

The Place of Culture: Using Surveys to Examine Intra-state Cultural Beliefs

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### **Abstract**

How does place affect the development of cultural beliefs? Previous studies of American political sub-cultures have largely treated culture as exogenous, determined by migratory patterns. Despite high population mobility in the United States, political culture is often assumed to change at a glacial pace and that culture is geographic, and not dependent on individual-level characteristics. Moreover, the use of demographic information to define cultural differences requires often untested inferences about the meaning or importance of these demographic characteristics. This paper seeks to create a survey-based measure of intra-state political culture based on a battery of questions on core attitudes towards political corruption, voter turnout, and the role of parties, and the government in the political system.

We find some evidence for the existence of four distinct cultural types in Ohio. Since the measure is survey-based, it allows us to uncover direct causal relationships between individual characteristics and cultural beliefs. We find some evidence that place, measured by region, affects individual cultural beliefs. We discuss the implications of our results and the importance of developing survey-based measures of intra-state political culture.

Political culture is an important but also one of the most elusive concepts in the study of political science. In the United States, cultural explanations have been used to account for the weak welfare state in the U.S, differences in civic engagement across communities, and as the foundation for the “red-state, blue-state” divide (Hartz 1955; Putnam 2000; Brooks 2001). Nevertheless, much like using the supernatural to explain phenomena that escape the tools of modern science, many empirical political scientists remain uncomfortable with such a nebulous theoretical concept as political culture to explain so much, believing that culture at best only represents the sum of omitted variables and under rigorous testing does not prove to be related to policy outcomes, political attitudes or individual behavior (Jackman and Miller 1996).

Yet there is continued evidence that cultural differences exist across U.S. states and regions (Lieske 2010). At the least, voting patterns show clear regional patterns that cannot fully be accounted for by demographic (or compositional) factors (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003; Erikson, McIver, and Wright, Jr. 1987.). Geographic (or contextual) factors influence citizen expectations about the role of government and the obligations of individuals, the degree of interaction between different social groups, and the types of conflicts that arise from these interactions (Elazar 1984). In sum, political cultures develop along regional lines and have consequences for the development of public policies and individual behavior (Cook, Jelen and Wilcox 1993).

In this paper, we test how political and social beliefs are affected by geographic location by examining two questions: do meaningful intra-state cultural differences exist and can they be measured through survey research? We use a study of Ohio voters during the 2008 election to test how region is related to citizen values and beliefs about the

operation of a “good” political system. Ohio is an ideal state to test these theories because it is divided into at least five regions which are culturally, economically and politically distinct. Using survey research to measure cultural attitudes provides two advances in research on political culture. First, survey measures of cultural attitudes are more dynamic and may capture how migration or social changes affect core citizen beliefs. Second, probabilistic models of cultural attitudes can be developed that account for the influence of regional context and individual level demographic characteristics. As a result, this study will provide insight into how place shapes political cultural attitudes.

### The Place of State Subcultures

Admittedly, political culture is not easy to define. We define culture here as societal beliefs about the purpose of government, the proper boundaries of competition for office and public resources, and expectations about the civic duties of citizens. These beliefs should vary geographically because of several factors. Federalism, through legal boundaries and guarantees of constitutional autonomy, has provided the conditions necessary for cultural development. Migration patterns and economic development have proceeded along regional lines. Many states have identifiable regional divisions; residents of just about any state can often easily identify at least one or two geographic divisions, such as “upstate”, “downstate”, “coastal” and “plains” or “piedmont”.

In turn, these factors have led to the creation of different communities and expectations about social norms, the proper role of government and even different dialects. American sub-cultures are constrained by the existence of a powerful set of national cultural attitudes, including individualism, egalitarianism, and a belief in limited government (Hartz 1955; Huntington 1981; but see Smith 1997). Yet, regional

differences are robust and may explain a variety of political phenomena, including the degree of political competition and the ideological distance between state parties (Gimpel and Schuknetch 2003; Morrill, Knopp, and Brown 2007).

