations.

Conclusion

The anti-capitalist movement that claimed a clear victory in Seattle when the millennium round of the WTO collapsed amid the African member nations’ refusal to accept the terms and conditions of first world trade rules is at a critical stage. Since September eleventh, the bombing of Afghanistan, and the horror of the Iraq war, the movement has been reeling. The labor movements, which backed the street protesters in 1999, have been nowhere to be found. In the wake of the attacks, plans to protest the IMF/World bank meetings in Washington were all but scrapped. Many leaders of the movement have become preoccupied with anti-war activism, a cause that has been, at times, difficult to publicly connect to the same movement that shook Seattle. The recent passing of the wildly contested Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA, which essentially expands the scope of NAFTA from Chiapas to the Panama Canal), after it lingered for years in Congress because politicians were afraid to touch it, was clearly a disappointing loss. For the global justice movement now is a time of reckoning.

Can anarchism contribute to the movement’s dire need for self-reflection, new forms of democratic/horizontal organization, and a more proactive and inspiring call for everyday resistance? Can anarchists in the movement find a way to push the limits of activism and organizing in a way that leads to a more bottom-up, popular movement that values solidarity, di-
versity, and direct action? Can we change the world without taking power?

Anarchists do not produce much theory. This dearth of theory production complicates an analysis of what anarchists think and do and why they do it. In recent times, John Holloway, an autonomous Marxist thinker, has risen to the forefront of interest in anarchist circles because he asks the question of the day: “can we change the world without taking power?” Holloway is the latest progenitor of a new kind of antipolitics, and may well be the anarchists’ answer to Hardt and Negri (whose work has helped to breath life into more traditional Marxist ideas about imperialism and revolution). Both reserve a soft spot for postmodernism and advance theories of revolutionary practice that at times, require some mental acrobatics to comprehend. Holloway’s main contribution, as per the concerns of this inquiry, is that he establishes a dialectic within the concept of power—power-over and power-to—a Spinozist formulation which attempts to reinstate the role subjectivity plays in revolution. He envisions the revolutionary process as interstitial, “a revolution that takes place in the interstices of capitalism, a revolution that occupies spaces in the world while capitalism still exists.” The degree to which these interstices resemble a state or a movement is, of course, up to the movement itself and remain to be seen.

The movement for global justice is a coordinated international assault on global neoliberalism, a movement whose leaders and participants are drawn from thousands of diverse struggles around the world. Occasionally they meet and come together in dramatic moments of “collective effervescence.” There is not consistent widespread cooperation on individual issues across borders yet, though the international anti-war protests of the last few years encourage that tendency. Without a central command, no intelligentsia, and comparatively informal modes of organization, disagreement (rather than consensus) is often the engine of activity, and the movement proceeds at times in myriad directions, with an open spirit reflective of the Zapatista adage for their struggle to change Mexico: “Walking, we ask questions.”

We view this muddling through as problematic but also probably the necessary grappling with ideas that question traditional left thinking, the basic tenets of which haven’t been challenged in decades by social movements. The anarchist sensibility that today survives after decades of mutation nevertheless maintains the importance of keeping all eyes on the prize—change life. And do it in a way that minimizes alienation, maximizes mass participation, and is sustainable, which cannot happen if one state continually replaces another.

The American left has always faced a double conflict—attack from outside and internal strife, both of which have at times proved to be the graveyard of radical possibility. This is the dilemma new anarchism finds itself in today—at odds obviously with the mainstream political party system, with the social democrats and Leninist-minded activists within the global justice movement, and sometimes torn from within by conflicts over ideology, practice, and structure. None of these conflicts are likely to subside soon, though they help to make sense of the intermittent success and failure of anarchist projects and the degree to which the anarchist spirit ebbs and flows in popularity within the new social movements.

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SectionID=41&ItemID=7588


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Notes

1. Or, as Leo Panitch puts it, the pluralist choir sings “with a distinctly upper-class accent.” (Aronowitz; Bratsis 2002: 90)

2. According to Hardt and Negri, “The possibility for democracy on a global scale is emerging today for the very first time.” (Hardt; Negri 2004: xi)

3. Demonstrations in Seattle, Genoa, and Davos, against the WTO, G8, IMF, being prime examples.


5. See Epstein 1993.

6. Here we mean those organizations and individuals who value diversity and are committed to global solidarity, justice, equality, and popular participation rather than the nationalist protectionism of some right-wing anti-globalization groups (see also Kiely, 178-179).

