FALL 2007

Computer Law
 
Course No.  9200 711 001
Th 6:30 - 9:30 p.m.
Room W-214
Professor Jay Dratler, Jr.
Room 231D (IP Alcove)
(330) 972-7972
dratler@uakron.edu, dratler@neo.rr.com
Copyright © 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2007   Jay Dratler, Jr.   For permission, see CMI.
 

Assigned Reading
Week 1
Week 5
Week 8
Week 11
Week 2
Week 6
Week 9
Week 12
Week 3
Week 7
Week 10
Week 13
Week 4
Week 14


Week 1

Thursday, August 30:  Statute Book, Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definitions of "audiovisual works," "compilation," "computer program," "copies," "copyright owner," "created," "device," "display," "fixed," "literary works," "perform," "publication," and "transmit"), and §§ 102, 103, 106, 107 and 501(a) and (b).  (Read each statutory definition twice, once for sense and a second time to pick out and highlight or outline key words and concepts.)  Casebook, Introduction and Preface (pages iii -v), and Pages 1 - 45.


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Week 2

Thursday, September 6:  Casebook, Pages 45 - 63.  Statute Book, reread Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of "derivative work"), 103, 107, 501(a) and (b).  Casebook, Pages 63-77.

Conceptually, MAI Systems Corp. is one of the most important cases in all of computer law.  How broadly does its basic holding apply?  If you view an image from a website on your computer screen, have you made a "copy"?  Make a list of five activities that you perform daily or weekly, as you use your computer, that likely make "copies" of others' work within the meaning of MAI.  Are all of those activities infringing?  If not, why not?

Precisely what is the holding of Sega, and how narrow or broad is it?  What specific activities does the court say might be fair use?  under what circumstances?  Does the purpose of the activity matter?  What specific conditions apply to the court's holding, and in precisely what words does the court express them?  Would the result be the same, for example, if Accolade had copied substantial portions of Sega's game code?



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Week 3


Thursday, September 13:  Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 117; Casebook, pages 77 - 116.

Napster is a seminal case on the subject of fair use on the Internet.  For each use claimed to be fair, be sure you understand how the court applied each of the four statutory fair use factors.  How could you explain each result to a young client who enjoys free music?

Krause provides an important result for users of computer software.  How does the court interpret the relevant phrases of Section 117?  Does the decision makes sense in terms of statutory language?  relevant policy?  How would you advise a developer/vendor of computer software to protect herself against the rather open-ended permission that Section 117 provides?

Section 512, which appears in the Casebook at pages 100-111, is a highly complex statute.  Skim it in its entirety; then go back and read subsections (a) through (d) and (i) through (n).  Reread subsections (a) through (d) carefully.  Make an outline of Section 512.  What is the purpose of the section?  Whom does it protect?  When does it apply, i.e., what is its "scope"?  To what sorts of activities does it apply?  Do the Ellison and Napster decisions apply it as Congress appears to have intended?  What pitfalls do these cases suggest a defendant seeking Section 512's "safe harbor" might encounter in general?


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Week 4

Thursday, September 20:  Casebook, pages 117 - 167.

Tasini is a case of pure statutory interpretation. What statute is the Court interpreting, and what is its "scope," i.e., to what persons, works or activities does it apply?  Can publishers circumvent the Tasini decision by contract?  If so, is the decision practically meaningless, or are there ways in which freelance authors can still assert their statutory rights?

Altai is the seminal case on nonliteral infringement of copyright in source code.  As your Casebook points out, it prescribes a process of analysis, not an answer.  Make an outline of the steps in the analysis and the principles of copyright law on which each depends.  Does the Second Circuit give specific hints on how various aspects of computer software should be treated in each step?  What specific language provides those hints?  Why did the Altai court reject the facially simpler analysis of Whelan?   If an aspect of a computer program, such as the menu-command hierarchy in Lotus v. Borland, has become an industry standard, does Altai support copyright protection for it?

Vault and Grokster both involve secondary liability, i.e., one person's legal responsibility for another's infringement.  In each case, who was the primary or direct infringer and who was the secondary (contributory or vicarious) infringer? What was the legal standard for holding the secondary party liable?  What were the facts on which the secondary party's liability turned?  Did the result in each case make sense?  Was the Grokster Court right not to revisit the quantitative standard for contributory infringement announced in Sony?