The question is whether these regional differences represent cultural differences. Scholars have developed numerous cultural typologies to explain cross-sectional differences in state politics and policies (Patterson 1968; Sharkansky 1969; Lieske 1993). Daniel Elazar's (1984) trichotomy of political cultures (moralist, individualist, and traditionalist), however, remains the single most cited and perhaps compelling scheme of inter and intra-state divisions. Researchers continue to show it is a robust predictor of policies and political attitudes, even if they differ about the underlying causes of cultural differences (Cook, Jelen and Wilcox 1993; Grogan 1994). Considerable research has confirmed that the scale at least correlates with other state characteristics above and beyond socio-demographic or attitudinal differences. Erikson, Wright and McIver (1987), despite their emphasis on the importance of public opinion in explaining election and policy outcomes, find that state culture powerfully affect both citizen ideology and state policy outcomes.

As political science has become methodologically advanced, scholars have called into the question the validity of Elazar's scheme or have sought to replace it with one more empirically grounded (Wirt 1991). One of the criticisms of Elazar has been that the divisions are largely impressionistic and ignored tensions within the American ethos. Hero and Tolbert (1996), for example, point out Elazar devotes little attention to the cultural influences of non-European groups and find that the cultural differences are rooted in the degree of a state's racial and ethnic diversity. On the other hand, Putnam

(2000) notes that his index of social capital correlates strongly with Elazar's categories. Lieske's (1993; 2010) extensive empirical analysis of contemporary county-level demographic and religious variables largely confirms that Elazar's basic mapping of sub-cultural divisions is still valid.

In terms of explaining cultural attitudes, however, most studies focus on the culture of a region and not the attitudes of individuals. Culture is treated as either exogenous or is something that is so ancient in origin that the causal process, or differences within regions, is given little consideration and is not thought to vary at the individual level within regions. Cultural identities develop at a glacial pace and so researchers have generally treated them as a geologist might look for evidence of a centuries old volcanic eruption, something we can only infer from fossilized clues.

Yet, as Gimpel and Shuknecht (2003) point out, regional differences in voting patterns are meaningful and dynamic. They note that there are often two major views on sectional political patterns: the compositional view vs. the contextual view. The compositional view is that regional differences (especially in voting patterns) are a function of the different groupings of ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic groups in a given geographical area. Region is a proxy for the sum of a region's religious, ethnic, racial, and economic characteristics. Regional differences are observed, but really just represent the composition of the population living in artificial political units.

Cultural identities, if they exist at all, are largely the product of different groupings of salient sociological characteristics. Existing typologies of regional cultures tend to embrace the compositional explanation. The root of regional subcultures are

generally found in migratory streams. These streams often are thought to have shaped political and social attitudes decades before Elazar (1984) and Lieske (1993; 2010).

Alternatively, the contextual perspective argues that regional differences cannot be reduced to sum of their parts. The contextual view understands that regional differences are *at least in part* driven by underlying cultural differences. Numerous studies in political science have confirmed the existence of what are sometimes referred to as “state effects”; that is, when a range of control variables are taken into account, the state one lives in still appears to exert an influence on an individuals’ political beliefs and behavior. Contextual effects have also been identified by many researchers in the growing field of political geography. As Newman (1999) points out, “space and politics are interdependent factors” and political boundaries, although perhaps historically arbitrary in their origins, nevertheless constrain and shape political beliefs and behavior.

A contextual interpretation is consistent with theories of political socialization. Interpersonal communication, for example, has been shown to affect individual attitudes quite powerfully (Burbank 1997; Mutz 2006). As Erikson, Wright and McIver (1987) point out, socialization plays an important role in the development of individual political identities. They write:

Studies of the contextual effects of the small geographical units like neighborhoods have given special attention to the hypothesis that people’s attitudes are influenced by the aggregated attitudes of those around them. Rationales include the possibilities that people respond to social norms or are influenced by social interactions (1987: 807).

### Measuring Culture through Surveys

Conceptualizations of political culture generally do not incorporate a dynamic element.

In states and regions where in or out migration is high, it is plausible that change in a

region's political culture will occur more rapidly (Gimpel and Schuknetch 2003). For example, immigration of Northerners to the South and Sunbelt in the post-War period resulted in a much more economically diverse and Republican South (Philips 1969; Abramowitz 1994). Hispanic migration has transformed the political culture of many Southern states (Hero and Tolbert 1996). Similarly out-migration is also important, as people self-select to move to particular areas, attracted by higher paying jobs, cheap land, and lower taxes and lifestyle options, leaving behind others who have different values, religious identities, education levels and economic resources (Bishop 2008). Changes in the composition of geographic area can cause changes in the lines of political conflict, the expectations of what constitutes good government, and the partisan or ideological outlook of an area.