7. The term anti-globalization movement, probably the most popular vernacular in mainstream press, is an inversion of the truth: The object of most of the global justice movement is not to stem the tide of globalization, but to transform the terms by which it happens. Most of the other names given are either too narrow, too broad, or resemble a pan-glossian approach that has the tendency to collapse the myriad and varying interests of the movement’s constituents into a single phrase.

8. For further discussion about terminology, see for example Graeber 2002, pg. 62-63.


11. Referring to the 1999 anti-WTO protests that brought the movement, and the WTO, onto the radar of popular consciousness.


13. The exception being the WTO meeting in the scenic destination of Doha Qatar, a small island nation which still has a reigning monarchy, and is less than amenable to public protest.


15. Term coined by David Graeber.


17. Obviously the forums, large as they are, fulfill myriad purposes within the movement. Brand (2005) suggests that the “fantastic atmosphere” of WSF serves an identity formation function and affirmation of (non-)participants and their positions, is needed for the search of “emancipative alternatives” to neo-liberal project, calls it “a gigantic education event”, and an “important symbolic counterpoint” to WEF/G8/UN meetings.


20. We feel compelled to report (not in search of an ironic or telling twist), that Daniel Cohn-Bendit, whose name became a symbol of young revolutionary spirit in Paris, and who published an absolutely spectacular book on the burden of “Obsolete Communism” of his day, is now a member of the European Parliament.


22. Contrary to high hopes, the anarchist spirit at the G8 demonstrations failed to materialize in any coherent form of protest or critique. There were squabbles with police, a few haphazard road blockades, and a fence was torn down. It was by many accounts a low point for the movement both in terms of creativity and efficacy. It shows that in a vacuum of organization and vision past tactics and strategies tend to reassert themselves, even in contexts that don’t necessarily accommodate them.

23. See Communiqué of the EZLN. (http://www.ezlnaldf.org/comunicas/english/030728en.htm)


26. Most theories of economic globalization posit the existence of some change in the sovereign power of nation-states. It would be ridiculous to assert, in the face of the US-led war on terror and the political hegemony the EU and US continue to enjoy, that nation states are reduced to impotence. Nevertheless, as states in the developing world have come increasingly under the jurisdiction of the IMF, World Bank, WO, etc, a case can certainly be made that the power of these states, as sovereign political actors, is often displaced by institutions of corporate globalization.

27. For an elaboration of dual power strategy and a critique of Biehl and Bookchin’s work, see Brian Dominick: “Grassroots Revolutionary Strategy.” (http://www.zmag.org/AWatch.note.htm)

28. The answer, of course, is completely ambiguous.

29. See Holloway, 2005: http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=41&ItemID=7588
Abstract
The proliferation of the Independent Media Center (IMC) network throughout the world in recent years has been frequently reported upon by communication scholars, but rarely by organizational sociologists. The radical, decentralized, and democratic structure and processes used by IMCs is contrary to that used by all mainstream corporate and state-run media. This paper briefly describes the IMC movement in terms of organizational sociology, and then explores the structure within individual IMCs, the IMC global network, and the external environment of the movement. Anarchism may be seen as an ideological and organizational framework directing the movement, and suggestions are made to explore this possibility as well as other questions not yet examined by scholars.

Keywords: Indymedia, radical social movement, alternative media, anarchism

Introduction
The Independent Media Center (“IMC” or “Indymedia”) movement is a network of autonomous, radical collectives that publish alternative media in a variety of mediums, covering demonstrations against capitalism, states, and human rights abuses throughout the world. Since its inception in 1999, the network of IMCs has grown to include over 150 independent centers on every continent in the world (except Antarctica), in a dozen languages, all using democratic decision-making processes, an open-publishing system that encourages public participation, and a radical opposition to conventional media creation.

None of the literature on the IMC movement in academic, peer-reviewed journals comes from sociology journals, but mostly from communications and journalism journals. This is unfortunate, because Indymedia is not only a source for alternative news, but also a clear example of radical organizational structure and methods. Similar to Rothschild-Whitt’s (1979) collectivist-democratic organizations, which organize in egalitarian, cooperative, and democratic ways, Indymedia takes participatory media to the Internet and to radical social movements. Indymedia emulates many of the same traits found in these collectivist-democratic organizations, while extended them beyond their own internal structure and into a international network of IMCs linked together on the same principles.

This paper has two goals. First, I explain the Indymedia movement in terms of major organization theories, including rational, natural, and open systems theory. By drawing out the organizational connections to Indymedia from the existing literature, I hope to extend the understanding of Indymedia as an organization itself.