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Week 5

Thursday, September 27:  Casebook, pages 167 - 216.

What is the purpose of Section 1201, which is discussed in Corley, Chamberlain Group, and Lexmark?  Why did congress adopt it?  Which of the three cases directly addresses Congress' purpose in adopting Section 1201?  Were the plaintiffs in all of the cases trying to protect copyrighted works from piracy?

Early in Congress' work on Section 1201, 62 copyright law professors objected to the pending bill on the ground that "liability under [Section 1201] would result from conduct separate and independent from any act of copyright infringement or any intent to promote infringement."  H. R. Rep. No. 551 (Part 2), 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 24 (July 22, 1998).  (Emphasis added.)  These professors further asserted that, if passed, Section 1201 would mark "an unprecedented departure into the zone of what might be called paracopyright—an uncharted new domain of legislative provisions designed to strengthen copyright protection by regulating conduct which traditionally has fallen outside the regulatory sphere of intellectual property law."  Id. at 25.  (Emphasis added.)  The House Committee on Commerce responded to this letter as follows:
    "While the Committee on Commerce agrees with these distinguished professors, the Committee also recognizes that the digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright owners, and as such, necessitates protection against devices that undermine copyright interests.  In contrast to the analog experience, digital technology enables pirates to reproduce and distribute perfect copies of works—at virtually no cost at all to the pirate.  As technology advances, so must our laws.  The Committee thus seeks to protect the interests of copyright owners in the digital environment, while ensuring that copyright law remain technology neutral.  Hence, the Committee has removed the anti-circumvention provisions from Title 17 [the copyright title], and established them as free-standing provisions of law."
Id. at 25.  (Emphasis added.)  The last sentence shows the Committee's intent at the time, although Congress later did codify Section 1201 in Title 17.  Based on this bit of legislative history, which of the Chamberlain and Lexmark courts had the best approach to applying Section 1201?

Does the result in American Library Association preclude laws that require manufacturers to adopt particular protective technology?  What was the legal flaw that it addressed?  Take a look at your Statute Book, Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.§§ 1002, 1201(k). Are these sorts of statutes a good way to address the risk of copyright piracy?  Why or why not?  Is there a potential conflict between these sorts of statutes and patent law?

The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act was passed in 1984, after several years of internal debate within the intergrated-circuit industry as to whether such a law was necessary or desirable.  It is largely and purposefully modeled on the copyright statute, but it has certain "patent-like" features and some unique features as well.  The Brooktree case (including the district court's decision, not reproduced in the Casebook) is the only reported decision applying the Act to the merits of a dispute.  One other case, Anadigics, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 903 F. Supp. 615, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), involved procedural wrangling, the resolution of which put some gloss on the statute.

This situation is extraordinary.  The statute has complexity and nuance comparable to those of the copyright act.  See generally Jay Dratler, Jr. and Stephen McJohn, Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, Creative, and Industrial Property, Ch. 8 (Law Journal Press 1991 & Supps.), available on Westlaw as described on my Website.  Moreover, it has been in effect for over twenty years.  Yet only a single case applies it on the merits of a real dispute.  Is this law an example of an "orphan" statute, adopted to address a particular specialized technology whose time has come and gone?

In 1984, chip manufacturers used "masks" that partially blocked visible or ultraviolet light (much like children making shadow-puppet shows in the light from slide projectors) to delineate the physical structure of the various layers of chips.  Chip makers feared that unauthorized competitors could reproduce these masks, which were expensive to develop, by etching layers from chips sold in the marketplace and photographing each layer.  Today, leading-edge chip makers use electron-beam and x-ray lithography to make chips with features whose size is a fraction of the wavelength of light, obviating the possibility of reproducing a chip through simple optical photographic piracy.  In addition, the equipment needed to produce modern chips is vastly more expensive, and the processes used to make them vastly more complicated, than in the 1980s.  Do these practical factors account for the lack of litigation under the Chip Act and render it obsolete, or did the Chip Act serve a purpose in preventing simple piracy during the formative stages of an important industry?