It is also plausible that this process occurs at the individual level and not just in the aggregate. Once a person leaves their native environment, they will be subjected to alternate socialization forces. This may override or reshape (at least in some instances) individual cultural values. For example, recent research has revealed how specific geographic factors affect political and social attitudes. The population density of an area, the spatial design of communities, access to transportation and a range of other factors have been correlated with citizen attitudes (Bickford 2000). The degree of interaction with neighbors and the likelihood of developing heterogeneous racial and economic social networks seem to be affected by spatial designs. Williamson (2008), for example, found that newer housing stocks which use cul-de-sacs and lack sidewalks discourage social interaction and increase social conservatism.

Many studies, however, have not fully examined cultural beliefs at the individual level. Culture is assumed to be geographic in nature and so most studies use compositional (demographic) data to make inferences about the culture of a region. As a result, the relative influence of demographic factors versus contextual (geographic) factors is unknown, or whether cultural beliefs vary at the individual level.

Developing individual level measures of political culture have remained elusive. One reason is that culture is conceptually too difficult to transform into broadly understandable survey questions. Nardulli (1990) asked respondents survey questions meant to tap into each of the three primary subcultures. The responses, he found, did not line up in any consistent pattern. His survey, of citizens in Illinois, asked respondents to agree or disagree with statements along four dimensions: the role of the government in the political order, the role of citizens in the political order, the role of parties, principles and elites in the political process, and about the place of bureaucracies with the political order. He argues that in reality the Elazar-Shankansky scheme really measures U.S. sectionalism, as when sections were controlled for, the correlations with specific hypotheses in the Sharkansky (1969) largely disappear.

There are, however, reasons why individual measures could capture latent cultural attitudes. Nardulli points out that while the public may lack the sophistication or familiarity with politics to understand the underlying concept of political culture, if too much doubt is placed in individual understanding, then culture cannot be said to exist in any meaningful or conscious way. Putnam (2000) has relied on survey questions to classify states and regions by degrees of civic engagement and surveys are the most

frequent measure of trust, tolerance, and diffuse support for political institutions, concepts which are not easily explained in survey research questions.

#### Using Survey Data to Measure Patterns of Sub-cultural Variation

The analysis will be based on a four wave panel study of Ohio voters during the 2008 election. The study followed 1,500 Ohio voters through interviews in March, July, September, and November. In each wave, we asked citizens about basic political and social values, questions that were meant to tap into institutional support or deeply held beliefs rather than attitudes about candidates or policies. We attempted to use responses from these items to classify citizens according to their cultural dispositions. We also sought to see if the conventional wisdom about Ohio—that it is divided into five distinct regions—is verified by differences in citizen cultural orientations.

Certainly the complexity of the United States means that a single state case study has limitations. On the other hand, focusing on a single state allows us to test theories intra-state culture and to develop measures of intra-state regionalism. Moreover, other researchers have found evidence for generalizable results by focusing on a single state (Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2002).

While many states have a mix of political cultures, Ohio is largely an individualist state in Elazar's analysis. While the Northeast (the "Western Reserve") was founded by New England Yankees, this culture was largely subsumed by immigration to the state during industrialization. In addition, along the state's border with Kentucky, there are pockets of the traditionalist culture.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Lieske (1993) identified several political culture streams in the state. Northeastern Ohio is largely "ethnic", while much of the central part of the state is characterized as "heartland", the southern part of the state has the "border" culture in common with Tennessee and Kentucky, while pockets of "Germanic" and "rurban" cultures are scattered throughout the state.

Numerous political scientists, journalists, and historians have noted the existence of the “Five Ohios” (Knepper 2003; Smith and Davis 2004). These regions are (see Map 1 in Appendix) Northeast, Northwest, Central, Southeast (“Appalachia”), and Southwest. Ohio’s place as the “ground zero” of recent American presidential politics is due in part to the fact that it is regionally complex, with each region possessing a unique collection of big cities, suburbs, rural areas, one or more media markets, and at least one major newspaper. Since Ohio is an almost perfect microcosm of the nation as a whole, studying Ohio provides insight into the changing political and social environment in American politics at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

It is useful to briefly summarize the key differences across regions. Northeast Ohio includes the Cleveland-Akron-Youngstown-Canton metropolitan region (or what marketing materials now call “Cleveland+”). Similar to the megalopolis centered on I-95 on the East Coast, this is the most culturally “blue” region of the state and a vital political center. It is ethnically and racially diverse with a characteristic “rust belt” economy”.

