This book was also published as Volume 35 no. 4 of the journal *Apeiron*, and is a compilation of revised papers from the University of Cincinnati's 1996 conference on the topic of the title. It includes contributions from seven ancient and three modern scholars, and an index locorum.

The central theme of this book is the relationship between the ancient view of *eudaimonia* and the modern view of happiness. *Eudaimonia* is almost universally translated as 'happiness', even as the translators admit the ill fit. Yet they maintain the practice for ease of translation. In his introduction Jost cites Vlastos' justification: 'Well-being has no adjectival or adverbial forms', and well-being is 'a stiff, bookish phrase' (xxii). This makes it difficult to find a better English word for an accurate clause-by-clause translation, one that will capture the sentence structure as well as the sense of the Greek. But if we must choose surely it is more important, at least for philosophers, to have a translation that accurately captures the meaning of a term rather than its grammatical flexibility.

In 'Happiness Now and Then', L.W. Sumner argues that we should interpret *eudaimonia* in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* to mean well-being, not happiness. He is not arguing that *eudaimonia* be translated as 'well-being', recognizing the above-mentioned difficulties, but that it is the best way to understand Aristotle's ethical project (37, n21). Sumner means by well-being 'the prudential value of a life, namely how well it is going for the individual whose life it is' (37). Sumner stresses the subjectivity of this concept, and argues that an adequate theory must retain this subjectivity to capture our ordinary concept of well-being.

So what is wrong with reading *eudaimonia* as happiness? Sumner says that even on the more plausible interpretation of Aristotle as holding that virtue — *areté* — is necessary though not sufficient for *eudaimonia* (external goods also being necessary), Aristotle's position is overly optimistic because 'the vicious are therefore precluded by their very constitution from being happy' (23). Unfortunately this consequence is false, as vicious happy people do exist. What we today mean by happiness is some sort of psychological state, which makes it subjective. But Aristotle's identification of *eudaimonia* with *areté* makes it thoroughly objective: 'whether or not you are leading a virtuous life is determined by certain features of your life ... and not by any positive assessment you might make of it' (25). *Eudaimonia* cannot, therefore, be what we mean by happiness.
Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* is the most prominent and influential form of an objective theory, excluding 'all reference to the subject's attitudes or concerns' (38). Being objective, Sumner believes it fails as an adequate theory of human well-being. But interpreting *eudaimonia* as well-being yields a theory that needs a lengthy philosophical argument to disprove, which Sumner says is preferable to interpreting it as happiness which makes the theory 'seem silly or absurd from the outset' (39).

Julia Annas' paper 'Should Virtue Make You Happy?' argues that examination of ancient eudaimonistic theories can enlarge and develop our modern understanding of happiness, and may not be as unavailable to us as some suppose (19). She notes Sumner's view that the modern understanding of happiness is subjective, and since ancient theories are objective they cannot be theories of what we understand as happiness. So it is 'the subjectivity of modern theories of happiness as desire-satisfaction that is the key to deep differences between ancient and modern' (16). We moderns locate happiness in the desiring part of ourselves, whereas the ancients located it in our reasoning part. But Annas offers an example to challenge this sharp distinction. A class of students was asked what would make them happy, and they named money, a big house, cars, lots of money, etc. Would they now be happy? Most students said, No, because it is not the mere possession of these goods that they valued, but rather having them as a result of having made the money themselves, and having lived a certain kind of life (18). So the mere satisfaction of desires is not sufficient to understand the modern view of happiness. More objective elements are involved as well, which our reflection can uncover. Annas does not claim that modern views of happiness have any obvious relation to virtue, the central notion in ancient theories. She merely suggests that eudaimonistic theories 'might appeal to aspects of our notion of happiness which have been overlooked in the general emphasis on the desire-satisfaction model' (19).

In 'Happiness and Death in Epicurean Ethics' Phillip Mitsis addresses the Epicurean view that 'death is nothing to us,' especially stressing that death does not detract from one's *eudaimonia*. He defends the counter-intuitive view that the life of a murdered child is no less happy than the life of an old person who has always fared well, because the child's premature death had disvalue only for those left behind, not for her, since she no longer exists as a subject of value/disvalue. Glenn Lesses defends Epicurus in a different way in 'Happiness, Completeness, and Indifference to Death in Epicurean Ethical Theory'. Examining Epicurus' distinction between kinetic and static pleasures, he argues that while a longer duration of kinetic pleasures may be more valuable, a longer duration of static pleasures may not — duration may not matter once you reach that state, so that your death would not be a harm to you.

In other papers, Stephen White addresses the development of Aristotelian eudaimonism from Theophrastus to Antiochus of Ascalon, with a critique from Brad Inwood. David Hahn traces the development of a subjectivist
ethical theory in Polybius that was heavily influenced by Academic skepticism, with a critique from Jost suggesting that Stoic influence was more likely. Thomas Hurka and David Sobel debate the interpretation and validity of the 'Sen-Nussbaum capability theory' (140), a contemporary objectivist theory stressing the equal capability of people to choose what they value, where they are truly free to choose and not constrained by lack of access to education, etc.

This book will interest mainly specialists in ancient eudaimonist theories, but will also enlighten contemporary philosophers on ancient themes that may prove helpful in formulating a satisfactory theory of happiness.

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