The U.S. patent presented in your Casebook is typical of a broad range of patents now being licensed, asserted and litigated in the United States. Skim the patent (with a magnifying glass if necessary!) and try to determine what the invention was.  Was it a machine?  a piece of computer software?  a type of business?  a business idea?  Is it a good idea for the state to grant a patent on this sort of invention?  Is doing so consistent with the principles and policies underlying the antitrust laws?
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Week 6

Thursday, October 4:  Casebook, pages 216 - 274.   Dissenting Opinion (on Merits) of Judges Archer and Nies, and Notes and Questions on Patenting Computer Programs, and More on Patenting Computer Programs.


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Week 7

Thursday, October 11: [NOTE: THIS CLASS WILL MEET ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 6:00 - 9:30 p.m.]   Casebook, pages 329 - 334; eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.; Notes on Patent-Infringement and Other Remedies; Casebook, pages 343 - 373.

Most of the substance of trade-secret law appears in the definitions in Section 1(1), (2) and (4) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  Read these provisions several times, especially the definition of "trade secret" in § 1(4).  What three elements does that definition require?  What is the essence of "misappropriation"?  What kinds of activities may constitute misappropriation?

In Lerma, why does the court worry about the propriety of the Post's acquisition of the alleged trade secret even after it had been disclosed on the Internet?  Is there a subtle interaction between the issues whether a trade secret exists and whether misappropriation has occurred?  What if an employee steals her employer's trade secret and takes it to another employer, who, knowing the secret was stolen, files a patent application on it?  If the patent application is published, thereby dislosing the trade secret, can the new employer avoid liability on the ground that there is no longer any trade secret?  Cf. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1983).

Vermont Microsystems illustrates a common use of trade-secret protection in the computer industry: to "fill the gaps" between patent and copyright protection.  What were the specific trade secrets at issue in this case?  Could the plaintiff have protected them by copyright?  Why or why not?  by patent?  Why or why not?

The Quest Software decision addresses a number of practical questions that recur repeatedly in litigation involving computer software.  These include: (1) the qualification of expert witnesses and the weight of their testimony; (2) the extent to which alleged trade secrets must be specifically identified and proven as such; (3) the effect of unoriginal elements on copyright claims; (4) the effect of general public licenses on copyright claims; (5) how to prove non-literal copying of source code; (6) the effect of the so-called "balance of harms" on preliminary injunctive relief; and (7) the use and effect of so-called "clean room" procedures in copyright litigation.

On each of these issues, did the court's approach make sense?  How much did its decision depend upon: (1) common sense; (2) the facts of the case; (3) an understanding of computer software; and/or (4) application of legal principles, such as the three-part analysis of Altai, whether directly or by analogy?  Is it easier or harder to try cases like this if the court or clerk has some knowledge of computer software?


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Week 8

Thursday, October 18:  Casebook, pages 373 - 415.

Gilmore illustrates the dangers that the federal Freedom of Information Act poses to private, commercial trade secrets and confidential information submitted to or developed for the government.   What could Sandia Laboratories (or any private contractor similarly situated) have done to protect its trade secrets if the Department of Energy had refused to stand up on its behalf, and instead had decided to honor the FOIA request?

The Supreme Court has ruled that there is no such thing as a "reverse FOIA" action, i.e., an action by a trade secret owner to challenge, rather than demand, disclosure by a government agency under the FOIA.  See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979).  The combination of the Administrative Procedure Act with the federal Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, however, does allow a trade secret owner to challenge an impending agency disclosure as "not in accordance with law" within the meaning of 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), a part of the Administrative Procedure Act.   See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, supra, 441 U.S. at 317-319.

In order to make such a challenge before the cat is out of the bag, the trade-secret owner must of course have notice of the impending disclosure, in time to mount a legal challenge before disclosure occurs.  Most federal agencies have regulations under which trade-secret owners who submit their own secret data (for example, as part of an application for pre-marketing approval) can identify trade secrets and request such notification.  It is vital for trade-secret submitters to make good use of these regulations.  Otherwise, the government might provide their trade secrets to competitors or to the public with little or no chance for an effective remedy.  See generally, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (discussing under what circumstances the government's unauthorized disclosure of private trade secrets might give rise to a cause of action for damages).