Central Ohio has a single, dominant city. In part due to the presence of Ohio State, the city’s economy that has always been one of the most “white collar” in the state. Columbus and its suburbs have grown rapidly. The region is divided between a cosmopolitan central city and conservative strongholds in the rural areas and exurbs.

The Southwest is anchored by the urban centers of Cincinnati, Dayton, and Springfield. Urban white populations have declined significantly since the 1990s, while the surrounding counties are among the fastest growing in the state. One in three citizens are Evangelical Protestant. The Northwestern region is primarily agricultural and very conservative, but also includes the Toledo metropolitan area which is industrial and

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ethnically diverse. Finally, Appalachia is rural and economically depressed. In many ways, this region is very similar to West Virginia, with an economy based in mining and manufacturing, low population densities and chronically high poverty rates.

These patterns of voting tap into the deeply-held opinions and attitudes of the citizens of each region. Since 1980 Republican presidential candidates have won 41 percent of the vote in the Northeast, 50 percent in the Northwest, 55 percent in the Central region, 48 percent in Appalachia and 56 percent in the Southwest region.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

For the cultural measure of Ohio citizens, we asked survey respondents six questions (see Table 1 below) about the role of government, parties, politics and voting in two question sets. In the first set, we presented questions with options that were meant to correspond to Elazar's typology. Those with moralistic attitudes should express a belief that government should aim to improve society, and that voting is a way to participate in collective decision-making (see Table 1). Those fitting the individualist category should be more likely to want government to focus on efficiency, to be most concerned with economic performance, and believe that voting is about protecting or voicing one's individual interests. Those with traditionalist attitudes should believe that government should maintain order, that politics should be about community values, and voting is necessary to fulfill one's civic duty.

The results indicate that the questions did not differentiate between cultural attitudes as well as expected, but differences are evident.<sup>2</sup> The response distributions indicate that some of the questions were not clear to respondents. Alternatively, it is

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<sup>2</sup> We did ask a question on about attitudes towards political parties. Over seven in ten respondents favored competent leaders over winning elections or standing for issues and so this question was dropped from the final analysis.

possible that the lack of variance indicates that cultures identified by Elazar do not fit with beliefs of Ohioians, or that since this is a single state study, there was not sufficient variance in the population to capture the full range of cultural attitudes, a possibility we discuss in the conclusion.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The second set of questions used a scale to assess whether respondents agreed with certain basic principles (see Table 2). These items were meant to tap into core beliefs of citizens about the “rules of the game” of politics. The first item is perhaps most clearly associated with the moralistic culture; in the other cultures, we expect there to be less enthusiasm for deep moral conflicts in politics. The second item was meant to assess the extent to which citizens believe that politics requires a certain degree of bargaining that will occasionally cross ethical or legal lines. Such a view, we believe, should be strongly rejected in the moralistic culture, but in the traditionalistic culture, greater levels of apathy might lead to more ambivalent, neutral responses, while the individualistic culture should be the most tolerant of corruption. Finally, attitudes towards who should participate in politics should differentiate the moralistic from the individualist cultures; we expected the moralistic culture to disapprove of uniformed voting, but a culture which originated the phrase “vote early and vote often”, uniformed voting should be less odious. Since deference to elites characterizes the traditionalist culture, there should be less concern about uniformed voting in this cultural type.

The agree-disagree items—corruption, uninformed voters, and principles in politics—all generated distributions that indicated broad agreement with a single response option per question (see Table 2). Once again, the patterns are open to different

interpretations. While it is likely measurement error is the cause of the some of the lopsidedness, it is also quite plausible the items capture political consensus at systemic level about how the political system should operate and what the role of the citizen is.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Since we were looking to verify whether Elazar’s cultures exist in Ohio, it made sense to reduce the response patterns to fit Elazar’s categories. To do this, we created a composite measure to sum the individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic items in the first set of government, politics, and voting items. This resulted in a scale in which zero means no agreement with any of the sub-cultural responses and three means agreement with all three items in a particular culture (see Table 3). The results indicate that individuals, assuming we have captured Elazar’s scheme, accept at least parts of all three cultures, leading to the conclusion that we get very few “pure” or even “semi-pure” individualistic, moralistic, or traditionalistic respondents.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

We attempted to scale the survey items, but a factor analysis of the six items did not produce interpretable patterns. The factor analysis did produce a three factor solution—but the results failed to produce clear correlation patterns between the factors to identify pure versions of Elazar’s cultures.