Secondly, I note that there are two important intersections with the Indymedia movement and anarchism: 1) the common presence of anarchist participation in local IMCs and more importantly 2) the anarchistic nature, structure, and behavior of the Global IMC Network and of local IMCs. These two intersections will be explored more in-depth during future research.

About Indymedia
The IMC grew out of the anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) demonstrations that took place in Seattle, Washington during late November 1999. The demonstration was largely an Internet-motivated mobilization (Eagleton-Pierce 2001), particularly the segment of activists working with the anarchistic Direct Action Network (DAN) who were intent upon blockading all roads and entrances leading to the WTO meetings (Smith 2001). Media activists suspected that the message of demonstrators (especially DAN) would be shut-out of the media or distorted beyond recognition, and thus took it upon themselves to set-up various mechanisms for distributing news about both the demonstrations and the protestor’s complaints about the WTO itself (Almeida and Lichbach 2003; Eagleton-Pierce 2001; Hyde 2002; Kidd 2003a; Tarleton 2000). These mechanisms took the form of a central, clearinghouse webpage (www.indymedia.org) where anyone could get up-to-date developments from the streets, share photographs, video footage, and first-hand accounts. The IMC broadcast a half-hour TV program during each of the five days of demonstrations and published a daily newspaper (Morris 2004). These TV broadcasts were carried on many independent cable television programs, collected in an IMC-produced video called “Showdown in Seattle” (Kidd 2003b).

This alternative media model was so effective and inspiring that anti-corporate globalization activists decided to emulate Seattle’s IMC in subsequent mass mobilizations in the US, particularly the anti-International Monetary Fund/World Bank demonstrations in Washington DC during April 2000 (Tarleton 2000). Subsequent large demonstrations against capitalist globalization were also covered by Indymedia (Juris 2005; Montagner 2001).

Now, Indymedia is a central website in the anti-globalization network (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2002; Owens and Palmer 2003). The actual rate of growth has not been studied, so researchers have instead studied snapshots in time: 25 in late 2001 (Montagner 2001), 60 in November 2001 (Hyde 2002), 104 in October 2002 (Morris 2004), and 122 in October 2003 (Mamadouh 2004). Predominantly qualitative research
has been done on various individual IMC collectives: Australia (Pickerill 2003), Cleveland (Shumway 2003), New York City (Beckerman 2003), Ontario (Hanke 2005), Vancouver (Uzelman 2002), as well as IMCs in various “non-Metropolitan nations” (Downing 2003b). Mamadouh (2004) has focused on the particular geographic scale at which IMC collectives are located, such as city or metro area, country, region, or disputed territory.

The Indymedia movement offers a post-modern critique of “media” and “journalism”, by declaring: “Everyone is a witness. Everyone is a journalist.” (Montagner 2001: 14; Nogueira 2002) The movement disrupts the notion that journalists are “gatekeepers” to news, and encourages a form of “civic, public or communitarian journalism: involving the audience in the [manufacture of] news” (Platon and Deuze 2003: 341).

Platon and Deuze (2003) interpret Indymedia’s “repertoires” as a contrast of its ideology applied to its practice, and the access it offers everyday people via the process it has established (pp. 342-344). Anyone visiting an IMC’s webpage can post their own news story, photographs, video footage, or thoughts on a wide-variety of politically relevant movements. Then, anyone else can post comments, questions, and requests for further explanation or details to the original posted story (Cordell and de Silva 2002; Meikle 2003). This open-ended format encourages debate and discussion about the news reported at the IMC (Moore 2002).

This interactive mechanism further blurs the line between media producer and media consumer. IMC participants sometimes view themselves as activists and sometimes as media producers. However, there is often little distinction between the two roles. As such, IMC participants further distance themselves from the popular notion of an “independent press”, claiming that the corporate and government is not neutral, so why should social movements pretend to be neutral? Instead, Pavis (2004) asserts that Indymedia activists believe that “Journalists can and should be agents for social change” (para. 13).

**Within the Independent Media Centers**

In certain respects, IMCs may be explained via a rational systems theory, which claims that organizations are purposeful and have a high degree of formalization: IMCs have very explicit goals and transparent policies. All IMCs have their own mission statements (Morris 2004), yet all tend to emphasize their dedication towards “democratic”, “empowering”, and “passionate truth-telling”. Each IMC also has its own editorial policy stipulating how and which news bits are promoted as news. There is tension between rational and natural systems approaches to change because all members can discuss them as the “only way, forever”, but to prevent an unspoken or unacknowledged hierarchy from forming (see Freeman 2002). By making practices more formal, the practices are more able to change because all members can discuss them (Morris 2004).