Hogan, Vault, ProCD, Specht and Bowers illustrate two important principles of contracts, both in the context of the computer industry and more generally.  First, contracts may conflict with noncontract law in ways that cause courts to refuse to enforce them.  Second, contracts may be valid and enforceable even if not executed by manual written signatures in the purportedly "normal" way.  Which cases illustrate each of these principles and how?

Consider the contract clause at issue in Vault Corp.  Isn't it a standard part of virtually every software-industry end-user license?  Can you find such a clause in the license enclosed with, or provided on a website for, software that you use in your own computer?  What type of pre-emption was at issue here?  Was it "copyright" pre-emption under Section 301 of the Copyright Act, or so-called "constitutional" pre-emption?

Was the Vault court's result correct, or was the contrary result in Bowers correct?  Does or should it matter that Vault involved a special Louisiana law?  What consequence does each result have for the viability of the rights provided in Section 117?  Which result is more faithful to the intent of Congress in enacting Section 117?  How would you advise a software-vending client who asks whether the standard "no reverse engineering" clause in her end-user software license is valid and enforceable?

ProCD is the classic decision on the enforceability of so-called "shrink-wrap" license agreements.  It was authored by one of the foremost proponents of the "Chicago school" of economics and the law.  Does the decision make economic sense?  Does it make legal sense?  Are contracts of adhesion any worse (or any better) because they are offered in a box with software?  on line?  Does/should it make any difference if "opting out" of the contract requires returning a substantial, heavy piece of equipment, such as a whole computer?  paying shipping charges for returning it?

Specht is a seminal decision on so-called "click wrap" or on-line licenses.  Did the decision properly apply the principles of ProCD?  of general contract law?

As you read the facts of Specht, imagine yourself to be the person "surfing" Netscape's website; try to get a mental picture of what you would see and do.  Would you think you had entered into a binding contract?  would the average web "surfer"?  What specific steps would you advise Netscape to take to make its contracts more enforceable, and why?  Could you recommend steps that would do the job while imposing little or no additional cost on Netscape?

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Week 9


Thursday, October 25:  Casebook, pages 416 - 465; Notes and Questions on ICANN Regime for Arbitrating Cybersquatting Disputes.

This week's cases deal with five causes of action in the general field of trademarks and unfair competition: (1) trademark infringement and unfair competition; (2) trademark dilution; (3) misappropriation of Internet domain names, or "cybersquatting;" (4) cybersquatting claims under a private arbitration regime; and (5) general common-law misappropriation.  Except for the last two, these causes of action arise under federal statutes.  But the federal claims also have state counterparts, which are usually asserted in tandem with the federal claims.  (Unlike the federal patent and copyright statutes, the federal trademark statute pre-empts very few correlative claims under state law.)

The federal claims arise under the federal Trademark Act of 1946, as amended, known as the "Lanham Act" for its chief Senate sponsor.  Specifically, they arise under: (a) Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), which covers infringement of registered and unregistered trademarks and trade dress; (b) Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), which covers infringement of unregistered trademarks and trade dress and false designations of origin; (c) Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), which covers federal trademark dilution; and (d) Lanham Act § 43(d), which covers cybersquatting.  Of the three key subsections of Section 43, (a) has been around since 1946, but (c) and (d) are relatively recent additions, in 1996 and 1999, respectively.  These causes of action are covered extensively in our course in Trademarks and Unfair Competition and, as applied to the Internet, in Cyberlaw.  This week's readings provide only a brief overview.

Sporty's Farm is the first appellate decision to apply Lanham Act 43(d), the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999 (ACPA).  Be sure to read that statute in full, in your statutory supplement, before reading the decision.

Sporty's Farm is a relatively straightforward application of the statute, but it raises some interesting questions.  First, why did Congress have to enact a special statute for cybersquatting?  What problems of application or proof might the Trademark Dilution Act of 1996, as codified in Lanham Act § 43(c), have encountered?  Second, what are the elements of a cybersquatting claim, and how easy are they to prove?  Was the ACPA a good "fit" for this case?  Was it better than a Section 43(c) dilution claim would have been?  Finally, what remedies are generally available under Sections 43(c) and (d), and how do they differ from remedies generally available for trademark infringement and unfair competition?