An alternative approach is to treat the concepts separately. We created nine dummy variables—one for each of the responses in the three main culture items. Using k-means cluster analysis, a four-cluster solution appears to best fit the data. Elazar, after all, argued that while most regions usually had a dominant culture, at least two streams were

often present in any one region, so it may be the case that the previous models were unsuccessful since they were specified to look for a “pure” version of each culture.<sup>3</sup>

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

The resulting clusters are not as sharply defined, but are more intuitive. The first cluster is highly individualistic, but also includes respondents who selected public interest as their reason for voting. This is close to Elazar’s “individualist-moralistic” culture. We call this a “public interest individualistic” culture. Cluster 2 combined government pursuit of economic growth policies with maintaining order and voting civic duty. We label it an “individualistic-traditionalistic”, or “civic duty individualistic” culture. Cluster 3 is the most clearly moralistic, albeit lacking those who believed government should pursue social justice. Community values, however, ranks the highest in this cluster, although it does not load very high on any of the clusters. Cluster 4 is a combination of all three cultures: efficient government, social justice politics, and civic duty. We refer to this as the “Progressive” culture (as in the Progressive era, with its cult of efficiency, call to duty, and sense of justice). The resulting pattern makes some sense: Elazar thought Ohio was Individualistic, but with moralistic and traditionalistic variations by region.

#### The Causes of Cultural Identities

We next estimate a multinomial logit model to model the causes of the cultural identities since the categories are nominal and do not fall along any particular ordering (Long 1997). We are mainly evaluating the role of place on cultural attitudes, and so we estimated a model controlling for education, income, partisanship, ideology, gender, race

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<sup>3</sup> In the following specification, we exclude the response for self-interested voting since it never fit with any of the clusters.

and age.<sup>4</sup> The variables have all been shown to be related to political and social views and should affect individual cultural orientations. Controlling for these factors should provide a strong test for the research hypothesis that place type affects cultural beliefs.

We also controlled for whether a person was born in Ohio. This variable should control for some degree of cultural origin in that those who are raised in Ohio may have systematically different cultural orientations than those who were not. Sixty-one percent of the sample had lived their whole life in Ohio and 39 percent were not. Of those who lived in Ohio, the dominant cultural type was the Public Interest culture (48 percent) but a similar proportion of those not born in the state also were classified in this category (50 percent). The second most common type was the Civic Duty culture (20 percent), while the Moralistic culture was second (24 percent) for those who were not born in Ohio

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

The results are mixed in terms of the research claims. First cultural types are structured by individual characteristics. This stands in contrast to the conventional understanding that culture is primarily regional and not variable by individual characteristics. The patterns vary across cultural types compared to the baseline category, but consistently across categories, particular traits are systematically related to individual cultural orientations. For example, while the plurality of Ohioans identify with the Public Interest culture, age was negatively related to the other categories, so younger individuals were more likely to be classified as something other than the Public Interest culture. The same was true for Republicans compared to Democrats. Highly educated individuals

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<sup>4</sup> Ideology was measured on a five-point scale with “very conservative” = 5; Party ID was measured on a seven-point scale (“Strong Republican = 7); education was measured in six categories with post-grad = 6; age was measured in years; income was measured on a five-point scale (“over \$72,000” = 5); female, white and born in Ohio were all dichotomous dummy variables.

were less likely to be in the Community Moralistic category but more likely to be in the Progressive category. Those born in Ohio are less likely to be in the Community Moralistic culture.

#### FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The most important finding from the model is that regional differences, to some extent, survive the controls for composition. That is a clear pattern emerges as one moves from the northeastern part of the state to the southwest. The Public Interest culture is prominent in Northeastern Ohio, which Elazar identified as individualistic and also the area that Lieske finds to be the most “ethnic”. The culture is also evident in Appalachia, which Elazar also categorized as individualistic, but citizens in other areas are less likely to have this cultural set of beliefs. The Civic Duty and Moralistic clusters demonstrate the opposite pattern (although the citizens in the Northeast are almost as likely to be classified in this culture as in the Southwest). The higher probability for citizens to be classified in the Civic Duty and Moralistic cultures in the Southwest is somewhat consistent with Elazar’s categorization as he found more evidence of a traditionalist culture there. Controlling for other factors, relatively few citizens were classified in the Progressive cluster. In general, then, we find a regional pattern in which the Northeast and Southwest are at polar ends of Ohio’s cultural map. This is consistent with observations of voting patterns as well as demographic and economic characteristics; the north is more industrial, the central and southeast are more rural, and the Southwest has a southern cultural influence.