Decisions in IMCs are made via a consensus decision-making process, which requires active participation (Shumway 2003). If members do not speak up—whether in “face-to-face” meetings, over email listserves, or on Internet Relay Chat (IRC) meetings—they are assumed to be in general support of the proposal being discussed. Various inequities may develop when consensus is badly practiced (Butler and Rothstein 2001) or practiced online.

**The Indymedia Global Network**

There are two main scopes of the Indymedia movement: individual collectives and the Global Network. The collectives are connected to each other via a dense network of online working groups that negotiate various aspects of the network, including “process”, “tech”, “communication”, “editorial”, “new IMCs”, and so forth. Representatives from individual collectives and other individuals work with these ad hoc decision making bodies that constitute the connective aspect of the Network’s structure (Morris 2004). The core of the Network is, and has always been, the individual IMC collectives themselves (Nogueira 2002). This federated interplay between local collectives and the Network suggests an open systems approach that considers the actions of the Indymedia movement in its totality to impact each local IMC.

Using an open systems theory approach (Handel 2003), illustrates how the Indymedia movement evolved and shows the many environmental restraints placed upon it. Open systems approach argues that organizations are shaped, supported, embedded, dependent upon, and constituted by their surrounding environments, not merely their internal own structures.

Since April 2001, a “New-IMC” process (Morris 2004) has required interested media activists where prospective IMCs are forming to connect themselves with existing social movement organizations and actors, as well as with other producers of progressive or radical alternative media. This connects the focus of the IMC towards local active social movements and offers the IMC to those movements as a potential mouthpiece for their struggles (Cordell and Silva 2002).

After admittance to the Network, individual IMCs
may remain as autonomous from other IMCs as they like or may engage in vast resource and information sharing with other IMCs. Yet, many IMCs share hyperlinks with each other, especially on issues that others are reporting of interest to their own research. This happens particularly during large demonstrations, where many IMCs band together to cover the events.

Every level of the Indymedia Network operates on consensus decision-making models. These models can and do vary, yet all consensus decision making remains as much about the process of democracy as it is the ends (Butler and Rothstein 2001; Freeman 2002), and thus decisions cannot be made prior to proposals and discussions amongst all concerns parties—usually via listserves. Thus, Laroche’s (1995) claim that organizations make pre-figurative decisions that are subsequently justified does not seem to occur in the IMC process. Indymedia does have certain pre-figurative politics, which suggest a certain approach to decision-making, but not the content of the decisions themselves. This is not to say that the process is smooth—consensus by its very nature is highly contentious. The rapid growth in the size of the Network has also contributed to increased difficulties in reaching consensus due to the diverse and sometimes divergent opinions on what the Network should do (Kidd 2003a).

Anyone with computer access can theoretically participate in nearly all of the Network’s listserves. On these listserves there are no people with positions that give them privileging amounts of power, save list moderators/owners. IMC listserves are dedicated to cooperative and collective work, thus stemming the oligarchical tendencies Michel (2003) saw as organizations grow in size. No research has been done on the concentration of Indymedia activists—particularly their real-world locations—although one can witness the long-term participation of a small number of IMC activists are many of the key listserves.

The physical hard drive space used by the many Indymedia collectives was for a long time on one web server. But, true to its political ideology of decentralization, the Network has engaged in a process of redistributing many individual IMCs and other server functions to more servers, spread-out across the planet (Hanke 2005; Mamadouh 2004).

**External Environment of the Network**

Indymedia is clearly a product of its environment(s). It grew out of radical American movements particularly the anti-corporate globalization movement (Juris 2005), which deeply values direct democracy, feminism (Breitbart and Nogueira 2004), self-determination, and liberatory politics. Indymedia retains strong roots in North America, as many of the network’s technical resources and activists remain within the United States and Canada (Mamadouh 2004; Morris 2004), although internationalist in character. Other social movements, beyond the anti-corporate globalization movement, have demanded a wider focus than the explicitly anti-corporate globalization focus Indymedia began with in Seattle. Now, many left-leaning and radical movements throughout the world utilize the IMC Network to get their message out (Kidd 2003b), including labor, environmental, anti-war (Atton 2003), feminist, civil and human rights, anti-capitalist, anti-police brutality, and other transnational movements.

Indymedia is also the product of a growing disgust felt by many for the corporate- and state-owned media (Hyde 2002). Media concentration throughout the world continues, as well as the declining quality of the media (Bagdikian 2004). As opposed to merely trying to get the message of radical movements into the mainstream press, those movements now also support alternative methods for distributing their opinions and visions (Moore 2002). Some Indymedia activists also see alternative media as a possible institution to displace mainstream media (Shumway 2003).