Olly's B.V. and Dluhos illustrate some practical difficulties of the ICANN arbitration regime in resolving cybersquatting disputes.  What problems did the complainant in Olly's B.V. encounter in trying the prove the elements of a UDRP claim in a documentary proceeding against a respondent half way around the world?  Are those problems unique to this case or likely to be common?  Several courts have reached the same conclusion as the Dluhos court with regard to the finality UDRP arbitration.  What problems does that conclusion pose for a UDRP complainant?  How should you inform a client who wishes to file a UDRP complaint of these problems, and how would you expect him to respond?

Golf Association discusses the general tort of misappropriation, i.e., misappropriation not involving a trade secret.  Ever since the INS decision, courts have viewed this tort suspiciously.  Its very existence seems to contradict the general rule that matters in the public domain, not protected by patent or copyright, are free for anyone to copy.  Did the court here pay sufficient attention to that basic intellectual property policy?  To our "fundamental national economic policy" of competition?  What might the consequences of a contrary result have been?

Playboy v. Welles illustrates an important trademark-infringement defense: the doctrine of trademark fair use.  Would comparison shopping on the Internet be possible without such a defense?

Unlike the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a specific three-part test for "nominative fair use," drawn from the New Kids case.  Is that test appropriate?  Is it flexible enough to accommodate the wide range of circumstances in which a trademark might be used for descriptive or comparison-shopping purposes, rather than for infringement or dilution?  Is the Welles court right in holding that Welles' use of Playboy's trademarks was fair in metatags but not in watermarks?  Can you articulate a persuasive ratoinale for the distinction?  Was the court right in rejecting most dilution claims?  Could Welles have provoked comparison shopping on the Web by other means?  If not, how should that fact influence courts' decisions?

Playboy v. Netscape and 1-800 Contacts illustrate different approaches to an increasingly common fact pattern in Internet advertising: the use of trademarks "hidden" in computer code to trigger advertising by persons other than the trademark owner.  In Playboy v. Netscape, the ads were banner ads triggered by search requests; in 1-800 Contacts they were pop-up adds triggered by a user's Internet activity, including but not limited to search requests.  Did the differing results in the two cases reflect a different approach to the law or different facts?  Which court's approach was preferable and why?

In the early days of search engines, it was possible to achieve higher placement in search results by repeating a single metatag endlessly.  Today's more sophisticated search algorithms have rendered that tactic largely useless.  But suppose that Welles, in those early days, had put on her website an entire page full of hidden "Playboy" metatags, causing her site to appear first on any list of results of a search for the term "Playboy."  Would or should that fact change the result in Playboy v. Welles?  Should courts try to distinguish between apparently legitimate attempts to facilitate comparison shopping and "dirty tricks" like that?  Or should courts seeks a bright line rule which, although clear, might penalize some innocent attempts to facilitate comparison shopping?  


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Week 10

Thursday, November 1:   Introduction to Antirust, Microsoft III (Section 2 claims), and Notes. Microsoft III (Tying Claim and Remedy), Notes, and further Notes.  Misuse and Lasercomb and Notes.

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Week 11

Thursday, November 8:  Casebook, pages 548 - 560, pages 694 - 698; Questions to Consider during First Reading of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (edited); Casebook, pages 503 - 508;  United States v. Morris and Notes; Casebook, pages 510 -520, pages 592 - 598.

The first two cases comprise a footnote to last week's readings on antitrust.  They illustrate how state government can restrict computer-related competition, in the second case to protect citizens' privacy.  Under an antitrust doctrine called the "state action" doctrine, state government can restrict competition in ways that private parties, acting alone or together, could not do without violating the antitrust laws.  See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-352 (1943).  Could lawyers in Texas, individually or through their private bar associations, have agreed collectively not to provide advice or information to Parsons Technology, the developer of the "Quicken Family Lawyer" software?  Could automobile dealers in New York have agreed collectively not to provide new-car registration information, for example, to a marketing survey company?