#### Conclusions

We have attempted to measure political culture at the individual level and to explain the causes of these orientations using a measure of place size. Our limited success is similar to Nardulli's (1990) findings that Elazar's cultural scheme did not translate into identifiable differences at the individual level.

On the other hand, we did find evidence that there are identifiable cultural patterns and that region is related to cultural beliefs. Moreover, we found evidence that identification or acceptance of the norms of a culture are conditional and depend on a person's political and social makeup. Thus, measuring cultural beliefs at the individual level leads to the identification of detectable and meaningful differences.

This analysis raises several questions. The first is whether the fault is on our end. That is, did we measure political culture well? Clearly, some degree of measurement error is a part of measuring something as conceptual as political culture. Another possibility is that we need to revisit our regional breakdown. While scholars and observers of Ohio politics have an intuitive sense that there are five Ohio's, the exact breakdown of counties (and the definition of the regions) has never been clearly defined in a precise way that has been accepted as definitive. Perhaps using the clusters as a guide, we might discover that we have put some of the borderline counties in the wrong region—or maybe we need six or seven regions.

Alternatively, perhaps we have simply confirmed Nardulli's finding that Elazar's scheme does not accurately describe citizen attitudes at the individual level. The fact that very few people agreed with all three elements of culture is interesting, with the voting question being the most problematic. Perhaps Elazar was wrong—or has become wrong—with regard to views of voting and their association with political culture. Such a

conclusion is consistent with one of our basic arguments—political culture should be considered a dynamic rather than static concept. It may be more useful to try other conceptual measures, such as combining survey responses with demographic data (as in Liekse’s more variable approach).

This research provides some conclusions about how to measure cultural attitudes. In our study, we were able to compare attitudes against a conventional understanding of intra-state regional differences. Almost all states have regional differences and these should be taken into account when developing or analyzing measures of cultural attitudes. Other more objective geographic measures (such as how rural or urban an area is) can be used as well, such as those often available through the Census or state agencies.

Questions about culture should focus on core beliefs and avoid specific political issues or candidates. Our measures are far from complete. Additional survey questions might include measures about trust, tolerance, and efficacy, beliefs about political campaigns or even questions about the fairness of economic and political systems. General measures should provide access to deeply held values.

Our general conclusion is there are distinct intra-state cultures and that survey research can identify these among individuals. Survey-based measures may become more valuable if demographic indicators become less useful over time, as ethnic patterns are subsumed by social and technological changes that are result in cleavages based more on factors such as income or education (Bishop 2008). A survey-based measure would greatly improve upon Elazar’s highly influential analysis by adding a measurement tool that allows researchers to capture the dynamics of American political and social life.

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**Table 1: Political Culture Survey Questions**

Survey Question	Moralist		Individualist		Traditionalist		Total
	Response	Pct	Response	Pct	Response	Pct	
<b>“Government should focus on”</b>	Reforming society	20.5	Providing goods and services efficiently	51.6	Maintaining order	28.0	100
<b>“Politics should be primarily be about...”</b>	Social Justice	20.5	Economic Growth	60.0	Community values	19.5	100
<b>“People should vote to...”</b>	Decide what is best for everyone	52.9	Get what they want from the government	13.2	Because it is their civic duty	33.9	100

N = 1,484

Data are weighted.

**Table 2: Attitudes towards Political System**

<b>Statement</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>No Opinion</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>“Moral principles are necessary in politics.”</b>	35.0	44.4	10.3	8.5	1.9	100
<b>“Some corruption in government is normal.”</b>	4.4	18.2	7.8	38.9	30.7	100
<b>“Uninformed people should not bother to vote.”</b>	12.2	28.5	8.7	38.9	11.7	100

Data are weighted  
N = 1,495

**Table 3: Sub-Cultural Classification**

<b>Sub-Culture</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Moralistic</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>44.7</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Individualistic</b>	<b>20.9</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>32.7</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Traditionalist</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>42.7</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Note: Scale represents agreement with responses for each culture in the three questions measuring cultural attitudes (see Tables 1 and 2).