Due to its highly open nature, right-wing reactionaries have also played a role in shaping Indymedia’s direction and development. Right-wingers, “trolls” (online agitators who antagonize those who do not share the views of authors), and “law enforcement” agencies have provoked the IMC network to sharpen their editorial policies, security protocols, and such (Downing 2003a; Kidd 2003a; Uzelman 2002). As previously mentioned, posts which violate an IMC’s editorial policy (particularly if it contains offensive text that is racist, sexist, homophobic, etc) are automatically hidden from view (Kidd 2003a; Uzelman 2002). In response to repeated police harassment, IMCs now do not store any access logs in order to free users from fear of police reprisal. Other IMCs have created “redundant” systems in order to continue their operations should their server be seized by authorities. Perhaps in the near future (and it may already be happening) state, corporate, or right-wing actors may infiltrate IMCs in order to cause schisms or additional chaos. This would follow a well-established pattern of disruption _a la_ the FBI’s Counter-Intelligence Program that disrupted most movements on the political left in the US during the post-WWII period (Churchill and Vander Wall 2002). Such infiltration also may be viewed as a desirable alternative given the bad publicity associated with the overt repression of IMC reporters during protests or the seizure of IMC technical resources.

Indymedia is a perfect example of an organization as a system of interdependent activities: whether through webpages or radio or print, the differing aspects of the IMC’s output are dependent upon the diligence of active IMC members and the larger activist community (Morris 2004). The extent to which an IMC organizes is constrained by the energy and activity of its members and supporters. Through meetings, listserve discussions, newswire posts and comments, other media projects (like radio and print), and the activist movement’s pace itself—these activities can be either tightly- or loosely-coupled with each other. Thus, each IMC is unique and different than each other (Jankowski and Jansen 2003; Morris 2004).

**Indymedia and Anarchism**

According to Rothschild-Whitt (1979), collective-democratic organizations run counter to nearly every other form of modern organization. The values professed by the collective-democratic organizations—consensual, community-oriented, pre-figurative, egalitarian, minimal division of labor, wholistic—are arguably highly compatible with anarchist values and Indymedia movement. As mentioned above, this is one of many points of contact between Indymedia and anarchism. Contrary to popular belief, anarchism is not dedicated to nihilistic, chaotic violence, but rather towards an organized, yet horizontal and decentralized social order (Ehrlich 1996; Ward 1996).

Additionally, since the decision to form the first IMC in Seattle grew out of the highly-anarchist DAN, it is predictable that many anarchists would become involved in the functioning and design of the IMCs. Thus, many anarchists were
engaged in the construction of the early IMCs and later the Network, it is predictable that its structure would reflect many anarchist values. Downing (2003a), Breitbart and Nogueira (2004), and Shumway (2003) hint closer to this than most researchers.

**Future Research**

Although vigorously written about since its origins, most research has focused on the end results of Indymedia—the communication medium itself and its benefits for opening up new channels of alternative information for radical social movements. Yet, there are many aspects of the Indymedia movement that warrant further research, specifically how Indymedia has succeeded where other radical movement endeavors have failed. What is unique and dynamic within the Indymedia movement that has allowed it to prosper? Research oriented towards these goals might wish to focus on a few specific gaps in the literature:

1. Identify anarchist values (i.e. anti-authoritarian, autonomy, consensus, cooperation, decentralization and federation, direct action, freedom, mutual aid, solidarity, voluntary association) and apply to both the Network and individual collectives. Use these values to identify quantitative and qualitative methods for testing the hypothesis that IMCs function anarchistically.

2. Map-out the main avenues of decision-making in the Network. Determine the density of the Network by studying the links between core listserves (i.e. “cross-posting”) and activity between highly engaged Indymedia participants.

3. Plot the evolutionary timeline for all new IMC collectives. How did these new collectives develop and where did they regionally develop at different historical points? Also, what locations initially proposed an IMC to the Network and how many of these proposed IMCs successfully became official IMCs in the end—and are there patterns to those admitted and those not admitted to the Network?

**References**


Notes

1. For more on the DAN, see Polletta 2001. Also, see Maiba 2005 and Wood 2005 for more about People’s Global Action (PGA) which organized solidarity demonstrations around the world to coincide with the Seattle protests.

2. Whether in the past (Cobb-Reiley 1988; Hong 1992) or in the present (McLeod and Detenber 1999), media distortion has been a consistent dynamic during the entire history of anarchism (and other radical social movements) in the United States.