The readings and notes on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act illustrate the statute's broad scope.  Does it protect your own desktop or laptop computer?  If so, against what?

North Texas Preventive Imaging illustrates what can happen when a software vendor tries to rely on code, rather than law, to protect its financial interests.  Which of the six claims, if any, is plaintiff likely to win at trial, and why?  Which claims, if any, could defendant have avoided with a carefully drafted contract, and how?  Does this case illustrate the rule that an ounce of "preventive law" is worth a pound of litigation?

Rothenberg illustrates the serious criminal penalties in store for serious pirates.  What were the two principal factual issues that the court addressed, and how did it resolve them?  Should it have mattered that the defendants did not sell the pirated software for cash, but bartered it?

In 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that factual issues that control criminal sentences under sentencing guideliness must be decided by a jury, as the Sixth Amendment commands.  See Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2006).  Although this decision addressed state criminal sentencing guidelines, it appears to apply to federal sentencing guidelines as well.  Would a federal prosecutor have to make the same arguments differently to get a jury to accept them?

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Week 12

Thursday, November 15:  Introduction to Data Privacy; Casebook, pages 722 - 746; Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service and Notes; United States v. Czubinski and Notes.

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Week 13

Thursday, November 22:  THANKSGIVING: NO CLASS

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Week 14

Thursday, November 29:  U.S. v. Tank, U.S. v. Trenkler, U.S. v. Upham, and U.S. v. Jackson.

These four cases introduce the impact of computers on evidence in the courtroom.  In each case, focus on what specific items of evidence were at issue, what were the objections to their admissibiility or use, and what was the specific legal basis for each objections.  As you read each case, form as sharp a mental picture as you can of precisely what the proponent of the evidence introduced in court, and in what form.  Think of yourself as presenting the evidence: would you be handing the jurors a mass of paper, gesticulating in front of a computer screen, TV screen, or slide screen, or doing something else?

In Tank, for example, the evidence was in the form of "chat room logs" and printouts of e-mails.  Exactly how were they included in the record and presented to the jury?  From that starting point, conceptualize the logical, inferential links that had to be made to: (1) connect the defendant to the evidence and (2) prove the defendant's guilt.  What logical objections did defendant's counsel make?  Were they well founded, were they overcome, and, if so, how?

In Trenkler, the objection to the computer-based evidence was very basic.  Can you state it in one word?  More subtle objections were based on the jury's or factfinder's putative response to computer-generated evidence generally.  How forceful were/are both sets of objections?  Can they be overcome?  Is overcoming them simply a matter of courtroom procedure, or night overcoming them require collecting the data and/or managing the database differently?

In Upham, the issue is somewhat different: the proper scope of and authorization for a search warrant.  There are really two issues: (1) was the evidence presented to the judge (usually by way of affidavit) in seeking the search warrant sufficient to meet the constitutional standard of "probable cause" and (2) was the descripion in the search warrant sufficiently specific to avoid authorizing an improper "fishing expedition"?  Was the court's decision on reach issue right?  Could the description in the warrant have been made more specific and still have been effective?  If so, how?  Would/should a more general warrant, allowing seizure of "any and all computer equipment and media found at the [suspect] house," be sufficient?  Why or why not?

Besides being a marvelous example of vindictiveness carried to pathological extremes, Jackson illustrates the basic reason why courts are still uneasy with electronic and computer-based evidence, although computers have been with us for over half a century.  Courts suspect, not without reason, that electronic evidence is easier to alter and falsify without detection than "traditional" evidence such as paper and physical objects.

As you consider the Web of falsehood that Jackson tried to weave, consider the evidence tending to show the falsity of each fabricated link.  On what evidence was the assertion (and later adjudication) of falsity based?  Was it easy or hard to establish falsity?  Could Jackson's scheme have succeeded if she had been a little more careful, or would circumstantial evidence have inevitably refuted her claims?  How hard did the prosecutor have to work to prove his/her case, and thereby, in the process, exonerate UPS from unfair civil charges?  Is this case an object lesson in treating electronic evidence with just as much suspicion and just as careful scrutiny as other kinds of evidence?  an argument for even more suspicion?




PRACTICE EXAMINATION

FINAL EXAMINATION
 
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