N = 1,496

**Table 4: Factor Analysis**

<b>Cultural Indicator</b>	<b>Dimension 1</b>	<b>Dimension 2</b>	<b>Dimension 3</b>
Moralistic	.092	<b>-.972</b>	-.087
Individualistic	<b>.779</b>	<b>.583</b>	.067
Traditionalistic	-.909	<b>.369</b>	-.001
Moral Principles	.092	.040	-.139
Acceptance of corruption	-.006	.030	<b>.510</b>
Uninformed Voting	.031	.030	<b>.081</b>
Percent Variance Explained	25.7	24.4	17.8
Eigenvalue	1.54	1.46	1.07

**Note:** These entries are rotated factor correlations from a maximum likelihood factor analysis with varimax rotation.

**Table 5: Cluster Results and Sub-Cultural Responses**

	<b>Cluster 1 (Public Interest Individualist)</b>	<b>Cluster 2 (Civic Duty Individualist)</b>	<b>Cluster 3 (Moralist)</b>	<b>Cluster 4 (Progressive)</b>
<b>Elazar Sub-Cultural Type</b>	<i><b>Individualist- Moralist</b></i>	<i><b>Individualist- Traditionalist</b></i>	<i><b>Moralist</b></i>	<i><b>Mixed</b></i>
Efficient Government	<b>0.853</b>	0.000	0.000	<b>0.745</b>
Economic Growth	<b>0.792</b>	<b>0.668</b>	0.346	0.000
Reform Society	0.000	0.094	<b>0.732</b>	0.203
Social Justice	0.102	0.156	0.246	<b>0.559</b>
Vote Public Interest	<b>0.678</b>	0.000	<b>0.889</b>	0.000
Maintain Order	0.133	<b>0.883</b>	0.244	0.000
Community Values	0.094	0.156	<i>0.346</i>	<i>0.331</i>
Vote Civic Duty	0.221	<b>0.757</b>	0.000	<b>0.790</b>
N	730	264	326	179

Results from K-means cluster analysis. Cell entries are means for each cluster for each of the eight dummy variables (where '1' indicates agreements or belief in the response, '0' indicates respondent did not select the response).

**Table 6: Multinomial Logit Model of Individual Cultural Types**


Variables	<u>Civic Duty</u>			<u>Moralist</u>			<u>Progressive</u>		
	Coeff	S.E.	Min-Max	Coeff	S.E.	Min-Max	Coeff	S.E.	Min-Max
Female	-.402*	.188	-.059	.112	.185	.026	.129	.221	.018
Education	-.026	.098	.006	-.262**	.093	-.236	.245*	.106	.144
White	-.304	.343	-.016	-.706**	.287	-.116	.230	.357	.030
Income	-.010	.070	.024	-.186*	.083	-.106	.097	.088	-.022
Party	.224***	.058	.158	.081	.052	.017	.104	.061	.026
Ideology	.252*	.107	.128	.110	.96	.053	-.181	.126	-.104
Age	-.018**	.006	-.104	-.021***	.006	-.171	-.018**	.008	-.074
Born in Ohio	.224	.196	.037	-.304*	.187	-.055	.076	.216	.010
Northwest	-.242	.288	-.042	.221	.277	.034	.333	.331	-.027
Central	.182	.286	-.000	.488	.277	.063	.436	.302	.031
Appalachia	.249	.289	.014	.522	.280	.076	.102	.348	-.006
Southwest	.629**	.266	.059	.703**	.272	.089	.246	.334	-.005
Constant	-1.55	.717		1.46	.627		-1.46	.745	
N	1,345								
Nagelkerke R2	.12								

Note: Baseline category is Public Interest Individualism.

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

Note: Ideology was measured on a five-point scale with “very conservative”= 5; Party ID was measured on a seven-point scale (“Strong Republican = 7); education was measured in six categories with post-grad =6; age was measured in years; income was measured on a five-point scale (“over \$72,000” =5); female, white and born in Ohio were all dichotomous dummy variables.

**Figure 1: Regional Effects on Cultural Type**



Note: Bars represent probability of being classified in a cultural cluster for each region, with all other variables set to their means.